Book Department

• DOI: 10.1177/000271628145400117
• Published date: 01 March 1981
• Date: 01 March 1981
• Subject Matter: Articles

207

Book

Department

INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

JOHN

BURTON.

Deviance,

Terrorism

and

War:

The

Process

of Solving

Unsolved

Social

and

Political

Problems.

Pp.

xv,

240.

New

York:

St.

Martin’s

Press,

1979.

$22.50.

No,

this

is

not

another

volume

in

the

seemingly

endless

series

of

books

on

terrorism.

In

fact,

in

Deviance,

Ter-

rorism

and

War:

The

Process

of

Solving

Unsolved

Social

and

Political

Problems,

John

Burton

neither

discusses

in

detail

nor

emphasizes

any

of

the

three

&dquo;prob-

lems&dquo;

mentioned

in

the

title.

Rather,

this

distinguished

British

scholar

examines

the

underlying

&dquo;power&dquo;

theory

of

poli-

tics

that

guides

research

and

policy

in

the

problem-solving

sector

of public

and

world

affairs.

In

much

the

same

way

as

he

has

done

in

the

areas

of

communications

theory

and

conflict

resolution,

Burton

indicates

the

serious

limitations

placed

on

re-

search

and

policy

by

the

dominance

of

a

single

theoretical

perspective

as

a

frame

of

reference

for

viewing

social

affairs.

After

illustrating

the

inability

of

such

single-factor

explanation

to

serve

as

a

springboard

for

effective

social

policy,

Burton

develops

an

alternative,

yet

complementary,

&dquo;paradigm&dquo;

for

guid-

ing

research

and

political

decision

making.

In

part

one

of

the

book,

Burton

de-

composes

the

problem-solving

enter-

prise

and

pays

particular

attention

to

the

contribution

which

existing

theories,

complete

with

their

inherent

assump-

tions,

make

to

the

problem-solving

proc-

ess.

Part

two,

the

bulk

of

the

book

is

a

detailed

investigation

of

a

number

of

the

underlying

assumptions

of

the

&dquo;power&dquo;

theory

of

politics.

Devoting

a

chapter

to

each

set

of assumptions,

Burton

analyzes

our

current

conception

of

the

social

sys-

tem

and

its

legitimacy,

control

mecha-

nisms,

and

dispute-settling

techniques.

Of

central

importance

to

Burton’s

claim

about

the

inadequacy

of

the

&dquo;power&dquo;

paradigm

and

his

argument

for

the

in-

corporation

of

a

&dquo;needs&dquo;

or

&dquo;relation-

ship&dquo;

paradigm

into

our

thinking

about

problem

solving,

are

his

chapters

on

the

role

defense

of

decision

makers

and

on

the

conflict

between

human

needs

and

institutional

values.

By

the

beginning

of part

three,

Burton’s

case

is

firmly

established:

the

course

of

human

events

in

the

late

seventies

de-

mands

that

researchers

and

policymakers

direct

their

attention

to

variables

not

in-

cluded

in

either

the

assumptions

of

or

the

propositions

deduced

from

the

power

theory.

We

need

to

develop

&dquo;a

different

208

theory

of

behavior,

one

that

does

not

deny

the

realities

of

power,

but

one

which

encompasses

elements

that

limit

the

effectiveness

of

power.&dquo;

Burton’s

alternative

thesis,

logically

sketched

in

10

propositions,

is

the

&dquo;re-

lationship

theory.&dquo;

Its

focus

is

on

human

needs

and

the

relationships

and

&dquo;prob-

lems&dquo;

which

the

drive

for

needs

satis-

faction

prompts.

Such

&dquo;problems&dquo;

can

be

effectively

dealt

with-in

ways

that

the

power

paradigm

could

not

envision

-through

a

problem-solving

process

grounded

on

the

assumption

that

both

individual

and

institutional

needs

can

be

satisfied.

Adaptation

by

elites

and

bureaucracies

is

essential,

as

is

the

place

of

values

as

a

legitimizer

and

con-

trol

mechanism.

Although

the

reader

leaves

the

book

with

a

clear

understanding

of

the

power

paradigm

and

its

inadequacies

and

with

a

sense

of

urgency

for

educating

leaders

and

citizens

in

this

new

and

useful

&dquo;re-

lationship&dquo;

perspective,

some

readers

may

also

expect

a

fuller

explication

of

the

alternative

theory

than

is

provided.

