Apprehension and Argument: Ancient Theories of Starting Points for Knowledge.

• Author: Hoffman, David
• Position: Book review

Apprehension and Argument: Ancient Theories of Starting Points for Knowledge. By Miira Tuominen. Studies in the History of Philosophy of Mind, Volume 3. Springer: Dordrecht, The Netherlands, 2007. pp. 327 + xiii

Apprehension and Argument: Ancient Theories of Starting Points for Knowledge surveys what author Miira Tuominen views as the arche (principles or "starting points") upon which episteme (knowledge) was built in Plato, Aristotle and in Hellenistic philosophy. Tuominen sees her main contribution to the existing literature as drawing attention to two co-existing perspectives concerning the starting points of knowledge in ancient Greek sources: 1) the "point of view of argumentation," and 2) psychological theories concerning perception and cognition (p. 4). Tuominen has a strong appreciation for the extent to which knowledge, in ancient times, was defined as the product of philosophical debate, and spends much of the book surveying the ground rules Aristotle, Plato and others have set up to govern the kinds

of arguments productive of knowledge. But she also recognizes that questions about whether, and under what conditions, cognitions of the external world are trustworthy add a significant development in the Hellenistic philosophy of knowledge.

The relevance of this material to scholars who are interested in the relationship between argumentation and philosophy should be obvious. Tuominen is a careful scholar, who painstakingly shifts through multiple layers of source texts, ancient commentaries and modern scholarly opinion, an operation that is especially necessary in her field. But it must be said that her intended audience seems to be scholars of classical philosophy. She is interested solely in interpreting the material correctly, not in making any connections to contemporary epistemology, let alone contemporary rhetoric or argumentation, although the connections are there to be made. Students and scholars of argumentation who come to this book should be prepared to roll up their sleeves, dig for what they want, and make their own connections.

Even if the book is approached only to provide insight into ancient Greek epistemological theories, several caveats are in order. First, the idea of "starting points of knowledge" seems to be more an organizing principle employed by the author than an organizing principle of ancient thought. True, Tuominen does point to the term arche as the Greek term which she translates as "starting point" (p. 2) but the primary meaning of this term in Greek philosophy is the first principle or element out of which the physical universe arises, being water, fire or the apeiron (the unlimited), depending on the philosopher. I am not aware of any discussion in primary sources of the term arche in an epistemological context, and the author points to no such discussions. Arche doesn't even have an entry in the book's index. There is certainly nothing wrong with organizing a book about ancient philosophy around what is...