Book Department
| Date | 01 May 1970 |
| DOI | 10.1177/000271627038900116 |
| Published date | 01 May 1970 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
132
Book
Department
INTERNATIONAL
RELATIONS
ORAN
R.
YOUNG.
The
Politics
of
Force:
Bargaining
during
International
Crises.
Pp.
xii,
438.
Princeton,
N.J.:
Princeton
University
Press,
1969.
$12.50.
This
book
reports
a
theoretically-ori-
ented
study
of
four
postwar
crises
between
the
United
States
on
one
hand
and
the
Soviet
Union
or
China
on
the other:
the
1948-1949
Berlin
Crisis,
the
Taiwan
Straits
Crisis,
the
1961
Berlin
Crisis,
and
the
Cuban
Missile
Crisis.
The
purpose
is
to
develop
and
substantiate
a
set
of
gen-
eralizations
that
apply
to
crises
between
the
great
powers
in
any
international
sys-
tem
similar
to
that
which
now
obtains.
The
description
and
first-level
analysis
of
the
cases
is
interesting
and
stimulating.
The
theoretical
material
has
its
merits,
but
also
its
problems.
In
my
estimation,
the
most
interesting
generalizations
concern
the
strong
incen-
tives
to
avoid
initiating
violence
in
a
nu-
clear
world.
These
incentives
logically
lead
to
an
emphasis
on
the
tactic
of
fait
accompli
in
which
the
opponent
is
put
into
the
position
of
having
to
initiate
violence
in
order
to
avoid
loss.
The
importance
of
this
tactic,
which
was
first
described
by
Schelling,
is
clearly
substantiated
by
the
cases.
Concern
about
the
initiation
of
violence
also
logically
implies
that
states-
men
will
employ
tactics
that
demonstrate
resolve
without
being
overly provocative,
and
without
sacrificing
freedom
of
action.
Again,
such
tactics
are
quite
prominent
in
these
cases.
The
author
also
argues
that
there
is
little
negotiation
in
crises
because
the
positions
taken
by
the
nations
involved
are
highly
rigid,
owing
to
emotion
and
considerations
of
international
prestige.
Instead,
crises
are
likely
to
be
resolved
by
tacit
coordina-
tion
or
occasional
brief
explicit
negotiation
of
simple
local
arrangements.
While
these
interesting
generalizations
find
support
in
his
cases,
one
wonders
whether
they
will
apply
so
well
to
future
crisis.
It
can
be
argued
that
the
United
States
&dquo;won&dquo;
all
of
the
crises
analyzed
in
this
book,
in
the
sense
that
we
were
able
to
sustain
the
status
quo.
Hence,
negotiation
could
only
have
made
things
worse
for
us.
In
future
East-West
crises
where
the
United
States
is
forced
to
make
concessions,
there
may
be
plenty
of
negotiation.
Alternatively,
one
could
argue
that
the
relative
absence
of
negotiation
in
these
crises
was
due
to
the
weak
political
ties
that
already
existed
between
the
nations
rather
than
the
fact
that
they
were
in
a
crisis,
and
that
negotia-
tion
will
be
more
prominent
in
future
East-
133
West
crises
if
political
ties
improve
between
the
antagonists.
While
some
of
the
generalizations
in
this
book
are
challenging,
such
as
those
just
cited,
the
theoretical
work,
as
a
whole,
seems
to
be
at
an
early
stage
of
develop-
ment.
Many
of
the
generalizations
are
vague
and
some
seem
tautological,
for
ex-
ample,
&dquo;Periods
of
crisis
tend
to
be
politi-
cally
fluid
[in
the
sense
that]
crises
take
place
when
the
existing
setting
of
interna-
tional
politics
is
significantly
disturbed.&dquo;
There
is
relatively
little
theoretical
inte-
gration
in
the
sense
of
links
between
the
generalizations.
Furthermore,
the
author
appears
to
misconstrue
the
nature
of
theory
in
that
his
generalizations
do
not
usually
state
a
relationship
between
variables.
In
particular,
he
does
not
explicitly
contrast
crises
with
noncrises,
or
talk
about
levels
of
crisis,
though
this
variable
seems
to
be
implied
throughout
the
book.
This
ap-
pears
to
be
more
than
a
semantic
problem
because
it
seems
to
affect
his
choice
and
handling
of
the
cases.
