The effects of arguing expectations and predispositions on perceptions of argument quality and playfulness.

• Author: Hample, Dale
• Position: Report

A variant of message production research (e.g., Greene, 1997b) focuses on the production of interpersonal arguments (e.g., Hample, 2007). Concentrating on the argumentative nature of messages leads to examination of the content that is produced and tends to set aside questions of form, organization, and timing. Most of the relevant research in these main and subsidiary traditions is the same, and the two literatures are easily merged. This article examines some of the theorized processes involved in production of arguments. Generally speaking, we sought to discover how expectations and predispositions concerning face-to-face arguing affect one's judgments of the argumentative products themselves.

Although fuller theoretical descriptions of the process of argument production are available (e.g., Hample, 2007), we begin with a limited account, confined to the matters studied here. Anticipation of an interpersonal argument ostensibly activates certain cognitive elements. Message production researchers ordinarily concentrate on the activation of goals and plans, but we have something different, perhaps more basic or preliminary, in mind. Situations are perceptually classified (Dillard & Solomon, 2000). These classifications, in turn, activate several types of phenomena besides goals: procedural knowledge of how to participate in such an episode (Greene, 1997a); expectations concerning what may happen during the interaction (Burgoon, 1995; Honeycutt, 2003); and appraisals that result in emotional reactions to that sort of event (Scherer, Schorr, & Johnstone, 2001). We are concerned chiefly with the latter two, operationalized as argument frames (Hample, 2005a) and the degree to which people personalize interpersonal conflicts (Hample, 1999), respectively. The sections that follow elaborate what is known about argument frames, personalization of conflict, and judgments of argument.

ARGUMENT FRAMES

Argument frames are people's understandings of why arguing occurs, how it takes place, and the nature of interpersonal arguing (the original theoretical treatment of frames appears in Hample, 2003; most research on frames is summarized in Hample, 2005a, ch. 2; see also Hample, Warner, & Young, 2006). The various frames are organized theoretically into three groups.

The first group is self-centered and concerns the primary goals that a person might pursue by means of arguing. These frames acknowledge that another person is involved in arguing, but the interlocutor is in the background and serves only as a means to or foil for one's own goals. Although developmental research has yet to be conducted, Hample (2003) suspects that this frame is the first to appear in children. One such frame is utility, arguing to obtain or achieve something. Most arguments, after all, are undertaken in order to persuade someone, for instance, to go to lunch, share a toy, pick up dry cleaning, or some other immediate personal goal. Another reason for arguing, another self-focused goal, is to display dominance. A person higher in power (or one who wishes to appear so) may argue to overwhelm the interlocutor, perhaps with argumentative skill, but also possibly with status, power, wealth, or a pointed vocabulary. More general than dominance is the expectation that arguing reveals identity. For example, a student might write an argumentative essay to establish that she is bright, or a minister might offer a proof of Christ's divinity to assure his congregation that his own faith is unwavering. A final self-oriented goal is play. Some people argue for fun or satisfaction, just as one might play chess. This frame is particularly interesting because some people, who simply do not understand that others argue playfully, take any argument at face value, with interpersonal difficulties the possible result.

The second group of frames takes into account the other person and conjoins one's goals to those of one's interlocutor. Hample (2003) suspects that children arrive at this level of interpersonal sophistication only after learning what arguing can do for self. Blurting marks a transition from the first group of frames to the second. This behavior is characteristic of communicators who do not take others into account (Hart & Burks, 1972; O'Keefe, 1988). Blurters believe that they should say what they think and not adapt to the other person. A high score on this measure suggests that the arguer effectively is restricted to frames in the preceding group. In the cooperation frame, the question is whether the respondent recognizes that arguments are essentially cooperative (e.g., involve turn-taking, exchange of ideas, and consideration for the other) in spite of the appearance of overt disagreement. A low score represents a competitive orientation, which is a way of connecting one's goals to another's, although not a very developed one. The final frame in this group, civility, concerns whether one believes that arguing is a polite, constructive activity, or sees it as nasty and brutish. This scale shares some content with both cooperation and the third group frame, which makes it another transitional measure.

The third, final category contains only one frame. Professional contrast concerns a reflective, naively theorized understanding of argument. It represents several contrasts between ordinary actors and argumentation scholars (Hample, 2003). For instance, many people instinctively see arguing as a destructive activity, whereas scholars understand its enormous constructive potential. A high score indicates that respondents' views and expectations are similar to those of professional scholars.

The frames measures, whose development continues, have been associated with numerous variables that are relevant here (Hample, 2005a, pp. 209-213; Hample, Warner, & Young, 2006). Highly argumentative people also have high scores for the utility, play, identity, and civility frames. Verbal aggressiveness relates directly to dominance, playfulness, blurting, and competitive expectations, and negatively to civility and professional contrast. Most of the first group frames are positively associated with psychological reactance, as is cooperativeness. The frames scores predict editorial preferences, although the relationships are not especially strong. Prior work also has connected the frames measures to those used to assess personalization of conflict; we defer these results until the end of the review of literature relating to personalization.

TAKING CONFLICT PERSONALLY

Argument and conflict are not the same phenomena, although ordinary actors often view them as synonymous. Conflicts can unfold by nonargumentative means, such as a fistfight, a price war between soft drink companies, or a gossip campaign in junior high school. Arguments, in turn, need not be conflictual. For instance, we are making an argument in this paragraph but are not aware of any opposition. Nonetheless, the pragmatic domains of the two phenomena overlap substantially: Interpersonal conflicts may well involve the exchange of reasons and most interpersonal arguments (i.e., [arguments.sub.2]) anticipate or manage disagreement (Jackson & Jacobs, 1980; Meyers & Brashers, 1999; O'Keefe, 1977).

Taking conflict personally (Hample, 1999; Hample & Dallinger, 1995) is captured by a set of measures designed to tap people's emotional reactions to face-to-face conflicts. We know that many people regard arguments as negative, hostile, destructive episodes (e.g., Hample & Benoit, 1999; Martin & Scheerhorn, 1985). The personalization scales reveal the extent of these feelings. The core idea is that, when they anticipate or recall a conflict, or realize that they are engaged in one, people recognize the situation as conflictual and appraise it (Scherer, Schorr, &Johnstone, 2001). These appraisals connect situational features to one's own goals and produce emotional reactions and expectations. Inasmuch as ordinary actors do not distinguish carefully between conflict and arguing (Martin & Scheerhorn, 1985), these feelings should typify emotional reactions to interpersonal arguing as well (Hample, 2005a).

The taking conflict personally (TCP) instrument has six subscales. The first, direct personalization, most immediately indexes the degree to which people take conflicts personally. High scores indicate that respondents feel that conflicts are about self in addition to or rather than the ostensive topic. The persecution feelings measure is somewhat more specific. This subscale reflects the impression that the point of the conflict is simply to attack self, that is, to victimize. Third, stress reactions indexes physical and psychological feelings of pressure and discomfort. These three subscales are intercorrelated and sometimes

are combined into a single measure called core TCP Positive relational effects reflects the degree to which people believe that conflicts can improve personal or workplace relationships. Its companion, negative relational effects, provides the reverse estimates. Although these subscales are negatively correlated, it is possible (and interesting) to have high (or low) scores on both. The final...