Administrative Law

• Publication year: 2015

Administrative Law

Jennifer B. Alewine

Courtney E. Ferrell

Erin G. Watstein

[Page 1]

Administrative Law

by Jennifer B. Alewine^* Courtney E. Ferrell^** and Erin G. Watstein^***

I. Introduction

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2014 through May 31, 2015 in which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case.¹ The Article begins with a discussion of cases on exhaustion of administrative remedies, followed by a series of cases discussing standard of review for an agency decision, a review of sovereign immunity cases, and a brief review of enactments from the 2015 regular session of the Georgia General Assembly.

This Article is dedicated to the illustrious Martin M. Wilson, who authored this Article for countless years and served as an invaluable mentor to each of us as we were shepherded on board. In light of his recent retirement, Marty will now likely be found reading this article with his toes in the sand.

[Page 2]

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

This year saw no major changes in the well-established doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies and had an unusually low number of cases addressing this principle. Perhaps this doctrine has, in fact, become so well-established as to garner few challenges.

Of the two cases to be reviewed, the first involves a two-decade-old, highly litigated landfill dispute in Bartow County. In Southern States-Bartow County, Inc. v. Riverwood Farm Property Owners Ass'n,² Southern States again found itself defending its asserted vested right to build a landfill on the subject property.³ This fight dates back to a 1991 Georgia Supreme Court decision⁴ when the court declared that because the Bartow County zoning ordinance did not comply with the Zoning Procedures Law,⁵ it was invalid.⁶

Over twenty years later—with ground still unbroken on the landfill—a local neighborhood association challenged the county's issuance of a 2012 certificate of zoning compliance to Southern States, alleging the proposed landfill violated the county's zoning ordinance. While in the midst of this litigation, the Georgia Environmental Protection Division issued a permit to allow for the landfill.⁷ The neighbors subsequently challenged that grant under section 12-2-2(c)(2)(A) of the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.),⁸ which provides adversely affected parties with a thirty day appeals period before an administrative law judge.⁹ Southern States asserted that, based on the statute, the neighbors should have been required to exhaust their administrative remedies before being heard in superior court.¹⁰ The court swiftly rejected this argument, finding instead that the remedy provided in the statute would not have resolved the neighbors' primary claim—that the proposed landfill violates the county's zoning ordinance—so it could not be considered an adequate remedy and, thus, the superior court had jurisdiction to issue an injunction.¹¹

[Page 3]

The second case articulates the importance of both parties following the applicable statutory requirements related to the exhaustion of administrative remedies. In United Cerebral Palsy of Georgia, Inc. v. Georgia Department of Behavioral Health & Developmental Disabilities,¹² the superior court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss based on the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust their administrative remedies.¹³ On appeal, the plaintiffs argued they were excused from the exhaustion requirement because the defendants never provided them with the required notice of the agency decision.¹⁴ While the defendants countered that the plaintiffs had actual notice and no requirement of formal notice existed, the court disagreed with the defendants' interpretation of the manuals.¹⁵ The court distinguished that although an administrative body's interpretations of applicable statutes and administrative rules are entitled to deference, its interpretation of manuals are not.¹⁶ Based on the applicable provisions of the manual, the court concluded that mailed, written notice by the defendants to the plaintiffs was required.¹⁷ Because the defendants failed to give such notice, "they were not entitled to dismissal for the plaintiffs' failure to exhaust administrative remedies."¹⁸

III. Standard of Review for an Agency Decision

Georgia courts considering judicial review issues this year primarily focused on a number of issues: (1) the application of the "any evidence" standard to administrative decisions; (2) whether the decisions of certain administrative bodies should be reviewed de novo; (3) whether new evidence can be considered when a trial court reviews a "quasi-judicial" decision by an administrative body; and (4) whether arguments or objections not first raised before an agency could be raised in the reviewing court.

