Admiralty - Robert S. Glenn, Jr. and Colin A. Mcrae

• Publication year: 2001

Articles

Admiraltyby Robert S. Glenn, Jr.^* and Colin A. McRae^**

I. Introduction

The Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit decided fourteen admiralty cases with written opinions in 2000. These cases can generally be divided into three broad categories: (1) cases involving the interpretation of federal statutes such as The Americans with Disabilities Act, ("ADA"), the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), theSuits in Admiralty Act ("SAA"), The Carriage of Goods By Sea Act ("COGSA"), and the Federal Maritime Lien Act ("FMLA"); (2) cases involving the interplay of admiralty law and state law in suits involving claims for attorney fees, the application of laches, and marine insurance issues; and (3) cases involving traditional maritime issues such as the interpretation of maritime contracts, salvage law and sovereign immunity.

If there is an underlying theme to the Eleventh Circuit's decisions this year, it would be that they are firmly grounded on precedent and they are consistent with the majority of other circuit courts that have addressed the same issues. In that sense, the Eleventh Circuit could be said to have promoted in 2000 one of the primary goals of the maritime bar: uniformity in maritime law.

II. Admiralty Law and the ADA

The Eleventh Circuit had two opportunities to expound upon the interaction between admiralty law and the ADA.¹ In Frederick v. Kirby Tankships, Inc.,² the Eleventh Circuit considered whether the filing of an ADA claim, in which a plaintiff alleges to be a "qualified individual"³ fit to perform essential job functions, is inherently inconsistent with a suit under the Jones Act in which the same plaintiff alleged complete disability.⁴ Frederick was a seaman aboard the M/V CHAMPION who successfully sued the vessel's owner for the injuries he sustained from a slip and fall while employed on board the vessel.⁵ He alleged these injuries caused him to be completely disabled and thus unable to work. Frederick then brought a subsequent lawsuit alleging, among other things, that he was entitled to damages under the ADA.⁶ In order to bring suit under the ADA, plaintiff must show he is a "qualified individual" who is fit to perform the essential job functions.⁷ Kirby Tankships brought a Rule 60(b)⁸ motion for relief from judgment in the Jones Act case because the ADA suit was predicated on the seemingly contradictory allegation that Mr. Frederick was a qualified individual who was fit to perform the essential job functions, despite his allegation in the previous Jones Act case that he was totally disabled.⁹

The Eleventh Circuit held that Frederick's assertions in his ADA case that he would be able to work with accommodation were not inconsistent with his claim of disability in his Jones Act case.¹⁰ The court cited to an analogous social security case in which the Eleventh Circuit held that an employee's certification of total disability for the purposes of obtaining social security benefits does not judicially estop that employee from also arguing that she is a qualified individual under the ADA.¹¹ Therefore, the court concluded that Jones Act cases asserting total disability are not inherently inconsistent with ADA cases in which the plaintiff alleges to be a qualified individual who is fit to perform essential job functions with accommodation.¹²

In its next foray into the interplay between admiralty and the ADA, the Eleventh Circuit was confronted in Stevens v. Premier Cruises, Inc.¹³ with the question of whether the provisions of Title III of the ADA apply to foreign-flag cruise ships operating in United States territorial waters.¹⁴ The Stevens case was brought by a wheelchair-bound individual who decided to take a vacation aboard the S.S. OCEANIC, a Bahamian-flag cruise ship owned by Premiere Cruises. Upon boarding, she discovered that her cabin and many public areas of the vessel were not wheelchair-accessible. Stevens brought suit in the Southern District of Florida, alleging the cruise ship's inaccessibility to persons in wheelchairs constituted a violation of Title III of the ADA. The district court dismissed her complaint on the grounds that the ADA was not applicable to the OCEANIC, and thus her complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.¹⁵

