Apprendi v. New Jersey: Should Any Factual Determination Authorizing an Increase in a Criminal Defendant's Sentence Be Proven to a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt - Jason Ferguson

• Publication year: 2001

Casenote

Apprendi v. New Jersey: Should Any Factual Determination Authorizing an Increase in a Criminal Defendant's Sentence Be Proven to a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt?

In Apprendi v. New Jersey,¹ the United States Supreme Court held, with the exception of the fact of prior criminal convictions, that any factual determination that authorizes an increased sentence beyond the statutory maximum must be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.²

I. Factual Background

In the early morning hours of December 22, 1994, Petitioner Charles C. Apprendi fired several .22 caliber bullets into the home of an African-American family that had recently moved into a predominately white neighborhood in Vineland, New Jersey. The police promptly arrested Apprendi who later admitted that he had fired the shots.

Apprendi also made a statement, which he later retracted, that even though he did not know the family personally, he fired the shots because he wanted to deter the presence of African-Americans in the community.³ The shooting marked the fourth time the home had been fired upon since the family moved into the neighborhood.⁴

A New Jersey grand jury returned a twenty-three-count indictment against Apprendi; however, it did not include a formal hate crime or otherwise mention Apprendi's racially motivated purpose in committing the crimes. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Apprendi later pled guilty to two counts of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose and one count of third-degree unlawful possession of an antipersonnel bomb.⁵ The State sought to have Apprendi's sentence extended based on a New Jersey statute, which permits a sentence enhancement if a trial judge finds by a preponderance of the evidence that a defendant's criminal activities were motivated by racial bias.⁶ The trial court accepted the three guilty pleas and conducted an evidentiary hearing on the issue of Apprendi's purpose in committing the December 22 shooting.⁷

Apprendi introduced a number of character witnesses, a psychologist and his own testimony to rebut the State's contention. However, at the conclusion of the hearing, the trial judge found by a preponderance of the evidence that Apprendi was motivated by racial bias. Consequently, the trial judge imposed a twelve-year term of imprisonment on the charge of second-degree possession of a firearm for an unlawful purpose arising from the December 22 shooting. This sentence is two years greater than the statutory maximum penalty for the offense. The trial judge also imposed a shorter, concurrent sentence on the two remaining counts.⁸

Apprendi appealed his sentence to the Appellate Division of the Superior Court of New Jersey arguing, inter alia, that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires racial bias under the New Jersey Hate Crime Statute to be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.⁹ However, the court stated that because racial bias under the statute is a "sentencing factor" and not an "element" of the offense, the State was not required to submit proof of the racial bias beyond a reasonable doubt.¹⁰ The court further concluded that the requisite findings of the statute are best characterized as relating to motive, which has been traditionally used by trial judges in sentencing without offending the Constitution unless the legislature chooses to define motive as an actual element of the offense.¹¹ Thus, the court affirmed Apprendi's sentence.¹²

A divided Supreme Court of New Jersey affirmed Apprendi's sentence but disagreed with the reasoning of the appellate division.¹³ The court refused to draw a distinction between an element of an offense and a sentencing factor in determining when to apply the reasonable doubt standard and further noted that characterizing the statute as relating to motive simply did not answer the constitutional question.¹⁴ The court instead relied on decisions of the United States Supreme Court, which hold that a defendant's prior criminal history or possession of a firearm may be considered by a trial judge in determining whether to increase his or her punishment for a crime.¹⁵ The court also recognized that "almost invariably" there is no real doubt as to whether a particular crime is committed for a racially biased purpose, and enhancement under the statute is limited to cases in which the State has a compelling interest in protecting its citizens from invidious discrimination.¹⁶ Concerned that the decision may jeopardize the traditional role of a jury in the criminal justice system, the United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,¹⁷ reversed the Supreme Court of New Jersey's decision, and remanded for further proceedings.¹⁸