C.P.R. v. Henry County Board of Education¹⁹ was the most significant decision discussing and applying the any evidence standard this year. In this case, the court of appeals affirmed that the any evidence standard of review, not the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),²⁰

[Page 4]

applied to decisions that involve local boards of education, including the subject decision involving the appellant-student's long-term suspension.²¹ As the court of appeals stated, "it is well established that appeals from final decisions reached by local boards of education do not fall within the APA because local boards are 'not included within any of the definitions of "agency" contained in the statute.'"²² The court noted that it was immaterial that the General Assembly amended the APA in 1990 to specifically include the State Board of Education within the APA's definition of an "agency."²³ Local boards were not specifically included within the amended definition and, thus, the court of appeals "must presume that the General Assembly's decision to include the State Board but not local boards within that definition 'was a matter of considered choice.'"²⁴ The court of appeals held explicitly that the appellant's reliance on the APA's framework for judicial review was "misplaced."²⁵

C.P.R. also involved an analysis of whether the local board of education's decision should be reviewed de novo.²⁶ Specifically, the appellant relied on a recent court of appeals decision, Fulton County Board of Education v. D.R.H.,²⁷ to argue the local board's determination that he violated the student handbook was an erroneous decision of law that should be reviewed de novo.²⁸ The court of appeals held that D.R.H. was clearly distinguishable because it involved a legal question—whether the student's disciplinary appeal was moot—that would be reviewed de novo, and C.P.R. involved a "quintessentially factual question" that must be reviewed under the any evidence standard.²⁹

In Druid Hills Civic Ass'n v. Buckler,³⁰ the Georgia Court of Appeals determined that new evidence could not be considered when a trial court reviews a quasi-judicial decision from an administrative body.³¹ Specifically, the court of appeals held that because the DeKalb County Planning Commission was making a quasi-judicial determination when it approved the sketch plat at issue, "the superior court was bound by the record as developed before the commission, and could not consider

[Page 5]

the issue of the Association's standing," which had not been raised before the Planning Commission.³² Because the trial court reached the contrary conclusion and granted a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court of appeals reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion.³³

Finally, in Georgia Peace Officer Standards and Training Council v. Hodges,³⁴ the court of appeals discussed whether proof of procedural irregularity in an agency hearing could be considered by a reviewing court if the irregularity was not first raised before the agency.³⁵ Citing O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(c),³⁶ the court of appeals held that "objections or arguments must first be raised before the agency prior to raising the issue in the reviewing court."³⁷ This requirement was not obviated by the exception in O.C.G.A. § 50-13-19(g)³⁸ allowing superior courts to hear evidence of alleged procedural irregularities in an administrative proceeding that are not in the record.³⁹

IV. Sovereign Immunity

The topic of sovereign immunity received an unusual amount of attention from the Georgia Supreme Court during this survey period. The court devoted particular attention to the topic of the transposition of official immunity issues into the analysis of sovereign immunity.

In City of Atlanta v. Mitcham,⁴⁰ the Georgia Supreme Court reversed the holding of the court of appeals and held that "the care of inmates in the custody of a municipal corporation is a governmental function for which sovereign immunity has not been waived."⁴¹ In this case, a diabetic inmate alleged that the city was negligent in failing to monitor his blood sugar levels.⁴² The trial court denied the city's motion to dismiss, which was based on sovereign immunity grounds, and the court of appeals affirmed, holding sovereign immunity was waived under

[Page 6]

O.C.G.A. § 36-33-1(b)⁴³ and "the provision of medical care to inmates in the City's . . . custody was a ministerial act."⁴⁴ The Georgia Supreme Court reversed and endeavored to clear up any misunderstanding with respect to sovereign immunity issues.⁴⁵

The court acknowledged that municipal corporations have "dual functions, performing in the exercise of its corporate functions two classes of service, governmental duties and private corporate, or ministerial, duties."⁴⁶ The court also acknowledged that there exists a "difficulty in determining to which of the two classes a function belongs, the proper classification depending in each case on an interpretation of the powers and duties delegated to the corporation and the character of the function being performed."⁴⁷ The court of appeals erred when it transposed the issue of...