Justice and argument: toward development of a dialogical argumentation theory.

• Author: Czubaroff, Jeanine
• Position: Report

Everywhere, these days, one hears the call for dialogue. In the public domain, for instance, the Ford Foundation recently called for "difficult dialogue" initiatives from colleges and universities, and organizations like the Public Conversation Project and Public Dialogue Consortium work with civic organizations and groups to encourage dialogue among Americans on the polarizing issues of the day (see, for instance, Becker, et al., 1995; Chasin and Herzig, 1993; Pearce and Littlejohn, 1997; as well as www.publicconversations.org\ and www.publicdialogue.org\). In the academy, the foundational work of Martin Buber, Mikhail Bakhtin, Hans-Georg Gadamer, and Jurgen Habermas has had an impact on scholarship in many fields, including literature, philosophy, psychology, theology, communication studies, and social criticism. There is, suggest Anderson, Baxter, and Cissna (2004, p. 2), a conceptual turn toward dialogue.

For some this interest in dialogue may appear to be a fad. However, there is a tradition in argumentation and rhetorical studies which has repeatedly pointed to the importance of a dichotomy between monological, or functional/instrumental communication, and dialogical communication. In his essay, "The Limits of Rhetoric" (1965a), philosopher Maurice Natanson argued that even though Aristotle related rhetoric to dialectic and ethics, Aristotle's focus on the modes of persuasion led to "a misleading emphasis on rhetorical technique and to a lack of emphasis on the theoretical aspects of rhetoric" (p. 95). For Natanson, the ultimate consequence of this emphasis on technique has been a perception that rhetoric is functional or instrumental in character (see Czubaroff, 2000, on the rhetoric, dialectic, dialogic nexus).

His own studies of argumentation led Natanson (1965b) to recognize an interpersonal and existential dimension in argument. Thus, he noted that the arguer is always situated in the presence of another (p. 10), and that genuine argument entails risk to the particularity of the self (pp. 15-16). However, Clark (1976) comments that Natanson remained interested in argumentation as a cognitive and logical enterprise, and so failed to explore the relational orientations identified by Martin Buber (1970) as I-It and I-You. In differing ways, Ehninger's (1970) and Brockriede's (1972) theoretical work acknowledged a relational tradition in communication, and both, citing Buber's classic distinction between I-It and I-You relations, made a fundamental distinction between unilateral/instrumental and bilateral/personal argumentation. More recently David Gilbert (2003), noting that Brockriede's essay is part of a larger conversation within our field about Plato's Phaedrus, suggests that the relational tradition in argumentation studies has an ethical impetus. That is, he argues that recognition of the relational character of arguing enables researchers to distinguish manipulative communication from communication that entails genuine self-risk and a respect for others (p. 15). (1) Finally, writing from outside the argumentation and rhetorical perspectives, communication scholar Carl Botan (1997) confirms the importance of the relational dimension to communication when he comments, "the ethicality of strategic communication can be analyzed not so much in terms of its content as its process-the relationship it assumes or enforces between the involved parties-and the attitudes and values this reflects" (p. 190). Botan not only confirms the connection between process, relationship, and ethics assumed by Ehninger and Brockriede, he also recognizes that the fundamental choice of orientation is between a monological and dialogical attitude (see pp. 190-192).

The recent theoretical work of Josina M. Makau and Debian L. Marty (2001) in Cooperative Argumentation, and James Crosswhite (1996) in The Rhetoric of Reason contributes to this relational tradition in argumentation studies by elaborating elements of a dialogical argumentation model to be distinguished from competitive and adversarial models. While their work introduces central concepts of a theory of dialogical argument, neither explicitly or systematically elaborates on the interpersonal, relational dimension of argument and neither explicitly grounds its ethical character on this relational dimension. Fortunately, the contextual theory and therapy model of Ivan Boszormenyi-Nagy and his associates based on Martin Buber's philosophy of dialogue has much to offer in this respect (see, Boszormenyi-Nagy & Krasner, 1986; Boszormenyi-Nagy, 1986; Boszormenyi-Nagy, et al., 1991; and Friedman, 1989, 1998).

