An Uneven Playing Field: the Government Extended Rights Denied to Defendants on Appeal

• Publication year: 2020

An Uneven Playing Field: The Government Extended Rights Denied to Defendants on Appeal

Breyana Fleming

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An Uneven Playing Field: The Government Extended Rights Denied to Defendants on Appeal^*

by Breyana Fleming

I. Introduction

Many people find themselves in the crosshairs of the criminal justice system as defendants. In preparing to defend themselves against the charges being brought by the government, these defendants cannot predict whether the outcome of a criminal proceeding will result in a finding of innocence or guilt. Defendants can, however, generally depend on uniformity in the law as it pertains to appellate procedure. Still, there are times where this uniformity will be sacrificed, and further, when it will be done in an unjust manner. For instance, when an appellate court allows the federal government to maintain an argument against a defendant it never raised on appeal, uniformity in appellate procedure is sacrificed unjustly. In United States v. Campbell,¹ this kind of injustice took place.² In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit applied the good-faith reliance exception to an officer's actions of unlawfully prolonging a traffic stop through unrelated inquiry because the officer was relying in good-faith on United States v. Griffin,³ the binding precedent at the time.⁴ Significantly, the court exercised its discretion in hearing the issue despite the government's failure to properly raise the issue in any oral argument, initial brief, or any other supplemental filing to the

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court.⁵ An in-depth analysis of the majority opinion will show, however, that this decision unfairly prejudiced Campbell in order to provide protection to the federal government.

II. Factual Background

Deputy Sheriff Robert McCannon was patrolling the interstate at night when he noticed that a Nissan Maxima crossed the fog line. Upon seeing this, McCannon activated the camera on his dashboard, at which point he noticed the vehicle cross over the fog line again, and further, that the vehicle had a signal light which was blinking at an unusually rapid pace. As a result of these infractions, the officer pulled the vehicle over and came upon Erickson Campbell, whom he asked for his driver's license and registration. After explaining to Campbell the reasons why he was stopped, McCannon determined that he would issue him a warning for failure to adhere to two Georgia traffic violations: (1) failing to maintain signal lights in a good working condition,⁶ and (2) failing to maintain his own lane.⁷ While writing the ticket, McCannon began to question Campbell about the purpose of his travels. McCannon learned that Campbell was on his way to Augusta in order to see his family, that he held a job, had previously been arrested over sixteen years ago for a DUI, and that he was not traveling with a firearm.⁸

Further, during the time that McCannon continued writing out the warning ticket for Campbell, Deputy Patrick Paquette arrived on the

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scene.⁹ At this point, McCannon asked Campbell more questions on the following topics:

McCannon: Any counterfeit merchandise that you're taking to your relatives in Augusta? And what I mean by that is—any purses? Shoes? Shirts? Any counterfeit or bootleg CDs or DVDs? Anything like that? Any illegal alcohol? Any marijuana? Any cocaine? Methamphetamine? Any heroin? Any ecstasy? Nothing like that? You don't have any dead bodies in your car?" Campbell shakes his head or otherwise responds in the negative to each question.¹⁰

This particular line of questioning lasted for twenty-five seconds.¹¹ When Campbell stated that he did not have any of those items, McCannon requested to search his vehicle to confirm the truthfulness of his statements to him, to which Campbell obliged. As such, McCannon had Campbell sign the ticket and then he and Paquette begin to search Campbell's vehicle. Their search revealed a 9mm semi-automatic pistol, 9mm ammunition, a black stocking cap, and a face mask in a bag hidden under the carpet in Campbell's trunk. Once McCannon and Paquette found the gun, Campbell admitted that he had lied about having it because he was a convicted felon.¹²

