Are All Network Ties Created Equal? Distinguishing Between Strength and Use of Ties in Bureaucrat–Lobbyist Alliances

• Author: Jake Haselswerdt,Katharine W. V. Bradley
• DOI: 10.1177/0095399720902803
• Date: 01 May 2020
• Published date: 01 May 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095399720902803

Administration & Society

2020, Vol. 52(5) 771 –793

© The Author(s) 2020

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0095399720902803

journals.sagepub.com/home/aas

Article

Are All Network

Ties Created Equal?

Distinguishing Between

Strength and Use of Ties

in Bureaucrat–Lobbyist

Alliances

Jake Haselswerdt1

and Katharine W. V. Bradley2

Abstract

Scholars of policy networks consistently find that agreement on policy

explains network ties, but inconsistent results on the importance of strategic

considerations, such as the influence of potential partners. We use original

data on communications between bureaucrats and lobbyists on pending

Medicaid legislation to distinguish network ties (contacts) from bureaucrats’

use of those ties to attempt to advance their policy goals (requests for

lobbying help). We find that policy agreement explains both the strength of

network ties and bureaucrats’ requests for advocacy from their partners,

but that interest group influence and unified partisan control of government

explain only the latter.

Keywords

policy networks, lobbying, bureaucrats, Medicaid

1University of Missouri, Columbia, USA

2Mathematica Policy Research, Ann Arbor, MI, USA

Corresponding Author:

Jake Haselswerdt, Department of Political Science, University of Missouri, 113 Professional

Building, Columbia, MO 65211, USA.

Email: haselswerdtj@missouri.edu

902803AASXXX10.1177/0095399720902803Administration & SocietyHaselswerdt and Bradley

research-article2020

772 Administration & Society 52(5)

How do bureaucrats work with interest groups to achieve their policy goals?

One prominent theory of policy change holds that individual policy areas are

governed by loose, cloud-like networks (Heclo, 1978), in which bureaucrats

are important players, not only in their capacity as administrators but also in

the formulation of policy (S. Nicholson-Crotty, 2009). In part, bureaucrats

achieve influence by working with the interest groups in their policy net-

works (Aberbach et al., 1981; Abney & Lauth, 1986; Bradley & Haselswerdt,

2018; Carpenter, 2000, 2001). Network alliances with interest groups can be

an important source of influence over legislative outcomes because bureau-

crats are constrained in their ability to lobby directly. Not much is known,

however, about bureaucrats’ participation in networks, or how they use them

to attempt to influence legislators. In this article, we use original data to dis-

tinguish between the strength of network ties and bureaucrats’ use of those

ties, and to explore determinants of both. By making this distinction, we pro-

vide new insights into bureaucrats’ behavior, as well as a way to integrate

previous findings on determinants of network ties.

The existing literature on policy networks includes two distinct theories

about the important factors underlying network formation. The Advocacy

Coalition Framework (ACF) tradition developed by Sabatier and Jenkins-

Smith (1993) holds that shared policy preferences play a major role in deter-

mining network ties, whereas resource dependency theory (RDT), pioneered

by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978) to explain mergers and acquisitions among

firms, suggests that organizations should seek to establish ties that bring

needed resources. In the political realm, this means that individuals or groups

should seek to establish network ties with potential partners who have the

most influence with those in power.

We integrate these two perspectives and argue that agreement and influ-

ence matter for different kinds of communication within networks. Although

existing studies distinguish between network ties on the basis of their relative

strength (e.g., the frequency of contacts), we argue for categorization based

on the type of the communication between individuals or organizations.

Specifically, we distinguish between the frequency of contacts (denoting

strength of ties) and the presence or absence of bureaucrats’ requests for lob-

bying help (denoting type of communication).

Our study employs survey data on bureaucrat–interest group communica-

tions around recent Medicaid legislation in 25 states that allow us to tease

apart contacts and requests, enabling us to examine which interest groups

bureaucrats contact most often, and which they target with requests for lob-

bying. We find that, as expected, these two sets of groups do not perfectly

overlap: Contacts depend on policy agreement, whereas requests for lobby-

ing depend on both agreement and on the strategic advantages the interest