Bennis v. Michigan: the Supreme Court Clings to Precedent and Denies Innocent Owners a Defense to Forfeiture - Mark E. Beatty

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Publication year: 1997
• Citation: Vol. 48 No. 3

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Bennis v. Michigan: The Supreme Court Clings to Precedent and Denies Innocent Owners a Defense to Forfeiture

In Bennis v. Michigan,¹ the Supreme Court decided the constitutional-ity of a Michigan statute² authorizing the forfeiture of an innocent owner's interest in property under the guise of a statutory nuisance abatement scheme.³

I. Factual Background

After convicting petitioner's husband of gross indecency, the State of Michigan then sued both petitioner and her husband to have their car declared a public nuisance and abated as such, because the crime was committed in a neighborhood known for prostitution.⁴ The Wayne County Circuit Court judge rejected petitioner's argument that her interest in the car should not be forfeited because she did not know that her husband would use the car illegally when she entrusted it to him.⁵

The circuit judge declared the car a public nuisance and ordered its abatement by forfeiture, instead of ordering a sale and division of the proceeds, because of the car's minimal value.⁶

Ignoring the language of the Michigan statute authorizing the forfeiture,⁷ the Michigan Court of Appeals reversed on the grounds that Michigan Supreme Court precedent interpreting the abatement statute prevented the State from abating petitioner's interest in the car unless she knew her husband's intentions when she entrusted the car to him.⁸ The Michigan Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the abatement in its entirety by concluding that the State does not need to prove that the owner knew of or had agreed to allow the illegal use of the entrusted vehicle.⁹

Based upon the United States Supreme Court rulings in Van Oster v. Kansas¹⁰ and Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,¹¹ the Michigan Supreme Court found that the State's failure to provide an innocent-owner defense was "without constitutional consequence."¹² The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.¹³ The Court held that the forfeiture order did not offend the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment or the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment.¹⁴

II. Legal Background

Judicial consideration of an innocent-owner defense has a long history in this country. In 1827, the Supreme Court first considered the constitutionality of a forfeiture proceeding involving an innocent owner in The Palmyra.¹⁵ There, a vessel was used in acts of piracy on the open seas and the Court held that the shipowner's conviction was not necessary to enforce the forfeiture of the vessel.¹⁶ The Court created a fiction that the vessel itself was guilty of the acts and that the forfeiture proceeded against the vessel stating, "[T]he thing here is primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing . . . ."¹⁷

Fifty years later, the Court was confronted with the same issue in Dobbins's Distillery v. United States,¹⁸ in which a leased premises was used as a distillery.¹⁹ Using the same reasoning employed in The Palmyra, the Court concluded that the forfeiture was claimed against the distillery and the real and personal property used in connection with it.²⁰ However, the Court stated it would not consider the guilt of the owner "beyond what necessarily arises from the fact that he leased the property to the distiller, and suffered it to be occupied and used by the lessee as a distillery"²¹

In J.W. Goldsmith, Jr.-Grant Co. v. United States,²² an automobile owned by the Grant Company was used to transport distilled spirits, in violation of the revenue statutes.²³ The Court again employed the fiction that the thing was the offender and held that the forfeiture did not violate the Fifth Amendment.²⁴ Only five years later in 1926, the Court in Van Oster v. Kansas²⁵ considered the constitutionality of a Kansas statute²⁶ that had been used in the forfeiture of an automobile.²⁷ In that case, the car had been used to transport distilled liquor and was declared a common nuisance, and forfeited.²⁸ Adhering to precedent, the Court again held that "[i]t has long been settled that statutory forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment."²⁹ Further, the Court noted that some uses of property are "so undesirable that the owner surrenders his control at his peril."³⁰

Nearly fifty years later in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. ,³¹ the Court ruled that forfeitures are not unconstitutional because of their application to innocent owners of property.³² The Court specifically noted that "confiscation may have the desirable effect of inducing [owners] to exercise greater care in transferring possession of their property."³³ However, the Court quickly pointed out that innocent owners who proved that they had done all that could reasonably be expected to prevent the illegal use of their property would be able to successfully challenge such a forfeiture.³⁴ In his dissenting opinion, Justice Douglas advocated the recognition of a common-law defense that required owners only to prove that they, in fact, were innocent.³⁵

Recently, in Austin v. United...