Never
once
does
he
contrast
his
crises
with
periods
of
non-
crisis,
nor
does
he
ever
compare
his
four
cases
though
he
says
initially
that
he
plans
&dquo;systematic
comparison.&dquo;
Hence,
one
is
left
with
the
uncomfortable
possibility
that
many
of
his
hypotheses
apply
equally
to
big
crises,
small
crises,
and
noncrises,
for
example,
we
might
expect
maximal
use
of
f ait
accompli
tactics
and
minimal
amounts
of
negotiation,
at
all
times,
among
the
great
powers,
in
eras
such
as
the
one
from
which
these
crises
were
drawn.
DEAN
G.
PRUITT
Professor
of
Psychology
State
University
of
New
York
Buffalo
LEIF
KR.
TOBIASSEN.
The
Reluctant
Door:
The
Right
Of
Access
To
The
United
Nations.
Pp.
vi,
413.
Washing-
ton,
D.C.:
Public
Affairs
Press,
1969.
$s.5o.
The
February
8,
1970,
edition
of
The
New
York
Times
carried
among
its
head-
lines
on
the
front
page
the
following:
&dquo;Washington,
D.
C.:
Russian
U.N.
Aide
Arrested
As
Spy.
A
Soviet
employee
of
the
United
Nations
was
arrested
today ...
and
charged
with
espionage....&dquo;
The
uninitiated
might
well
have
proclaimed
on
reading
the
story
&dquo;Why
does
the
United
States
permit
representatives
of
an
’enemy’
on
its
soil?&dquo;
The
initiated
might
well
have
proclaimed
&dquo;How
can
the
United
States
do
this
to
a
U.N.
representative?&dquo;
Both
re-
sponses
are
legitimate,
and
indeed
are
the
very
crux
of
Mr.
Tobiassen’s
The
Reluctant
Door:
The
Right
o f
Access
To
The
United
Nations.
The
flyleaf
of
this
book
states
that
&dquo;under
the
terms
of
a
treaty
of
1947
[ The
United
States
was
officially
born
at
San
Francisco
in
1945]
the
United
States
recog-
nized
the
right
of
unhindered
access
to
meetings
and
conferences
of
the
United
Nations
in
New
York
[headquarters
of
the
U.N]
...
however,
the
United
States
has
through
the
years
repeatedly
restricted
such
access.&dquo;
By
the
time
one
reaches
page
402,
&dquo;the
question
whether
the
United
States
has
fulfilled
its
obligations
under
the
treaty
of
1947&dquo;
is
answered
as
follows:
&dquo;Narrowly
evaluated
there
have
been
in-
stances
of
underfulfillment.
More
broadly
speaking,
it
should be
borne
in
mind
that
since
1946
thousands
and
thousands
of
alien
U.N.
persons
have
gained
unimpeded
access
to
what
is
one
of
the
most
zealously
guarded
countries
in
the
world.
The
grant-
ing
of
access
rights
under
the
1947
Agree-
ment
signified
a
revolutionary
legal
in-
novation ;
it
would
have
been
more
of
a
miracle
than
could
be
reasonably
expected
if
this
revolution
had
been
carried
through
in
immaculate
perfection
during
its
first
years.
Among
the
thousands
and
thousands
for
foreign
U.N.
persons
who
have
been
ad-
mitted
to
the
United
States
under
the
1947
Agreement,
there
have
been hundreds
of
politically
obnoxious
aliens
whose
counter-
parts
would
have
gained
entrance
into
no
other
country
that
exercises
political
control
of
immigration.&dquo;
The
door
then
was
not
as
reluctant
to
entry
as
might
be
imagined,
especially
since
&dquo;it
must
readily
be
con-
ceded
that
not
all
members
of
the
United
Nations
have been
fair
to
the
United
States
in
their
selection
of
citizens
for
service
to
and
within
the
international
organization
... and
that
espionage
and
kindred
illegal
and
impermissible
efforts
have
been
insti-
gated
and
maintained.&dquo;
What
really
gives
this
book
both
depth
134
and
currency
is
what
Professor
Tobiassen
does
on
the
pages
between
the
flyleaf
and
conclusions.
For
these
pages
relate
a
story
that
can
be
read
on
many
levels,
yet
are
bound
firmly
together
by
the
mastery
that
Professor
Tobiassen
has
of
his
subject.
On
one
level,
it
deals
historically
with
&dquo;the
problem
of
access
to
international
head-
quarters
and
conferences.&dquo;
On
another
level,
it
is
a
study
of
the
founding
of
the
U.N.
itself.