II. Legal Background

A. The Right of Proof to a Jury Beyond a Reasonable Doubt

Overwhelming acceptance of the right to a trial by jury in criminal cases is clearly indicated by its longstanding history. From the early to late eighteenth century, recognition of this right even led to reluctance on the part of many English trial judges to accept guilty pleas from criminal defendants.¹⁹ This strict adherence followed English colonists to American shores²⁰ and ultimately became a part of the Bill of Rights to the United States Constitution via the Sixth Amendment.²¹ The United States Supreme Court soon recognized that the right to a jury trial in serious cases was of paramount importance to a fair criminal justice system.²² In fact the Court eventually held that the right was so fundamental to the notion of ordered liberty that it should be applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.²³ As indicated by the Court in Duncan v. Louisiana,²⁴ "[t]he jury trial provisions in the Federal and State Constitutions reflect a fundamental decision about the exercise of official power—a reluctance to entrust plenary powers over the life and liberty of the citizen to one judge or group of judges."²⁵

Of equal constitutional significance is the longstanding principle, recognized by the Court as early as 1881,²⁶ that the State must prove all elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court reaffirmed this principle in 1970 in In re Winship.²⁷ In Winship a New York Family Court found a juvenile guilty of larceny without requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt.²⁸ The Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution requires the State to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, every fact necessary to constitute a crime for which a defendant is charged,²⁹ Concluding that the reasonable doubt standard applies to juveniles as well as adults, the Court recognized that a stigma of criminal culpability accompanies a criminal conviction in addition to any penalties that may be imposed.³⁰ Thus, the Court concluded that "[the reasonable doubt standard] is a prime instrument for reducing the risk of convictions resting on factual error.³¹

The Court has extended the procedural safeguards of the right to a jury and proof beyond a reasonable doubt to determinations that bear solely on the degree of punishment and culpability associated with a crime rather than the actual guilt or innocence of the defendant. In Mullaney v. Wilbur,³² the Court addressed a Maine law that presumed that a criminal defendant charged with murder acted with the requisite malice aforethought and denied a reduction to manslaughter unless the defendant could prove that he or she acted with justifiable provocation. Recognizing that murder carried a penalty of life in prison and manslaughter carried a maximum term of imprisonment of twenty years,³³ the Court held the law to be unconstitutional and contrary to the Court's holding in Winship.³⁴ The Court reasoned that because the effect of the Maine law was to place a criminal defendant's personal liberty in substantial jeopardy, the State should not be permitted to avoid the reasonable doubt standard by shifting the burden to the defendant to prove mitigating circumstances.³⁵

However, two years later in Patterson v. New York,³⁶ the Court limited its holding in Mullaney. In Patterson the Court upheld a New York law, which placed the burden of proving the affirmative defense of extreme emotional disturbance in a murder trial on the defendant.³⁷ The Court stated that its holding in Mullaney should not be read so broadly as to require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in every instance in which the State gauges the severity of punishment based on the existence of a particular fact.³⁸ The Court instead stressed that the determination of when to apply the reasonable doubt standard is resolved by looking to the elements of the crime as defined by the legislature.³⁹ With regard to the New York law at issue, the Court noted that, unlike the law at issue in Mullaney, an affirmative defense is a separate issue raised by the defendant and the State is still required to prove every essential ingredient of murder beyond a reasonable doubt.⁴⁰

In McMillan v. Pennsylvania,⁴¹ the Court relied on Patterson and upheld the constitutionality of a Pennsylvania statute that required a lesser standard of proof while subjecting a defendant to greater punishment. The statute at issue in McMillan permitted visible possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony to be used by a trial judge in imposing a five-year minimum sentence without requiring proof to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.⁴² The Court stated that proof beyond a reasonable doubt was not required because the Pennsylvania legislature expressly provided that visible possession of a firearm is treated as a sentencing factor to be used by a trial judge and not as an actual element of the offense.⁴³ The Court further noted that, unlike the law at issue in Mullaney, the Pennsylvania statute "neither alters the maximum penalty for the crime committed nor creates a separate offense calling for a separate penalty; it operates solely to limit the sentencing court's discretion in selecting a penalty within the range...