Admiralty
| Jurisdiction | United States,Federal |
| Publication year | 2016 |
| Citation | Vol. 67 No. 4 |
Admiralty
John P. Kavanagh Jr.
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The cases discussed herein represent decisions the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit issued in 2014 and 2015. While not an all-inclusive list of maritime decisions from the court during that timeframe, the Author identified and provided summaries of key decisions which should be of interest to the maritime practitioner.1
A. Medical Negligence
In Franza v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,2 the Eleventh Circuit—specifically rejecting longstanding jurisprudence from its sister circuit—held a cruise ship passenger can sue a shipowner for medical negligence under the doctrine of respondeat superior and the principles of apparent authority and apparent agency.3
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Pasquale Vaglio was a passenger aboard the Royal Caribbean cruise ship EXPLORER OF THE SEAS. On July 23, 2011, while attempting to board a trolley at a port call4 in Bermuda, Vaglio fell and suffered a severe head injury.5 The court pointed out that the complaint alleged Vaglio "was required to go to the ship's medical center to be seen for his injuries."6 It does not explain why this was the case, but it is important to note the posture of the matter on appeal. The suit was dismissed pursuant to a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)7 filed by the defendant cruise line.8 Thus, the appellate court was compelled to "accept the well-pled allegations in the complaint and construe them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."9 Accordingly, the factual recitation in the appellate decision is straight from the plaintiff's complaint, which obviously presents a one-sided version of the underlying narrative.
Following his fall and presentation at the ship's infirmary, Vaglio received a cursory exam from a nurse, "allegedly employed full-time by Royal Caribbean."10 Observing the knot and abrasion on Vaglio's head, the nurse nevertheless conducted no diagnostic tests and advised Vaglio and his family to return to their cabin. However, Vaglio's condition deteriorated. He returned to the ship's infirmary but faced another delay, as the medical providers would not examine him until the ship's personnel obtained Vaglio's credit card information.11 Vaglio was finally seen by Dr. Rogelio Gonzales ("allegedly an employee of Royal Caribbean") some four hours after first coming to the infirmary.12 The dire nature of Vaglio's condition must have been apparent to Dr. Gonzales, as he ordered Vaglio be transferred to a shoreside hospital in Bermuda. Vaglio was eventually airlifted to a hospital in New York, but sadly died approximately one week after his fall in Bermuda.13
Patricia Franza, Pasquale Vaglio's daughter, filed suit against the cruise line in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Franza advanced a trio of liability theories in her original complaint: (1) Negligence and/or misconduct for which Royal Caribbean
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was liable under the doctrine of actual agency (respondeat superior), (2) the alternative theory of apparent agency, by which Royal Caribbean led Vaglio to believe the doctor or nurse were the company's employees or agents, and (3) a theory of negligent hiring, retention, and training.14 In granting Royal Caribbean's motion to dismiss, the court made short work of the actual agency/respondeat superior claim: "[T]he district court applied the Barbetta rule to conclude that Franza's actual agency claim was 'predicated on duties of care which are not recognized under maritime law.'"15 The district court dismissed Franza's claims involving apparent agency as inadequately pled, holding Ms. Franza had not "plausibly claimed that Vaglio ever relied on the appearance of an agency relationship."16
In beginning its legal analysis, the Eleventh Circuit first stated, "Neither the Supreme Court nor this Court has ever decided, in binding precedent, whether a passenger may hold a shipowner vicariously liable for the medical negligence of the ship's employees."17 The court continued by observing that federal courts are constitutionally charged with developing fair and equitable principles to address maritime claims.18 Following this vein of reasoning, it was observed that the Supreme Court—in other contexts under the general maritime law—has imposed vicarious liability upon "maritime principals to answer for the negligence of their onboard agents."19
The court then discussed the factors which can demonstrate actual agency, the underpinning of the respondeat superior doctrine.20 Recall the allegation that the treating nurse and physician were employees of Royal Caribbean, and that the court accepted the averments as true (since the appeal followed a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint).21 Establishing an agency relationship requires: (1) acknowl-
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edgement by the principal that the agent will act for it; (2) acceptance by the agent of the undertaking; and (3) the principal's control of the purported agent's actions.22
