Administrative Law
| Publication year | 2012 |
Administrative Law
Martin M. Wilson
Jennifer A. Blackburn
Courtney E. Ferrell
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This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2011 through May 31, 2012, during which principles of administrative law were either illuminated or formed an important piece of the decision making.1 For a change, the Authors observed a significant increase in the number of reported cases during the survey period, but that increase does not necessarily indicate a trend. No attempt has been made to survey cases that properly would fall under categories of more specific articles in this issue, although some degree of overlap is inevitable because of shared subject matter.
This Article begins with a discussion of cases on exhaustion of administrative remedies. Statutory construction is the next topic, followed by cases discussing discretionary appeals, and then standards of review of an agency decision. The last topic for the survey of appellate cases is sovereign immunity, and the Article concludes with a brief review of enactments from the 2012 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly.
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The Georgia Court of Appeals reaffirmed the well established rule that judicial review of a final agency decision is available only where all administrative remedies have been exhausted.2 In Alexander v. Department of Revenue,3 the trial court found that "Alexander did not exhaust his administrative remedies because he failed to ask the Commissioner [of Revenue] to review the initial decision before it became final."4 Alexander argued he could not have sought review of the initial decision by the commissioner because section 50-13-41 of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.)5 does not expressly provide for such review.6
While the statute itself does not specifically discuss "an aggrieved party applying to an agency for review of the decision of an administrative law judge," it clearly allows for an agency to undertake such a review.7 The court determined that if an agency is authorized to take on such reviews, aggrieved parties would most certainly have the ability to request such reviews themselves.8 Furthermore, O.C.G.A. § 50-13-419 provides that "decision[s] of an administrative law judge shall be treated as an initial decision" and O.C.G.A. § 50-13-1710 allows for applications to an agency for review of an initial decision in contested cases.11 Because Mr. Alexander failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him, the court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of his petition for judicial review.12
At times, the central issue in an administrative law case relates to the agency's construction of the governing statute that it is charged with administering. In Palmyra Park Hospital v. Phoebe Sumter Medical Center,13 the Georgia Court of Appeals consolidated several cases
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appealing two superior court decisions in which the court granted a hospital certificate of need (CON) issued by the Georgia Department of Community Health (DCH).14 In granting Palmyra Park Hospital's (Palmyra) CON application to provide basic perinatal services, DCH relied on a 2008 amendment to the CON statute providing that, for perinatal services, where there is only one facility in the applicant's county and fewer than three facilities in the contiguous counties, need does not have to be established.15 This provision is commonly referred to as the "Areawide Need Exception."16
On appeal, DCH asserted that "the trial courts erred in failing to defer to DCH's interpretation of the statute and in concluding that DCH exceeded its statutory authority by improperly expanding the scope of the Areawide Need Exception . . . ."17 The superior court determined that DCH's argument about the apparent legislative intent to create a "'choice' of basic perinatal providers in enacting the Areawide Need Exception" was erroneous.18 Further, the superior court found DCH "exceeded its statutory authority by determining that the presence of a choice of providers was a factor that affected other considerations in [the statute]."19
While the court of appeals acknowledged the superior court's observation that "the 'plain language' of the statute merely removes from consideration the existence of 'need,'" the court determined DCH did not improperly extend the exception to other considerations and instead simply considered the effects of the Areawide Need Exception in its analysis.20 Well established Georgia law requires the trial court to defer to such statutory interpretations by an agency.21 Accordingly, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's order reversing DCH's grant of Palmyra's CON application.22
The point in time in which a "planned interchange" becomes an actual "interchange" is speculated in Eagle West, LLC v. Georgia Department
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of Transportation.23 Eagle West, an applicant for an outdoor advertising sign, cleverly asserted that the statutory provision prohibiting signs from being erected within 500 feet of an interchange does not include interchanges that are under construction but not yet completed.24 The Georgia Department of Transportation (DOT) denied Eagle West's application for permits to erect and maintain outdoor advertising signs adjacent to Interstate 9525 under the Outdoor Advertising Control Act,26 which prohibits signs from being erected or maintained "adjacent to an interstate highway within 500 feet of an interchange . . . ,"27 The administrative law judge (ALJ) reversed the DOTs decision, finding that the plain language of the statute restricted the location of signs within 500 feet of an interchange,28 but did not apply to a proposed or future interchange.29 The ALJ rejected the DOT'S assertion that they were authorized to deny the permit application because the interchange was planned and all preconstruction work had been completed on the project.30
The DOT deputy commissioner reversed the ALJ's decision, finding that the interchange was not only planned but nearly completed because construction is the final phase of a lengthy approval process.31 Affirming the DOTs final agency decision, the superior court held: "[O]nce the location of an interchange is publicly announced, [the DOT] is authorized to deny requests for permits to build signs at or adjacent to the site of the interchange which would violate the limitations imposed by O.C.G.A. § 32-6-75(a)(18)."32
On discretionary appeal, Eagle West argued that the statutory language "within 500 feet of an interchange" is plain and unambiguous and clearly does not include planned or future interchanges.33 The rules of statutory construction require the cited clause be reviewed in the "context of the statutory provision in which it is found," as well as in "related statutory provisions[, to determine the] legislative scheme as
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a whole."34 Noting the statute fails to include modifiers such as "operational," "paved," or "fully constructed" to support Eagle West's argument, the court of appeals held that the General Assembly did not intend to limit the word "interchange" by leaving its meaning so plain and unambiguous that it only applied to constructed interchanges.35 Because the DOT deputy commissioner's denial of the permit application was consistent with the Outdoor Advertising Control Act, the decision was affirmed.36
In Northeast Georgia Cancer Care, LLC v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Georgia, Inc.,37 the issue was whether the "Any Willing Provider" (AWP) statute applied to the PPO network owned by Blue Cross and Blue Shield or the HMO network owned by BC Healthcare.38 Under the rules of statutory construction, the Commissioner of Insurance decided the AWP statute applied to both the PPO and HMO networks.39
Based on the plain and unambiguous language of the AWP statute together with relevant statutes, the court of appeals determined there was support for the Commissioner's decision as to the PPO network, but not for the HMO network.40 While the Commissioner applied the same rules to both the PPO and HMO networks, the HMO network is a separate, for-profit network.41 A plain reading of the Insurance Code provides that AWP provisions are not applicable to for-profit corporations, such as the BC Healthcare HMO network.42 Because of the clear intent of the statute, the court held the Insurance Commissioner's decision was erroneous.43
This section concludes with a case in which the Georgia Supreme Court appears divided on the proper application of the rules of statutory construction, with the majority relying heavily on legislative intent and the dissent citing the plain language of the statute. In Cardinale v. City of Atlanta,44 the appellant alleged that the Atlanta City Council violated the Open Meetings Act (the Act)45 by omitting certain informa-
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tion from the meeting minutes.46 Specifically, the meeting minutes failed to list the names of those council members who voted in the minority to amend certain council rules.47 The trial court dismissed the action and the court of appeals affirmed, holding the language of the Act does not require such information be included in the minutes.48
Both courts interpreted the statute's plain language to provide that the results of a non-unanimous, non-roll call vote must be presumed unanimous unless the agency chooses to record the names of those voting against the proposal or abstaining.49 The supreme court disagreed, holding that the statute's silence on the issue requires further review of the legislative intent and purpose of the law.50 The court stated the Act "was enacted in the public interest to protect the public-both individuals and the public generally-from 'closed door' politics and the potential abuse of individuals and the misuse of power...
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