Consequently, Campbell was arrested and indicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1),¹³ for being in possession of a firearm as a convicted felon. In his defense, Campbell filed a motion to suppress the evidence.¹⁴ However, the district court denied Campbell's motion to suppress, convicting him of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon.¹⁵ First, the district court determined that McCannon had reasonable suspicion to make a traffic stop under Georgia's statute, as his rapidly blinking turning signal was not in good working condition. Second, the district court addressed whether the traffic stop became an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment¹⁶ when McCannon prolonged it with his unrelated inquiry. The district court determined that McCannon's inquiry in reference to whether Campbell had contraband, drugs, or dead bodies in the vehicle, lasting for about twenty-five seconds, was unrelated to the purpose of the stop because they did not

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relate to road safety concerns. Following the precedent set in United States v. Griffin,¹⁷ however, the district court held that McCannon had not unlawfully prolonged the stop because the overall length of prolongation was reasonable, and he had acted diligently in issuing his warning ticket. The district court declined to address whether the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule applied.¹⁸

The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit stated that it agreed with the district court that the precedent set in Griffin was controlling.¹⁹ The Eleventh Circuit, however, did address the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule, deciding that it would hear the issue despite the government's failure to preserve the issue on appeal.²⁰ Thus, in applying its discretionary authority to hear an issue first raised on appeal, the Eleventh Circuit held that because McCannon relied in good-faith on the binding precedent in Griffin, the subsequent ruling in Rodriguez v. United States,²¹ did not make the prolongation of the traffic stop through his unrelated inquiry turn into an unreasonable seizure under the Fourth Amendment.²²

III. LEGAL BACKGROUND

A. The Fourth Amendment: Protection Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizures

1. The Clause

As determined in Mapp v. Ohio,²³ The Constitution's Fourth Amendment Clause protects peoples' right to privacy from being infringed upon by searches and seizures which are not founded on a basis of reasonable suspicion.²⁴ The Fourth Amendment states, in pertinent part, that, "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated."²⁵ Because security of one's privacy against intrusion by the police is a liberty guaranteed by the principles

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of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,²⁶ the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against the states to ensure that there is no arbitrary denial of life, liberty, and property by the government.²⁷

2. The Subsequent Adoption of the Exclusionary Rule

Though the Fourth Amendment itself does not explicitly prohibit the entering of evidence in violation of its clause, the United States Supreme Court created the exclusionary rule.²⁸ The exclusionary rule, a prudential doctrine, prohibits evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Fourth Amendment from being used in a criminal proceeding.²⁹ Because the Fourth Amendment is enforceable against both the states and the federal government, the exclusionary rule is also enforceable against these actors.³⁰ As such, evidence unlawfully obtained by law enforcement will be suppressed under the exclusionary rule.³¹

However, the application of the exclusionary rule is not without limitations.³² As with any other judicially created remedial device, the application of the rule is restricted to those areas where its remedial objectives are best served.³³ The exclusionary rule is designed to safeguard constitutional rights, meaning that it is not concerned with the personal constitutional rights of the aggrieved party.³⁴ Hence, because the exclusionary rule's sole purpose is to deter unlawful conduct which is in contention with the Fourth Amendment, the rule will not apply in the case that suppression fails to yield appreciable deterrence, making exclusion unnecessary.³⁵

3. An Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Good-Faith Reliance on Binding Precedent

In United States v. Leon,³⁶ the Court carved out the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule, finding that the costs of excluding evidence outweighs its deterrent value when an officer

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objectively relies on binding precedent.³⁷ The court determined that the good-faith reliance exception applied to an officer's acts in obtaining a warrant from a magistrate who found that there was probable cause for its issuance.³⁸ In this particular case, upon receiving an affidavit of observed drug-trafficking activities, an officer requested the issuance of warrants of the defendants' home and vehicles, which was subsequently issued by the magistrate court. The search produced drugs and the defendants were indicted on drug offenses, all moving to have the evidence suppressed. The district court granted the motions in part, finding that the affidavit lacked sufficient evidence of probable cause and that it would not consider the good-faith reliance exception to the officer's actions. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed.³⁹

The Supreme Court of the United States disagreed with the findings below, holding that the good-faith reliance exception to the exclusionary rule should be recognized because the officer reasonably relied in good-faith on the validity of the warrant issued by the...