Appointee Confirmation and Tenure: The Succession of U.S. Federal Agency Appointees, 1989–2009

• Date: 01 November 2012
• Author: Sang Ok Choi,Matthew Dull,Patrick S. Roberts,Michael S. Keeney
• Published date: 01 November 2012
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6210.2012.02676.x

Matthew Dull is associate professor in

the Center for Public Administration and

Policy at Virginia Tech. His current research

interests include American political institu-

tions, oversight political appointees, and

public sector professionalism.

E-mail: mdull@vt.edu

Patrick S. Roberts is associate profes-

sor in the Center for Public Administration

and Policy at Virginia Tech. His book

Disasters and the American State:

How Politicians, Bureaucrats, and the

Public Prepare for the Unexpected

is forthcoming from Cambridge University

Press.

E-mail: patrickroberts@vt.edu

Michael S. Keeney received his

doctorate from the Center for Public

Administration and Policy at Virginia Tech

in May 2012. In addition to this project, his

ongoing research interests include studying

the effects of state constitutional design in

state policymaking.

Sang Ok Choi is associate professor in

the Department of Public Administration

at Korea University. His current research

focuses on the study of interorganizational

relationships and public management

network. His work has appeared in Public

Administration Review, American

Review of Public Administration,

State and Local Government

Review, Administration & Society,

International Journal of Public Sector

Management, International Journal

of Emergency Management, and

Journal of Homeland Security and

Emergency Management.

E-mail: sangchoi@korea.ac.kr

902 Public Administration Review • November | December 2012

Public Administration Review,

Vol. 72, Iss. 6, pp. 902–913. © 2012 by

The American Society for Public Administration.

DOI: 10.111/j.1540-6210.2012.02676.x.

Matthew Dull

Patrick S. Roberts

Michael S. Keeney

Virginia Tech

Sang Ok Choi

Korea University

 is article analyzes the conf‌i rmation and tenure of

2,300 Senate-conf‌i rmed, presidential appointees to U.S.

government agencies between 1989 and 2009, link-

ing patterns of appointee conf‌i rmation and tenure to

institutional politics, appointee independence, and agency

context. Consistent with prior research, the authors f‌i nd

that nominees of new, powerful, and popular presidents

enjoy expedited Senate conf‌i rmation. Contentious con-

gressional committee oversight, by contrast, tends to delay

conf‌i rmation and reduce tenure. Agency heads and posi-

tions insulated from removal, such as for f‌i xed-term posi-

tions and inspectors general, increase tenure. Extending

empirical research, the analysis highlights program- and

agency-level variations that speak to the many contin-

gencies shaping appointee politics. Appointee positions

associated with national security and broad statutory

discretion receive expedited conf‌i rmation. Agencies with

more professionals are associated with increased tenure,

whereas agencies with more appointees among manag-

ers see shorter tenures.  e results speak to scholarship on

appointee politics and to public knowledge about the role

of appointments in American government.

President-appointed, Senate-conf‌i rmed agency

appointees play a storied role in American

government. Appointments are among the

most potent tools in both presidential and con-

gressional attempts to inf‌l uence federal agency

administration.1Appointee politics are also power-

fully contingent on agencies, policies, agendas,

personalities, and, occasionally, the intrigue for which

Washington’s “in and out” crowd is purportedly

famous.

Building on existing empirical work (McCarty and

Razaghian 1998; Wood and Marchbanks 2008),

this article explores two parameters of appointee

politics—Senate conf‌i rmation, measuring the time

between presidential nomination and Senate conf‌i r-

mation, and appointee tenure, or the appointee’s term

of service—across 2,300 Senate-conf‌i rmed agency

appointees (PAS) between 1989 and 2009. We com-

piled comprehensive data on appointments to PAS

positions in executive branch departments, single-

headed independent agencies, and Executive Of‌f‌i ce of

the President organizations during the George H. W.

Bush, Bill Clinton, and George W. Bush administra-

tions. In this article, we report the results of empirical

models that integrate and extend persistent themes in

research on the role of appointees in American gov-

ernment. Acknowledging the scope and diversity of

agency appointments, our analysis is organized around

four persistent themes in research on appointee

politics: presidential control, institutional bargaining,

appointee competence, and agency-level dynamics.

 e most prominent theme in current scholarship

casts appointments as instruments of presidential con-

trol.  e twentieth-century administrative presidency

placed new emphasis on political loyalty and the

alignment of agency governance with presidential pri-

orities (Aberbach and Rockman 1988, 2000; Durant

and Resh 2010). Framing the drive for administrative

control in the language of rational choice institutional

theory, the “politicized” presidency inspired a genera-

tion of scholarship that placed appointments among

the key instruments of presidential power (Gill and

Waterman 2004; Moe 1985; Moe and Howell 1999).2

Of course, “control” constitutes dif‌f erent things across

time and circumstance. Today, we take it for granted

that a president possesses the authority to remove his

secretary of state for any reason, but the scope of the

president’s removal power has changed over time.  e

removal question prompted a historic debate by the

1st U.S. Congress (Cook 1996, 25–40). For decades,

presidents rarely tested the question.3 Over time,

agency appointments became vital sources of partisan

and presidential patronage. Plum assignments dis-

tributed to presidential allies remain a vital currency

of Washington politics—often carrying the promise

of power, prestige, and enhanced future earnings.4

Twentieth-century “personalized” presidents depended

less on traditional party organizations, and the cur-

rency of presidential appointments shifted toward per-

sonal ties and ideological alignment. A large personnel

system took form as presidents sought to centralize

Appointee Conf‌i rmation and Tenure:  e Succession of U.S.

Federal Agency Appointees, 1989–2009