Alistair Horne. A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962. Pp. 608. New York: The Viking Press, 1978. $19.95

• Published date: 01 January 1979
• DOI: 10.1177/000271627944100116
• Date: 01 January 1979
• Author: Richard Sigwalt
• Subject Matter: Articles

199

ALISTAIR

HORNE.

A

Savage

War

of

Peace:

Algeria

1954-1962

.

Pp.

608.

New

York:

The

Viking

Press,

1978.

$19.95.

A

Savage

War

of

Peace

leads

general

readers

skillfully

through

the

complex

events

which

culminated

in

Algeria’s

independence;

it

also

provides

special-

ists

with

important

new

insights,

es-

pecially

in

its

analyses

of

information

Horne

gained

in

interviewing

surviving

protagonists.

Algerians,

both

in

Algeria

and

abroad,

and

loyal

Frenchmen,

as

well

as

those

freed

by

deGaulle’s

1968

amnesty,

speak

openly

about

who

led

the

1961

Algiers

putsch.

As

one

might

expect

from

the

author

of

three

major

studies

of

post-1870

France,

Home’s

most

convincing

chapters

deal

with

French,

rather

than

Muslim

Al-

gerian,

agonies.

Several

issues,

like

tor-

ture

and

deGaulle’s

abandonment

of

Algerie

francaise

(and

hence

a

million

settlers

and

his

own

army),

ring

some-

what

false

if

one

denies

France’s

legiti-

macy

in

Algeria

and

accepts

that

of

the

FLN,

as

most

Algerians

had

done

by

1958.

Horne’s

French

orientation

is

best

illustrated

by

his

sympathetic

evocation

of the

dilemma

of

General

Challe,

who

reluctantly

agreed

to

lead

the

1961

coup

attempt

largely

because

he

could

not

honorably

abandon

his

Algerian

troops

(harkis)

to

the

tender

mercies

of

the

FLN.

Challe’s

drama

is

valid

only

if

its

logical

resolution,

Algerie

francaise,

is

assumed

to

be

morally

admissible.

Home

considers

it

valid

drama.

In

fact,

save

for

a

brief

chapter

lauding

the

FLN’s

wartime

social

achievements,

the

consistent

implication

here

is

that

the

Algerian

people

were

essentially

terrorized

into

accepting

FLN

leader-

ship.

How

else

can

one

consider

&dquo;tragic&dquo;

deGaulle’s

failure

to

outmaneuver

the

FLN

and

negotiate

peace

instead

with

Kabyle

separatists,

Muslim

loyalists,

gallicized

intellectuals,

and

guerrilla

leaders

alienated

from

their

leaders

in

Tunis?

Still,

Horne’s

account

signifi-

cantly

deepens

our

understanding

of

the

FLN,

its

internal

crises,

and

its

relations

with

France.

Nevertheless,

one

regrets

that

this

work’s

deservedly

wide

recep-

tion

may

popularize

an

essentially

French

(albeit

humane

French)

view

of

the

conflict.

In

his

preface,

Horne

thanks

Anthony

Nutting

for

&dquo;graciously

withdrawing

from

an

identical

project

where

his

wide

knowledge

of the

Arab

world

might

have

stood

him

in

better

stead

than

mine.&dquo;

That

the

two

did

not

opt

to

collaborate

is

unfortunate-a

joint

work

might

have

transcended,

while

incorporating,

Home’s

approach

to

the

events

resulting

from

France’s

refusal

(in

deGaulle’s

apt

phrase)

&dquo;to

marry

her

time.&dquo;

Nevertheless,

this

is

magnificent

his-

tory,

thorough,

scholarly,

and

literate.

No

student

of

insurgency,

the

Maghreb,

the

twentieth

century,

or-and

espe-

cially-contemporary

France

should

miss

it.

RICHARD

SIGWALT

Radford

College

Radford

Virginia

FRIEDRICH

V.

KRATOCHWIL.

Interna-

tional

Order

and

Foreign

Policy:

A

Theoretical

Sketch

of

Post-War

Inter-

national

Politics.

Pp.

xix,

298.

Boulder,

CO:

Westview

Press,

1978.

$20.00

This

is

in

sketch

form,

a

self-contained

theory

deriving

ordered

interaction

among

states

from

interaction

itself,

at

both

its

&dquo;strategic&dquo;

(bargaining)

and

&dquo;symbolic&dquo;

(signaling)

levels

of

ex-

pression

(pp.

1-2,

74-76,

209-210).

Pending

extreme

diversity,

irrationality,

and

multipolarity,

frequent

interactions

make

common

background

knowledge

(about

decision

premises

or

inference

rules

of

each

actor)

the

ordering

princi-

ple-a

surrogate

for

global

coercion/

consensus-to

guide

bargaining

away

from

conflictual

outcomes

(Part

I).

The

US/USSR

(1945-72)

case

classifies

those

premises-historical

analogies

(&dquo;Mu-

nich,&dquo;

&dquo;encirclement&dquo;),

metaphors

(&dquo;containment,&dquo;

&dquo;liberation&dquo;),

myths

(&dquo;two

camps,&dquo;

&dquo;Red

Scare&dquo;),

doctrines

(defense,

deterrence),

and

laws

(SALT

I)-en

route

to

a

bipolar

order

(Part

II).

The

commentary

presumes

an

advanced

reading

competence.