Teaching argumentation existentially: augmentation pedagogy and theories of rhetoric as epistemic.

• Author: Gehrke, Pat J.

Teaching an introductory course in argumentation can be a highly exciting and rewarding experience. We see students learn research skills, logical fallacies, and methods of refutation, and transform themselves in the course of a few short weeks into practitioners of the art of debate. My experiences as a debater and my brief foray into debate coaching left a fondness for the form and substance of that activity. I often find that same fondness in the assumptions and methods of introductory argumentation texts. However, the disparity between our rhetorical theories and teaching practice is increasingly disturbing. This is especially the case with the teaching of argumentation. Put simply, contemporary argumentation pedagogy is out of step with rhetorical theory. In order to bridge the gap we might consider infusing basic argumentation pedagogy with the perspectives of existential thinkers. This may create a more inclusive and dialogic model for argumentation and argumentation pedagogy.

Robert L. Scott's theory of rhetoric as epistemic and Friedrich Nietzsche's writings provide ample foundation for an existential model of teaching argumentation. Scott's theory has been a dominant theme in rhetorical studies for many years (Zarefsky 177). Similarly, Nietzsche was influential in Scott's own work ("Rhetoric as Epistemic" 17) and has been an increasing presence in the communication discipline (see Desilet; Haynes-Burton; Porter; Thomas; Whitson and Poulakos). This essay seeks a rapprochement between these theories of rhetoric as epistemic and basic argumentation pedagogy. This rapprochement requires that we modify what we think of as argumentation to move away from the hegemony of a particular rationality toward a more pluralist view of argumentation. I begin this project by specifying certaIn assumptions in basic argumentation texts and argumentation pedagogy literature as representative of basic argumentation pedagogy. I then revisit these ideas from the lens of rhetoric as epistemic to shape an existential view of argumentation. From this re-vision of argumentation, I conclude by outlining some ideas for teaching argumentation that might represent existential argumentation pedagogy.

Existentialism, as a starting point, is not argumentation's panacea. It is also not the only way that we might reconsider argumentation. However, existentialism is particularly appropriate to this project as it seeks to unseat rationalism and foundationalism without losing sight of reasoning and ethics. Both Scott and Nietzsche are excellent examples of existentialists who continue to embrace reasoning and to struggle with questions of ethics while recognizing rhetoric's epistemic function and the contingency of human knowledge.

Trends and Tendencies in Argumentation Pedagogy

Omar Swartz notes a gap between rhetorical theory and basic communication course pedagogy ("Interdisciplinary" 130). Edward Schiappa similarly notes that while rhetorical theory proliferates, there is only a minimal attempt to explore its pedagogical implications (145). Both Schiappa and Swartz call upon communication educators to "ponder the connection between their theoretical insights and their classroom habits" (Schiappa 146).

My dissatisfaction with my own teaching practice led me to collect journal essays on argumentation pedagogy and basic argumentation and debate textbooks (Corcoran; Freeley; Hollihan and Baaske; Infante; Perella; Rieke and Sillars; Rybacki and Rybacki; Winebrenner). Looking to these sources for a way to revise my own pedagogical practices, I found four common premises in my practice and argumentation pedagogy more generally that disturbed me. First, argumentation texts favor a particular logical model of reasoning: a Western linear mode of logic. Second, there is an implicit assumption of the need to know the truth before engaging in argument. Third, these texts approach argumentation and debate from an oppositional model. Fourth, and perhaps most disturbing, the critical tools of argumentation are depicted as ways to assess others' reasoning and rarely one's own.

The heavy emphasis in argumentation textbooks on Western linear logic hardly needs demonstration. All the texts I have encountered outline a relatively standard "stock-issues" model for advancing arguments. The organizational structures for these arguments are uniformly linear. Very few texts present substantive alternatives to this method. When they do, it is usually done briefly in the form of a systemic model for argumentation (Hollihan and Baaske; Rieke and Sillars). Argumentation texts also generally subordinate narrative theories to a linear logic, rather than recognize narrative as an argument form in its own right. Other configural logics receive almost no attention. Argumentation and debate texts generally rely upon syllogisms, the Toulmin model, or fallacies of informal logic. The exceptions here stand out more than

the rule (see Infante). While this may seem reasonable from within the traditional argumentation paradigm, it portrays a limitation in our argumentation texts. Argumentation texts present the tradition of Western linear logic as the best or sometimes even the only way to access truth.

Perhaps more surprising is the relatively subordinate role most authors give argumentation. For example, Thomas Hollihan and Kevin Baaske argue that students should "continually search for objective facts and obvious truths" to strengthen arguments and create stronger cases (33). Austin Freeley defined argumentation as "reason giving in communicative situations by people whose purpose is the justification of acts, beliefs, attitudes, and values" (1). Authors approach even subjects such as audience adaptation from the view that one must bring a truth to the argument. Hollihan and Baaske, as is common of both argumentation and persuasion texts, discuss audience adaptation as a means to enhance the likelihood of convincing the audience of one's view (27-28).

While I find these perspectives disturbing, my discomfort arises most dramatically when we combine them with an oppositional view of argumentation. The majority of argumentation and debate pedagogy frames argument within competitive and often combative metaphors. Joseph Corcoran is certainly right to describe the practice of debate as a "highly structured competition" or a "contest judged by a third party" (1). Yet, this is only accurate because we currently teach and practice argumentation and debate in this way. T. C. Winebrenner considered debate to occur "between persons taking opposite sides in a controversy" (257). Gerald Sanders even compared debate to athletic events that pit one team against another, with strategies and game plans (1). This opposition is reinforced by and reinforces a view of argumentation as giving effect to prior truth. Thus, from the rationalist perspective there is no need to consider the viewpoints or arguments of others as even potentially legitimate. Rather, all arguments that disagree with the rhetor's position become objects for critical attack.

Though Wayne Brockriede's metaphor of the arguer as lover is found in the Hollihan and Baaske text (11), it is positioned to direct our attention to attacking arguments rather than people. Argumentation texts commonly reflect this theme, stating as Dominic Infante does that argumentation is when "each person attacks the other's position on the issue in order to establish the superiority of one's own position" (5). Alternatively, we simply receive an admonition such as in Sanders et al. that it is unacceptable to attack people, but reasonable to attack their arguments (29). I am skeptical of the degree to which we can attain the dialogic ideal of Brockriede's metaphor when ideas and arguments of others are positioned to be attacked or defeated instead of constructively engaged.

Argumentation scholars working in both feminism and ethics have noticed this oppositional form. Carrie Crenshaw perceives debate and argument as often being "understood through war metaphors" (21). Richard Fulkerson believes that we "tend to see argument as having two enemy camps with incompatible interests who are in a pitched battle with victory as the goal" (210). Similarly, Richard Johannesen notes a tension between dialogic models for communication, such as Brockriede's, and intercollegiate debate (71).

The combination of giving primacy to Western rational logic, a faith in one's own truth, and framing argumentation as opposition produces a condition in which critical thinking is directed only outward. Sanders noted that argumentation is supposed to help us "critically evaluate the arguments of others" (27, emphasis added). Similarly, Jeanne Fahnestock and Marie Secor...