Anti-Corruption Policy and Whistle-Blowing Intentions: Quasi-Experimental Evidence From Meritocratic Civil Service Systems

• Published date: 01 July 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231162528
• Author: Don S. Lee,Annemarie S. Walter,Soonae Park
• Date: 01 July 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/00953997231162528

Administration & Society

2023, Vol. 55(6) 1194 –1217

© The Author(s) 2023

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DOI: 10.1177/00953997231162528

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Article

Anti-Corruption Policy

and Whistle-Blowing

Intentions: Quasi-

Experimental Evidence

From Meritocratic Civil

Service Systems

Don S. Lee1, Annemarie S. Walter2, and

Soonae Park3

Abstract

How does an anti-corruption policy shape bureaucrats’ intentions to

whistle-blow? Anti-corruption research suggests that civil servants with

certain characteristics are more or less likely to blow the whistle, due to a

discrepancy in perceptions of expected outcomes within the organizational

hierarchy. We test this logic by examining how civil servants’ gender, age,

and civil service rank shape changes in their whistle-blowing intentions,

leveraging the recent implementation of an anti-corruption policy in South

Korea. By analyzing original survey data on over 5,000 civil servants, matching

pre- and post-implementation groups, we find that male, older, and high-

ranking civil servants, respectively, are more willing to whistle-blow than

female, younger, and low-ranking civil servants when the anti-corruption

policy is implemented. The implication of this finding is that the greater

power and prestige granted to the former groups within the organizational

hierarchy may make them more willing to do so.

1Sungkyunkwan University, South Korea

2University of Nottingham, UK

3Seoul National University, South Korea

Corresponding Author:

Don S. Lee, Graduate School of Governance and Department of Public Administration,

Sungkyunkwan University, 50903 Hoam Hall, Jongno-gu 03063, South Korea.

Email: don.lee@g.skku.edu

1162528AAS0010.1177/00953997231162528Administration & SocietyLee et al.

research-article2023

Lee et al. 1195

Keywords

anti-corruption policy, whistle-blowing intentions, meritocratic civil service,

quasi-experiment

Are individuals more willing to whistle-blow when an anti-corruption policy is

adopted? Research on whistle-blowing in government has examined how both

individual characteristics of government officials and situational characteristics

surrounding them are associated with such behavior (e.g., Culiberg & Mihelic,

2017; Keil et al., 2010; Mesmer-Magnus & Viswesvaran, 2005; Rehg et al.,

2008; Sims & Keenan, 1998). The importance of studying the characteristics of

potential whistle-blowers in a particular context lies in the fact that government

officials who are keen to detect wrongdoing in their organization are often reluc-

tant to blow the whistle without legally protective mechanisms that provide

them with clear incentives of reward and punishment. As exemplified by some

anti-corruption laws, institutional measures which establish clear channels for

internal whistle-blowing, educate employees on whistle-blowing, and produce

transparency in how an organization deals with reports of misconduct can stimu-

late reporting of unethical behavior (Callier, 2017; Near & Miceli, 2008).

In this study, we examine how a policy intervention affects civil servants’

whistle-blowing behavior, employing a quasi-experimental approach previ-

ously used in a handful of whistle-blowing studies (Miceli et al., 1999). The

implementation of a recent anti-corruption policy in South Korea, the 2016

Improper Solicitation and Graft Act, provides us with an excellent opportu-

nity to do so. Through our original surveys with thousands of South Korean

civil servants conducted both before and after the policy intervention, our

research design attempts to provide a mechanism for understanding how civil

servants with different characteristics are motivated to engage in whistle-

blowing. In addition, to make pre- and post-implementation samples compa-

rable, we use matching methods and control for their individual differences

across time periods.

Theoretically, we argue that civil servants’ decision to whistle-blow is

affected by the defined scope of wrongdoing and the perceived costs and

benefits of reporting, which should be conditional on the interplay between

situational and individual characteristics (Culiberg & Mihelic, 2017; Dozier

& Miceli, 1985). In terms of situational characteristics, the environment

around whistle-blowing changes after a policy intervention, and the reform

policy sets the scope of what is considered wrongdoing and how reporting

misconduct is protected. Regarding individual characteristics, we examine

several demographic and civil service characteristics that are closely related

to the distribution of power and prestige among members within an