BERNSTEIN, IRVING. The New Deal Collective Bargaining Policy. Pp. xii, 178. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1950. $3.00
| DOI | 10.1177/000271625127400165 |
| Published date | 01 March 1951 |
| Author | John Newton Thurber |
| Date | 01 March 1951 |
| Subject Matter | Articles |
236
ments
control
trade.
Finally,
in
Part
VI,
the
historical
knowledge
and
the
theoretical
equipment
of
the
book
are
focused
upon
the
major
long-run
problems
of
today:
the
restoration
of
currency
stability,
the
recon-
struction
of
a
workable
multilateral
trading
system,
and
the
economic
development
of
underdeveloped
areas,
with
a
final
chapter
on
the
International
Trade
Organization
and
the
General
Agreement
on
Tariffs
and
Trade.
Despite
the
considerable
coverage,
there
are
important
gaps.
Highly
inadequate
treatment,
for
example,
is
given
to
the
role
of
cartels
and
monopolies
in
international
trade
despite
the
fact
that
the
findings
of
the
Twentieth
Century
Fund
studies
on
this
matter
show
them
almost
to
dominate
modern
international
commerce.
Little
at-
tention
is
likewise
given
to
commercial
treaties,
or
the
status
of
international
in-
vestment,
or
the
merchant
marine,
or
such
new
areas
of
international
commerce
as
air
transport
and
telecommunications.
But
one
is
greedy
when
having
so
much
to
wish
for
more.
In
my
judgment,
Dr.
Ellsworth’s
volume
is
by
far
the
most
teachable
text
in
the
field
of
international
economics.
THEODORE
J.
KREPS
Washington,
D.
C.
BERNSTEIN,
IRVING.
The
New
Deal
Collec-
tive
Bargaining
Policy.
Pp.
xii,
178.
Berkeley
and
Los
Angeles:
University
of
California
Press,
1950.
$3.00.
Dr.
Bernstein
has
produced
a
well
doc-
umented
and
ably
written
monograph
ex-
amining
one
of
the
outstanding
reforms
of
the
New
Deal.
He
portrays
the
evolu-
tion
of
our
national
labor
policy,
federal
support
of
collective
bargaining,
against
the
needs
of
the
nation
in
the
era
of
the
depression.
Presenting
a
study
of
economic
and
political
history
which
reaches
an
al-
most
dramatic
climax,
he
is
inclined
to
agree
that
the
National
Labor
Relations
Act
was
passed
at
the
only
moment
in
his-
tory
when
it
could
have
been
passed;
yet
it
established
a
landmark
among
our
in-
stitutions
which
seems
destined
to
be
of
lasting
significance.
The
fundamental
principles
of
the
collec-
tive
bargaining
policies
of
the
New
Deal
are
identified
as:
1)
the
right
of
employees
to
associate
and
designate
representatives
for
collective
bargaining;
2)
freedom
from
in-
terference
with
these
rights
by
employers;
3)
use
of
secret
ballot
elections
and
ma-
jority
rule
in
determining
employee
repre-
sentation ;
and
4)
responsibility
of
the
employer
to
bargain
with
representatives
designated
by
his
employees.
None
of
these
principles
was
new;
the
author
traces
the
establishment
of
each
of
them
in
American
life
through
a
series
of
key
decisions
and
findings
from
Com-
monwealth
v.
Hunt
(1842)
through
the
Bankruptcy
Act
of
March
3,
1933.
The
book
presents
in
detail
the
story
of
how
these
ideas
were
woven
together
and
given
positive
enforcement
in
New
Deal
legisla-
tion,
chiefly
in
the
1934
Amendment
to
the
Railway
Labor
Act
and
in
the
Wagner
Act,
the
National
Labor
Relations
Act
of
1935.
The
book
is
rich
in
showing
the
germination
of
each
legislative
step,
the
experiences
resulting
as
each
step
was
taken,
the
marshaling
of
forces for
and
against
each
new
proposal,
and
the
argu-
ments
advanced
by
proponents
and
op-
ponents,
as
well
as
the
substantive
features
of
the
various
proposals
and
enactments.
Several
of
the
features
of
the
Wagner
Act
which
were
bitterly
attacked
by
the
busi-
ness
community
in
1935
were
retained
in
the
1947
Taft-Hartley
revision,
the
author
demonstrates.
As
a
result
of
close
examination
of
manuscript
materials,
records
of
hearings
and
debates,
reports
of
agencies,
contem-
porary
newspapers,
memoirs,
and
extensive
interviews
with
the
participants,
Dr. Bern-
stein
indicates
that
Senator
Robert
Wagner
was
indeed
the
key
figure
in
evolving
a
national
labor
relations
policy
based
on
col-
lective
bargaining.
Repeatedly,
through
ex-
amination
of
the
1932
campaign,
the
draft-
ing
and
&dquo;enforcement&dquo;
of
Section
7
(a)
of
the
Recovery
Act,
the
process
of
amending
the
Railway
Labor
Act,
the
career
of
the
Wagner
Bill
of
1934,
the
enactment
of
Pub-
lic
Resolution
No.
44,
and
the
evolution
of
the
Wagner
Act
in
1935,
Dr.
Bernstein
shows
that
Franklin
D.
Roosevelt
was
definitely
not
the
architect
of
what
may
well
be
regarded
as
the
most
significant
legislation
of
the
entire
New
Deal;
not
until
the
Schechter
decision
had
wrecked
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