Assessing the Effectiveness of High‐Profile Targeted Killings in the “War on Terror”

• Published date: 01 February 2017
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/1745-9133.12274
• Date: 01 February 2017
• Author: Jennifer Varriale Carson

RESEARCH ARTICLE

TARGETED KILLINGS IN THE WAR

ON TERROR

Assessing the Effectiveness of High-Profile

Targeted Killings in the “War on Terror”

A Quasi-Experiment

Jennifer Varriale Carson

University of Central Missouri

Research Summary

Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, and the ensuing “war on terrorism,” the

U.S. government has engaged in a series of controversial counterterrorism policies.

Perhaps none is more so than the use of targeted killings aimed at eliminating the

senior leadership of the global jihadist movement. Nevertheless, prior research has yet to

establish that this type of tactic is effective, even among high-profile targets. Employing

a robust methodology, I find that these types of killings primarily yielded negligible

effects.

Policy Implications

Given the immense controversy surrounding the policy of targeted killings, it has become

that much more vital to assess whether such measures are effective. This study’sfindings,

that most of these high-profile killings either had no influence or were associated with

a backlash effect, have important implications for future counterterrorism efforts. All

in all, the U.S. government’s investment in the policy of targeted killings seems to be

counterproductive if its main intention is a decrease in terrorism perpetrated by the

global jihadist movement.

This research was supported by the Office of University Programs Science and Technology Directorate of the

U.S. Department of Homeland Security through the Center for the Study of Terrorism and Behavior (CSTAB

Center Lead) Grant made to the START Consortium (Grant # 2012-ST-61-CS0001). The views and conclusions

contained in this document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily

representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, or

START. Special thanks to Marijana Kotlaja, Allison Swopes, and Matthew Suppenbach for their help with these

data. Direct correspondence to Jennifer Varriale Carson, Department of Criminal Justice, University of Central

Missouri, Humphreys Building, Room 301C–1, Warrensburg, MO 64093 (e-mail: jcarson@ucmo.edu).

DOI:10.1111/1745-9133.12274 C2017 American Society of Criminology 191

Criminology & Public Policy rVolume 16 rIssue 1

Research Article Targeted Killings in the War on Terror

Based on the expansion of Public Law 107–40, Authorization for Use of Military

Force, in 2001, targeted killings are justified as a “necessary and appropriate force

. . . in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United

States by such nations, organizations, or persons.” Despite this justification, there is little

empirical evidence to substantiate these claims of prevention. Fortunately, criminologists

have recently applied a set of unique and robust quantitative methods to address similar

deficits in the terrorism and counterterrorism literatures. By following this line of research, a

thorough quasi-experimental design was applied in the current study to address the following

research question: Has the U.S. policy of high-profile targeted killings decreased global jihadist

terrorism?

Targeted killings, defined by Alston (2010) as the “intentional, premeditated and

deliberate use of lethal force, by States or their agents acting under colour of law, or

by an organized armed group in armed conflict, against a specific individual who is not

in the physical custody of the perpetrator,” (p. 3) have been heavily criticized by the

international community. The practice of targeted killings most often takes two forms:

kill/capture1missions and unmanned aerial vehicle assaults.2Estimates of the number of

fatalities associated with the former practice vary widely given the inherent secrecy behind

the program. Certainly the most infamous of fatalities is that of the May 2, 2011 Navy

SEAL raid on Usama bin Laden’s Pakistan compound. This event was predated by several

missions, including the June 8, 2006 targeted bombing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi’s safe

house in Iraq. al-Zarqawi was labeled as a “most wanted” al Qa’ida leader because of his

participation in especially brutal attacks like that of beheadings (Burns, 2006). At the time,

American Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad cautioned that al-Zarqawi’s death should not be

considered the end of violence in Iraq, but he did note that it was an “important step in the

right direction” (Burns, 2006: para. 3).

The use of the latter type of targeted killing, that of unmanned aerial strikes, is likely

to have originated with the November 3, 2002 killing of Senyan al-Harethi. al-Harethiwas

chosen as a target for his role in organizing the USS Cole bombing, a suicide attack that

killed 17 and wounded 39 others (Alston, 2010). Strikes such as the one against al-Harethi

have become much more widespread under the Obama administration (VanLinschoten and

Kuehn, 2012) with Radsan and Murphy (2011) estimating 118 in 2010 alone.3Perhapsthe

most divisive of these given his U.S. citizenship is the killing of radical Muslim cleric, Anwar

al-Awlaki, on September 30, 2011, in Yemen. al-Awlaki was suspected of radicalizing Major

Nidal Hasan, the perpetrator of the Fort Hood, Texas, shooting that killed 13 people and

1. Obviously, targeted killings only involve the former outcome.

2. Targeted killings have also involved “sniper fire, missiles from helicopters, gunships, the use of car

bombs, and poison” (Alston, 2010: 4).

3. This number is nearly impossible to verify given the secrecy of the program. It is also important to

acknowledge that it conflicts with other estimates like that of Alston’s (2010) 120 total drone strikes.

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