Arizona v. Evans: Carving Out Another Good-faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule - Sara Gilbert

• Citation: Vol. 47 No. 4
• Publication year: 1996

CASENOTES

Arizona v. Evans: Carving Out Another Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

In Arizona v. Evans,¹ the United States Supreme Court considered whether the exclusionary rule requires suppression of evidence seized incident to an arrest, when the arrest resulted from inaccurate computer data created by court personnel.² In January 1991, police arrested Isaac Evans during a routine traffic stop because the patrol car's computer indicated he was the subject of an outstanding misdemeanor warrant.³ While being handcuffed, Evans dropped a marijuana cigarette.⁴ A subsequent search of the vehicle revealed a bag of marijuana hidden under the passenger seat, and Evans was charged with possession.⁵ Upon notifying the justice court of the arrest, the officers discovered the misdemeanor warrant had been quashed seventeen days earlier.⁶ Evans moved to suppress the evidence, alleging the seizure resulted from an illegal search incident to an unlawful arrest.⁷ Evans further contended that, under United States v. Leon,⁸ the good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule did not apply.⁹ The arrest, Evans alleged, was not caused by judicial error, but by police error.¹⁰ The trial court granted the motion to suppress, finding the State was at fault for failing to quash the warrant.¹¹ The court made no factual finding as to whether the sheriff's office or the justice court was responsible for the error.¹² Instead, the court found no '"distinction between State action, whether it happens to be the police department or not.'"¹³ The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's ruling.¹⁴ According to the court of appeals, the exclusionary rule was not intended to deter errors by justice court employees or sheriff's office employees who were not directly associated with the arresting officers or their police department.¹⁵ The court reasoned that the computer clerical error was outside the control of the arresting officers' police department.¹⁶ Therefore, the threat of exclusion would not deter the justice court employees or sheriff's office employees from making similar mistakes in the future.¹⁷ The Arizona Supreme Court rejected the distinction between clerical errors committed by law enforcement personnel and similar errors committed by court employees and therefore reversed.¹⁸ The court found that regardless of who erred, the exclusionary rule was "useful" and "proper" when negligent recordkeeping resulted in an unlawful arrest.¹⁹ The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed the Arizona Supreme Court.²⁰ The Court held the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of evidence when police relied in good-faith upon misinformation caused by computer clerical error.²¹

The exclusionary rule was first applied to federal criminal proceedings in 1914.²² In Weeks v. United States,²³ the Court held the Fourth Amendment barred illegally obtained evidence from being admitted against defendants.²⁴ The Court explained that by admitting illegally obtained evidence, courts would be permitting conduct that violated the Constitution.²⁵ Thus, through exclusion, the Court furthered the promotion of judicial integrity.²⁶ Following Weeks, the Court in Mapp v. Ohio²⁷ held the exclusionary rule was a mandatory remedy for Fourth Amendment violations in state proceedings as well.²⁸ The Court based its holding upon the constitutional foundation established in Wolf v. Colorado ²⁹ In Wolf, the Court held the Fourth Amendment's right of privacy extended to the states via the Fourteenth Amendment.³⁰ The Court in Mapp found it "logically and constitutionally necessary" that the exclusionary rule also apply to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because it was "an essential part of the right to privacy."³¹ The Court not only recognized the rule as an implicit constitutional privilege, but reiterated the judicial integrity rationale of Weeks.³² The Court cited the deterrence of police misconduct as a third rationale for the rule.³³ The Court reasoned that exclusion would compel police officers to respect Fourth Amendment guarantees.³⁴ In subsequent decisions, the Court rejected all but the police deterrence rationale of Weeks and Mapp.³⁵ The exclusionary rule was also narrowed by the adoption of numerous good-faith exceptions. For example, in United States v. Leon,³⁶ the Court held the exclusionary rule did not apply to good-faith seizures of evidence even if the search warrant was later found unsupported by probable cause.³⁷ The Court limited its analysis to three factors: (1) whether the application of the exclusionary rule will deter police misconduct; (2) whether evidence indicates that those responsible for the error are "inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment or that lawlessness among these actors requires . . . the extreme sanction;"³⁸ and (3) whether excluding evidence will have a significant deterrent effect on those responsible for the error.³⁹ First, the Court concluded the rule's application to judicial errors would not deter police misconduct.⁴⁰ It reasoned that police were not normally expected to second-guess judicial officers' decisions.⁴¹ "[OJnce the warrant issues, there is literally nothing more the policeman can do in seeking to comply with the law."⁴² Second, the Court found no evidence indicating judicial officers were inclined to subvert or disregard the Fourth Amendment.⁴³ Third, and most importantly, the Court concluded that the threat of exclusion could not significantly deter judicial officers' errors.⁴⁴ The Court reasoned that judges and magistrates were not law enforcement team adjuncts but were neutral parties.⁴⁵ Accordingly, they had no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.⁴⁶ The Court further emphasized that exclusion would not "necessarily meaningfully inform judicial officers of their errors."⁴⁷ Instead, the existing district court supervision and the threat of removal for misconduct or incompetency, for example, provided a more effective remedy.⁴⁸ Three years later, the Court used its Leon analysis in Illinois v. Krull⁴⁹ to expand the good-faith exception.⁵⁰ The Court held that the exception applied when an officer objectively and reasonably relied upon a statute authorizing a warrantless search even though the statute was ultimately declared unconstitutional.⁵¹

In Arizona v. Evans, decided eight years after Krull, the Court again addressed the question of whether to carve out a new good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule. After applying the analysis in Leon, the Court answered in the affirmative.⁵² First, the Court concluded that the rule's application to court employee clerical errors would not alter police officers' behavior.⁵³ It quoted the trial court: '"I think the police officer [was] bound to arrest. I think he would [have been] derelict in his duty if he failed to arrest.'"⁵⁴ Second, the Court found no evidence suggesting that court personnel were engaged in lawlessness or were inclined to subvert or disregard the Fourth Amendment.⁵⁵ In fact, the Court pointed to contrary evidence. It emphasized the Chief Clerk's testimony that the type of error affecting Evans rarely occurred.⁵⁶ Third, the Court reasoned court personnel would not be significantly deterred from error by the threat of exclusion.⁵⁷ Court employees were not law enforcement team adjuncts.⁵⁸ They were not "engaged in the competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime"⁵⁹ and thus had no stake in the outcome of particular criminal prosecutions.⁶⁰ Because the police officers could have objectively and reasonably relied upon the erroneous computer records, the Court concluded that the application of Leon supported an exception to the exclusionary rule.⁶¹ Hence, the Court carved out another good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule.

The implications of Arizona v. Evans⁶² for future Fourth Amendment controversies may prove more far reaching than expected. If read broadly, Evans suggests that the good-faith exception could be expanded to apply to circumstances in which no warrant or statute ever existed.⁶³ Before applying the exception, the Court in Leon ...