Despite

this

minor

shortcoming,

Burton’s

study

is

a

welcome

addition

to

the

liter-

ature

on

both

decision

making

and

the

role

of

theory

in

world

affairs.

GEORGE

A.

LOPEZ

Earlham

College

Richmond

Indiana

RICHARD

C.

CLARK.

Technological

Ter-

rorism.

Pp.

xviii,

221.

Old

Greenwich,

CT:

Devin-Adair,

1980.

$10.00.

ERNEST

EVANS.

Calling

a

Truce

to

Terror:

The

American

Response

to

International

Terrorism.

Pp.

xvi,

181.

Westport,

Ct:

Greenwood

Press,

CT:

Greenwood

Press,

1979.

$19.95.

Although

these

two

books

are

both

about

terrorism,

they

differ

in

several

ways.

Clark’s

book

is

an

effort

to

sound

an

alarm.

Shrill

in

tone,

it

warns

that

the

United

States

is

exceedingly

vulnerable

to

terrorist

acts

that

could

threaten

or

cause

mass

destruction,

utilizing

the

very

technology

on

which

complex

in-

dustrialized

societies

depend.

Roughly

half

of

the

book

is

devoted

to

discussion

of

the

possibility

of

terrorists

gaining

control

of

nuclear

weapons

or

nuclear

materials

from

which

weapons

could

easily-according

to

Clark-be

fabri-

cated.

Clark

also

discusses

the

possi-

bility

of

terrorists

utilizing

chemical

and

biological

agents,

sabotaging

the

operation

of

vital

computers,

and

inter-

fering

with

the

transport

of

liquified

natural

gas,

for

instance,

by

destroying

a

pipeline

or

blowing

up

a

tanker

in

a

harbor

in

a

heavily

populated

metro-

politan

area.

Clark

asserts

that

the

issue

is

&dquo;survival,&dquo;

and

affirms

that

the

only

possible

solution

is

for

the

United

States

to

adopt

&dquo;crisis

government.&dquo;

Although

the

book

is

replete

with

quotations,

there

is

not

a

single

citation

note.

Evans’s

book,

in

contrast,

has

all

of the

scholarly

apparatus,

notes,

a

biblio-

graphic

essay

and

a

regular

bibliography,

and

appendices

that

contain

summaries

of

terrorist

incidents

and

important

U.N.

documents.

The

study

is

about

interna-

tional

terrorism,

strictly

defined,

and

U.S.

attempts

to

deter

such

acts.

The

analysis

concentrates

on

the

period

be-

tween

the

fall

of

1969

and

the

fall

of

1978.

The

argument

of

the

book

is

that

U.S.

&dquo;efforts

to

deter

acts

of

international

terrorism

have

been

largely

unsuccess-

ful

because

they

have

been

based

on

the

assumption

that

terrorism

is

not

a

politi-

cal

phenomenon.&dquo;

Evans

suggests

that

U.S.

policy

should

be

&dquo;repoliticized.&dquo;

He

argues

that

the

United

States

&dquo;should

not

rule

out

in

advance

making

any

con-

cessions

to

terrorists

holding

Americans

hostage.&dquo;

He

maintains

that

concessions

can

mimimize

terrorists’

gaining

what

they

sometimes

desire

most,

publicity.

After

analyzing

the

difficulty

of

attempt-

ing

to

deter

&dquo;single-phase&dquo;

terrorism

through

preparing

a

multilateral

con-

vention

in

the

United

Nations,

Evans

suggests

that

the

United

States

should

give

support

to

regional

action

in

the

Americas

and

Western

Europe.

He

ar-

gues

that

it

would

be

a

powerful

deter-

rent

if

the

leading

Western

states

agreed

to

enforce

sanctions

against

states

that

supported

terrorism.

Both

books

are

flawed.

While

Techno-

209

logical

Terrorism

verges

on

being

a

polemic,

Calling

a

Truce

to

Terror

ver-

ges

on

being

pedantic.

Technological

Terrorism

contains

nu-

merous

unsubstantiated

assertions.

The

following

sentence

from

the

chapter

dealing

with

chemical,

biological,

and

other

instruments

of

mass

destruction

is

an

example:

&dquo;The

USSR

is

also

re-

portedly

training

a

minimum

of

1,200

terrorists

annually

at

an

institute

in

Moscow,

and

many

of

these,

it

has

been

established,

are

now

in

the

U.S.&dquo;

Clark

is

firm

in

arguing

the

need

for &dquo;crisis

government&dquo;

to

deal

with

terrorism,

but

he

never

spells

out

what

this

would

mean,

beyond

hinting

that

it

would

in-

volve

a

substantial

reduction

of

civil

liberties.