On
still
another
level,
it
tells
the
story
of
how
the
headquarters
of
the
U.N.
were
established
in
the
United
States,
and
particularly
its
location
&dquo;in
New
York
City
and
not
in
a
rural
area.&dquo;
On
a
most
interesting
level,
it
weaves
the
1950
Inter-
nal
Security
Act
(McCarran
Act)
and
the
1952
Immigration
and
Nationality
Act
(McCarran-Walter
Immigration
Act)
through
its
purely
domestic
political
setting
into
the
international
labyrinth.
This,
in
turn,
portrays
a
picture
of
the
American
Secretary
of
State
walking
a
tight
rope
sup-
ported
at
one
end
by
&dquo;the
influence
of
the
Attorney-General
and
the
INS&dquo;
(Immigra-
tion
and
Naturalization
Service),
&dquo;the
American
political
climate&dquo;
as
expressed
by
&dquo;congressional
sentiment,&dquo;
and
at
the
other
end,
by
the
various
States
represented
in
the
U.N.
and
&dquo;the
anxiety
on
the
part
of
the
Secretaries-General.&dquo;
To
give
these
levels
more
than
skeletal
or
academic
form,
Professor
Tobiassen
uses
the
case
method
of
documentation,
descriptively
and
illus-
tratively,
so
effectively
that
he
provides
material
enough
to
excite
the
most
realistic
of
&dquo;who-dunnit&dquo;
fans
as
well
as
television
enthusiasts
of
the
Federal
Bureau
of
In-
vestigation
programs.
The
FBI,
inciden-
tally,
is
acknowledged
as
a
source
in
the
Preface.
Leadership
necessitates
responsibility
and
responsibility
creates
risk.
The
responsibil-
ity
of the
United
States
as
a
leader
in
world
affairs
is
to
do
all
it
can
to
free
the
peoples
of
the
world
of
the
fear
and
suspi-
cious
mythology
that
has
engulfed
them,
and
to
stimulate
wisdom
and
understand-
ing
that
alone
can
transform
and
shape
the
future
of
the
world.
To
this
must
be
added
the
fact
that
as
the
host
country
for
the
United
Nations,
we
have,
in
a
way,
dedicated
ourselves
to
the
acceptance
of
that
risk
so
that
in
the
end
such
an
organi-
zation
may
produce
real
stability
in
inter-
national
relations.
What
Professor
Tobias-
sen
has
done,
and
done
well,
is
to
plead,
despite
the
good
record
of
the
United
States,
that
it
&dquo;should
oil
its
door
and
make
it
less
reluctant&dquo;
to
admit
persons
to
the
U.N.
so
that
it
can
operate
freely,
fully,
and
responsibly.
BENJAMIN
MUNN
ZIEGLER
Bertrand
Snell
Professor
of
Political
Science
Amherst
College
Amherst
Massachusetts
STEPHEN
RAUSHENBUSH.
Man’s
Past,
Man’s
Future: A
Humanistic
History
for
Tomorrow.
Pp.
308.
New
York:
Dela-
corte
Press,
1969.
$6.95.
In
this
very
thoughtful
book,
Mr.
Raush-
enbush
analyzes
the
numerous
mistakes
made
by
political
leaders
at
crucial
mo-
ments
in
history
that
led
to
disaster
and
the
subsequent
decline
of
states
and
soci-
eties.
Starting
with
the
Greeks,
the
author
shows
how
the
Peloponnesian
War
could
have
been
avoided,
but
honor,
prestige,
and
commitment
made
order
by
combat
im-
perative.
He
cites
recent
parallel
events,
such
as
the
First
World
War,
the
invasion
of
Cuba,
and
the
cynical
behavior
of
Com-
munist
Russia
and
China,
and
compares
the
inconsistencies,
hypocrisies,
and
difficul-
ties
of
uniting
Greeks,
Europeans,
or
the
nations
of
the
world.
There
were
lessons
to
be
learned
from
Roman
class
conflicts,
slave
revolts,
and
the
role
of
world
police-
man.
After
Roman
military
might
failed,
the
Church,
with
its
noble
creed
of
peace
and
love,
took
over,
but
it
too
mixed
morals,
wealth,
and
politics,
and
succumbed
to
the
temptations
of
secular
power
and
violence.
Raushenbush
dwells
at
consider-
able
length
on
the
Crusades,
and
alludes
to
the
analogous
problem
of
coexisting
with
medieval
Moslems
and
contemporary
Communists.
On
the
Reformation,
the
au-
thor
asserts
that
if
the
councils
had
suc-
ceeded
in
limiting
the
power
of
the
Pope,
and
if
the
Church
had
been
tolerant
and
liberal,
many
wars
and
barbarities
could
have
been
averted.
The
French
Revolution
benefited
the
middle
class
but
neglected
labor,
and
so
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