The facts, again taken from the complaint and accepted as true, suggested Royal Caribbean held out the nurse and doctor to act on its behalf, as well as an acceptance of the medical personnel to proceed with such a role.23 Turning to the right of control, the court again easily parsed the complaint to conclude sufficient facts were alleged which plausibly demonstrated control by Royal Caribbean over its medical personnel.24
On balance, then, Franza's complaint unambiguously establishes an agency relationship between the employer, Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., and its full-time employees, Nurse Garcia and Dr. Gonzales . . . . [W]e are compelled to hold that Franza's complaint sets out a plausible basis for imputing to Royal Caribbean the allegedly negligent conduct of its onboard medical employees.25
The court then conducted a more abbreviated review and analysis of the alternative liability theory of apparent authority.26 Distinguishing respondeat superior, which derives from a principal's right of control over the conduct of its agents, the Eleventh Circuit explained that liability under apparent authority flows from equitable concerns: "[L]iability may be appropriate under apparent agency principles when a principal's conduct could equitably prevent it from denying the existence of an agency relationship."27 In Barbetta v. S/S Bermuda Star,28 the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit evidently did not address the question of apparent agency.29 This distinction has supported decisions from multiple district courts within the Eleventh Circuit to recognize a shipowner's liability under apparent agency principles for onboard medical negligence.30
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The Eleventh Circuit agreed with this approach, observing that imposition of liability via apparent agency has a long history in the maritime context and cited examples of liens arising by virtue of an agent's ordering repairs, supplies, or necessaries for its principal's ship.31 Based largely on its election to eschew the Barbetta rule, the court found "no sound basis for allowing a special exception for onboard medical negligence, particularly since we have concluded that actual agency principles ought to be applied in this setting as well."32 The determination is a fact-intensive inquiry, and the decision summarized the litany of points raised with respect to apparent authority in Franza's complaint.33 The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings.34
It was evident the Eleventh Circuit was not going to follow the lead of its sister circuit, or any of the other circuits which continue to shield shipowners from claims arising out of alleged onboard medical negligence. "[T]he roots of the Barbetta rule snake back into a wholly different world . . . . [D]espite its prominence, the Barbetta rule now seems to prevail more by the strength of inertia than by the strength of its reasoning."35
B. Cruise Line's Duty to Warn of Shore-Based Hazards
There were a couple of cases decided by the Eleventh Circuit in 2014 and 2015 which continued the reasoning and analysis from Chaparro v. Carnival Corporation.36 While the Carnival cruise ship M/V VICTORY was at a port call in St. Thomas, Virgin Islands, the Chaparro family was caught in a gang-related shooting during their return bus ride from a local beach recommended by a Carnival employee. One of the family members was struck by a stray bullet and killed. The family sued Carnival under a failure to warn theory.37
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's summary dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. R 12(b)(6).38 The court discussed the duty of a cruise line to use reasonable care under the circumstances, "which requires, as a prerequisite to imposing liability, that the carrier have
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had actual or constructive notice of the risk-creating condition, at least where . . . the menace is one commonly encountered on land and not clearly linked to nautical adventure."39 The lower court's order dismissing the suit was reversed, as there was evidence presented which suggested Carnival had knowledge of potential gang-related activity, including shootings, in or around the beach where the family was visiting.40
In the 2014 case Burdeaux v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd.,41 a cruise ship passenger was sexually assaulted while shopping in Cozumel.42 The plaintiff departed the Royal Caribbean vessel OASIS OF THE SEAS and was provided a shopping map by the cruise line which depicted "[c]ertain 'guaranteed and recommended shops.'"43 The plaintiff stopped at a jewelry cart not identified on the map and was told by the vendor that he had additional merchandise in a nearby store. The plaintiff left the designated shopping area and followed the man to his store where she was assaulted. Suit was filed in the United States District Court for the Southern District of Florida. Following discovery, the court...
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