Evans

attempts

to

substantiate

his

case

for

the

U.S.

adopting

a

less

rigid

posi-

tion

on

negotiating

with

terrorists

about

prisoners

and

ransoms

by

showing

that

Japan

and

the

Federal

Republic

of

Germany,

which

have

been

more

flex-

ible,

have

suffered

fewer

hostage

in-

cidents

than

the

United

States.

Evans,

however,

admits

that

the

United

States

might

be

more

vulnerable.

The

relevant

issue

is

not

the

absolute

number

of

in-

cidents

that

each

country

has

suffered,

but

rather,

the

effects

of

each

country’s

policies

in

the

context

of

its

situation.

Relative

rates

of

increase

or

decrease

in

incidents

would

be

more

persuasive

supporting

data.

In

analyzing

U.S.

policy

seeking

U.N.

action

against

terrorism,

Evans

criticizes

U.S.

officials

for

viewing

terrorism

as

a

humanitarian

issue

rather

than

a

political

issue,

citing

their

speeches

as

evidence

of

their

views.

His

argument

neglects

the

possibility

that

the

officials

believed

that

a

strategy

for

getting

U.N.

action

was

to

convince

a

majority

that

terrorism

was

a

humanitarian

issue,

even

though

these

officials

clearly

under-

stood

that

many

governments

saw

ter-

rorism

in

a

political

context.

Of

the

two

books,

Calling

a

Truce

to

Terror

makes

the

more

important

con-

tribution

to

the

literature

on

terrorism.

There

is

little

new

in

Clark’s

book.

The

problems

with

which

he

deals

have

been

treated

in

more

detail

in

both

scholarly

and

popular

works.

On

the

other

hand,

Evans

book

is

a

pioneering,

careful

analysis

of

U.S.

policy.

It

merits

reading.

HAROLD

K:

JACOBSON

University

of

Michigan

Ann

Arbor

RAY

S.

CLINE.

World

Power

Trends

and

U.S.

Foreign

Policy for

the

1980s.

Pp.

xviii,

228.

Boulder,

CO:

Westview

Press,

1980. $20.00.

Paperbound,

$8.95.

Ray

S.

Cline

is

not

so

much

a

mod-

ern

Alfred

Thayer

Mahan

as

a

reborn

Themistocles

as

he

calls

for

&dquo;a

coherent

foreign

policy

based

on

a

strategy

Ameri-

cans

and

their

friends

can

understand,&dquo;

namely,

&dquo;a

series

of

informal,

bilateral

arrangements

with

nations

interested

in

constituting

a

voluntary

peacetime

’All-

Oceans

Alliance.’

&dquo;

Like

the

architect

of

the

Athenian

maritime

system

within

which

Western

Civilization

was

born,

Cline

would

create

a

similar

strategy

centered

on

the

United

States

in

order

that

this

very

same

civilization

might

continue

not

only

to

survive

but

to

flourish

and

prosper

with

supreme

self-

confidence.

Cline

is

not

the

first

analyst

to

recom-

mend

this

policy,

but

he

is

thus

far

the

only

one

to

argue

for

it

with

the

evidence

of

the

Carter

administration’s

utter

fail-

ure

to

practice

a

coherent

strategy

of

any

kind.

Neither

is

he

dealing

in

vague

abstracts

of

time

and

space,

but

he

is

speaking

directly

to

the

1980s

and

is

grounded

solidly

in

geographic

realities

which

he

calls

&dquo;politectonics&dquo;

(&dquo;meas-

uring

the

strength

of

nations&dquo; -his

own

word),

instead

of

the

historically

out-

dated

and

somewhat

misleading

&dquo;geo-

politics.&dquo;

The

book

is

necessary

reading

for

political

analysts

and

students

not

only

because

it

is

a

fresh

and

cogent

thesis

but

because

it

is

absolutely

correct.

Aside

from

Cline’s

analogy

to

ancient

Athens,

his

evidence

is

not

historical,

but

is

based

on

contemporary

political,

economic,

geographic,

and

military

ana-

lytical

techniques-an

interdisciplinary

methodology

heavily

dependent

on

the

statistics

so

necessary

nowadays

in

de-

cision

making.

Happily,

he

avoids

Penta-

gonese,

except

perhaps

for

the

formula