I argue below that the emerging dialogical argumentation theory found in the work of Makau and Marty and Crosswhite shares substantial premises about human relating and dialogue with contextual theory, and that contextual theory further elaborates the concepts and premises in that theory. In light of these findings, I argue, further, that the model of dialogue developed here casts in clearer relief the monological model of persuasion that has tended to be dominant in our field and clarifies the central importance of the monologue-dialogue dichotomy in argumentation and rhetorical studies.

CONTEMPORARY DIALOGICAL ARGUMENTATION THEORY

Makau and Marty's theory of cooperative argumentation and Crosswhite's theory of the dialogical nature of genuine argument, together enable the dialogue theorist to identify a cluster of premises and concepts central to the emerging theory of dialogical argumentation. In particular, these theorists argue that the twin ontic realities of difference and profound interdependence among human beings call for reciprocity and fairness if conflicts are to be addressed and social relations are to be stable. Both argue that dialogical argumentation (rather than competitive, monologic argumentation) is the means for achieving reciprocity and fairness, and that dialogical argument at its heart involves a process of claiming and critical questioning as well as a tensional capacity Makau and Marty call "balanced partiality" (p. 56). Finally, they elaborate variations on Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's concept of the universal audience to explain how arguments are judged by audiences. An examination of the core concepts and premises of the model of dialogical argument that emerges from these two works is in order.

Makau and Marty ground their theory of cooperative or dialogical argumentation on a theoretical contrast between competitive and cooperative modes of argumentation. For them, the central goal of cooperative argumentation is the building of constructive deliberative communities that are able to make reasonable and fair decisions through the give and take of "ethical and effective" argument, i.e., dialogic argument (p. 45). This goal is undermined by competitive argumentation praxis and enabled by cooperative argumentation praxis. Cooperative arguers experience that they are positively interdependent, that is, dependent upon each other for their well-being and for the generation of meaning (p. 88). Because human beings depend upon each other, successful social life entails commitment to a fair reciprocity in which "'supporting the good of the other leads to self-benefit'" (p. 91).

One obvious criticism made of cooperative argumentation theory is that it has little guidance to offer if one's partners are competitive and inclined toward unilateral argumentation and other forms of manipulative influence, without regard for fairness to others. This critical point, at the heart of much opposition to dialogue studies, raises the question of just how pervasive the competitive, power orientation is in public and private deliberations, and whether, in the long run, trusting human relations are, or are not, essential to stable, enduring human community. In response to those who argue that competitive power permeates society, Makau and Marty emphasize the limits of adversarial, monological advocacy: it fails to resolve conflicts adequately and instead generates the next conflict because the monologic advocate's unilateral standards of success fail to satisfy anyone but him- or herself (pp. 197-8).

Drawing on the work of Quaker mediator Mike Yarrow, Makau and Marty advocate an attitude of "balanced partiality" as a means of actualizing commitment to fair reciprocity when persons in interdependent relations are in conflict. The attitude of balanced partiality, a dialogic tensional stance, has two movements. It requires, on the one hand, that in a given conflict situation we acknowledge our own points of view, and, on the other hand, commit to fair (that is, equitable) consideration of others' points of view and interests as we work out our conflicts and differences (p. 203). This concept resonates with that argumentation tradition which preferences bilateral argument to unilateral argument (see, for instance, Ehninger's discussion of a "posture of restrained partisanship," 1970, p. 104; Brockriede's attitude of lovers, 1972; and Natanson, 1965). Makau and Marty claim that experiences of openness and fairness in a relationship with another lead one to trust that partner, and that trust in the other's fairness is the basis for a willingness to engage in further dialogue over differences (p. 56).

Makau and Marty propose that an advocate develop a "deliberation log," a brief-type document intended to help the advocate describe the multiple positions in a controversy, including all the issues, commonplaces, definitions, claims, values and support associated with each side (pp. 206-223). A "reflective questions" section of the deliberation log seeks to situate the argumentation content in the relevant communication context, and includes questions about the relations between the persons involved (especially the advocate and audience). Reflective questions revolve around issues of standpoint, power, and perspective, and include, "What identifies...