The Eleventh Circuit overturned the dismissal of Stevens' complaint holding that the provisions of the ADA are applicable to foreign-flag cruise ships in United States territorial waters.¹⁶ The court reasoned that cruise ships are places of public accommodation under the ADA because they contain many of the enumerated examples of public accommodations, such as places of lodging, restaurants, bars, theaters, and auditoriums.¹⁷ Premier Cruises argued successfully to the district court that application of the ADA would conflict with the presumption against extraterritorial application of United States statutes.¹⁸ The Eleventh Circuit rejected this argument because "a foreign-flag ship sailing in United States waters is not extraterritorial."¹⁹ Further, the Eleventh Circuit held that extending the applicability of the ADA to cruise ships in United States waters would not violate the presumption against applying United States law to the "internal management and affairs" of a foreign-flag vessel²⁰ because the vessel's accessibility to disabled American passengers does not involve the "internal management and affairs" of the vessel.²¹ The court concluded by comparing Stevens to Cunard S.S. Co. v. Mellon,²² in which the United States Supreme Court upheld the applicability of the National Prohibition Act to foreign-flag ships in United States waters.²³ The court in Stevens observed that, as with the ADA, Congress had drawn no distinction in the National Prohibition Act between domestic and foreign-flag ships and intended the Act to have a broad reach.²⁴

III. Admiralty Procedure

In addition to the numerous substantive admiralty law issues addressed by the Eleventh Circuit in 2000, the court also had occasion to decide two cases on admiralty procedural grounds. In Beluga Holding, Ltd. v. Commerce Capital Corp.²⁵ the Eleventh Circuit reviewed a case in which a litigant sought to appeal a nonadmiralty claim under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1292(a)(3), the admiralty interlocutory appeals section.²⁶ This statute gives the Federal Courts of Appeal jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal of either an admiralty claim, or a claim "integrally linked" to an admiralty claim.²⁷ Beluga Holding involved an admiralty claim (foreclosure of a ship's mortgage), as well as a non- admiralty claim (tortious conversion of stock certificates).²⁸ However, the court concluded that because these two claims had no common elements or facts, and because Beluga could prevail on one of them but not the other, the causes of action were not "integrally linked" for purposes of establishing appellate jurisdiction over the nonadmiralty conversion claim.²⁹ Therefore, the Eleventh Circuit had no appellate jurisdiction over the appeal of the stock certificate conversion claim, and the court dismissed the appeal.'"'

The Eleventh Circuit took the opportunity in Coastal Fuels Marketing, Inc. v. Florida Express Shipping Co.³¹ to clarify when it is appropriate for a federal court sitting in admiralty to apply substantive state law from the jurisdiction in which the district court sits.³² Coastal Fuels involved the question of which party was entitled to attorney fees in a marine insurance proceeds dispute in which both sides claimed victory.³³ The question of when to apply state substantive law is one with which admiralty courts have often wrestled.³⁴ The court readily conceded that no federal statutes or general maritime cases provided an answer." The court concluded that, because this was a question to which the general maritime law does not provide an answer and this issue is not one which calls for the creation of a uniform national rule in admiralty, state law may be applied.The Eleventh Circuit examined Florida state law to ascertain what standard to use in determining who is the "prevailing" party for the purposes of recovering attorney fees.³⁷ Applying standards borrowed from Florida law, the Eleventh Circuit, determined that Florida Express had clearly prevailed on the "significant issue"³⁸ tried before the court, and accordingly upheld the district court's decision to award them attorney fees.³⁹

The Eleventh Circuit also heard a case involving the use of the Supplemental Rule B attachment procedure against corporations owned by foreign nations. In Venus Lines Agency v. CVG Industria Venezolana De Aluminio, CA.⁴⁰ ("Venus Lines I"), the first of two separate cases involving these same parties,⁴¹ the issue was whether a contract of affreightment granting the carrier the "right to attach the cargo for the payment of the freight" offers a sufficient waiver of immunity under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA")⁴² to permit prejudgment attachment.⁴³ Venus Lines I involved the attachment, under Supplemental Rule B, of aluminum produced by Venalum, an aluminum-producing company controlled primarily by the Venezuelan government.⁴⁴ Venalum cited to the FSIA as a bar to this attachment proceeding on the grounds that the property of a foreign state is immune from attachment in the United States.⁴⁵ Venus Lines argued that Venalum's shipment of aluminum could be attached under an exception found in Section 1610(d) of the FSIA, which permits attachment if (1) the foreign state has explicitly waived immunity; (2) the purpose of the attachment is to obtain security and not to obtain jurisdiction; and (3) the cargo is being used for a commercial activity in the United States.⁴⁶

The primary issue facing the Eleventh Circuit in deciding whether to permit this attachment was whether the contract of affreightment's language permitting attachment amounted to an explicit waiver of immunity.⁴⁷ The court reviewed the language of the attachment provision of the contract and...