Administrative Law

• Publication year: 2020

Administrative Law

Alan Gregory Poole Jr.

Chelsea M. Lamb

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Administrative Law

by Alan Gregory Poole, Jr.^* and Chelsea M. Lamb^**

I. Introduction

This Article surveys cases from the Georgia Supreme Court and the Georgia Court of Appeals from June 1, 2018 through May 31, 2019, in which principles of administrative law were a central focus of the case.¹ Exhaustion of administrative remedies will be the first topic discussed, followed by a review of decisions by administrative agencies, followed by cases discussing the administrative scope of authority, with statutory construction to follow. The Article will conclude with cases discussing the standard of review of decisions by administrative agencies.

II. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

In Georgia Department of Human Services v. Addison,² the Georgia Supreme Court held that teachers and administrators were required to exhaust available administrative remedies before bringing any as-applied constitutional challenges to Georgia's child abuse registry statute and administrative rules.³ The plaintiffs, a group of high school teachers and administrators who worked with special education students at Albany High School, were accused of child neglect for failing to provide adequate supervision after two incidents of alleged sexual abuse between students. The claims were investigated by the Division of Family and Children Services (DFCS), which found the allegations to

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be "substantiated."⁴ DFCS informed the plaintiffs through notices that they had a right to an administrative hearing in accordance with section 49-5-183(a)⁵ of the official Code of Georgia Annotated (O.C.G.A.).⁶ Though the administrative process was still pending, the plaintiffs' names were added to the Georgia Child Abuse Registry,⁷ and the plaintiffs filed suit in the Dougherty County Superior Court requesting a declaratory judgment and injunctive relief against the defendants.⁸ The superior court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that "the Registry statutes violate due process because alleged child abusers [were] not given an opportunity to be heard before being added to the Registry; the notices . . . were insufficient" because they were insufficiently specific about the abuse, and "the definition of 'substantiated case' in OCGA § 49-5-180 [was] vague."⁹ As a result, the superior court declared O.C.G.A. §§ 49-5-180 through 49-5-187¹⁰ "unconstitutional 'on their face and as applied to' the plaintiffs."¹¹ The defendants filed a notice of appeal, arguing in part that the plaintiffs failed to exhaust their "administrative remedies before seeking judicial review of their claims."¹²

On appeal, the plaintiffs contended that they "were not required to exhaust their available administrative remedies because their constitutional challenges to the Registry statutes are entirely facial rather than as-applied."¹³ The court agreed with the plaintiffs, holding that under Georgia law facial challenges do not require exhaustion of administrative remedies.¹⁴ The court also held, however, that as-applied challenges do require exhaustion of administrative remedies.¹⁵ As such, the trial court should have dismissed the as-applied challenge because the plaintiffs had failed to exhaust their administrative remedies by

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filing the action during the pendency of the related administrative proceeding.¹⁶

In C&M Enterprises of Georgia, LLC v. Williams,¹⁷ the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the plaintiff's appeal was "not barred by a failure to exhaust administrative remedies."¹⁸ In March 2016, Mark Williams, the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, determined that a portion of riverfront property in Bryan County was illegally located in a protected estuarine area.¹⁹ Williams directed the structure's owner, C&M Enterprises of Georgia, LLC, to remove the structure, which C&M appealed to an administrative law court²⁰ pursuant to O.C.G.A. § 12-5-283.²¹ The Administrative Law Judge (A.L.J.) granted Williams' motion for summary judgment, and the Fulton County Superior Court affirmed.²²

On appeal, Commissioner Williams argued that because C&M failed to appeal a related cease and desist order in 2010 (which sparked the eventual determination of the Department of Natural Resources in 2016) that C&M failed to exhaust its administrative remedies.²³ The Georgia Court of Appeals agreed that there is a "[l]ong-standing Georgia law [that] requires that a party aggrieved by a state agency's decision must raise all issues before that agency and exhaust available administrative remedies before seeking any judicial review of the agency's decision."²⁴ The court, however, ultimately concluded that the 2010 cease and desist letter was only a preliminary occurrence in a greater proceeding that resulted in a final administrative ruling in 2016, which C&M properly appealed.²⁵

Next, in Carson v. Brown,²⁶ the Georgia Court of Appeals held that the "release" of a permit application back to an applicant during a

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permit moratorium is not a decision on the permit application, and therefore the permit application was not "rejected" for the purpose of triggering the administrative process of O.C.G.A. § 5-6-34.²⁷ The plaintiffs, Carson and Red Bull Holdings II, LLC (collectively Carson), filed for construction permits with the Forsyth County Department of Planning and Community Development (the Department).²⁸ The Department returned the permits back to Carson, stating that the permits were "released" due to a county-imposed moratorium, but did not expressly reject the permits.²⁹ Carson filed a mandamus petition seeking to "compel Brown and Williams"—Tom Brown, the director of the Department, and Carroll Williams, the planner of the Department—"to process his application for a land-disturbance permit submitted in anticipation of developing certain real property in Forsyth County."³⁰ The trial court granted Carson a partial motion for judgment on the pleadings against Brown and Williams. One of the issues in question was whether the trial court should have dismissed the action due to the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies.³¹ Brown and Williams claimed that the trial court had erred in not rejecting the application for failure to appeal the application's rejection as required by the County's Unified Development Code.³² The court of appeals determined, however, that the trial court did not err in failing to dismiss for this reason as the defendants contended.³³ In so determining, the court noted that there was no decision made on the permit application, and therefore, the plaintiffs could not appeal the permit's "rejection" as would otherwise be required by the statute.³⁴ The County's "release" of the permit application was not a decision, nor was the County's letter an "independent rejection of the application."³⁵ Therefore, Carson's action was not barred due to a theory of exhaustion of administrative remedies.³⁶

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III. Review of Decisions Made by Administrative Agencies

In Altamaha Riverkeeper, Inc. v. Rayonier Performance Fibers, LLC,³⁷ the Georgia Court of Appeals remanded a case concerning water quality standards back to the deciding A.L.J. due to the use of an incorrect legal standard.³⁸ Altamaha Riverkeeper (Riverkeeper) petitioned the Georgia Court of Appeals to review the Wayne County Superior Court's reversal of the refusal to issue a permit by an A.L.J. The permit was initially issued by the Environmental Protection Division (EPD) of the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, and the A.L.J. reversed the issuance.³⁹ In deciding to reverse, the A.L.J. "interpreted the phrase 'interfere[nce] with legitimate water uses'"⁴⁰ from the Georgia Water Quality Control Act (WQCA)⁴¹ "to mean 'any interference' with such uses," concluding that this standard applied to all waterways for all uses without exception.⁴² Further, the A.L.J. concluded that "to show interference with legitimate water uses, the 'use of the river [must be] actually hindered or disrupted.'"⁴³ Finding this standard unmet, the A.L.J. overturned the issuance of the permit by the EPD. On review, the Wayne County Superior Court found that the A.L.J. erred in interpreting the standard in the WCQA, concluding instead that the EPD's interpretation of the standard as one of "unreasonable interference" was correct, and reversed the decision of the A.L.J.⁴⁴

In deciding this issue, the court of appeals read the text of the standard "in its most natural and reasonable way, as an ordinary speaker of the English language would."⁴⁵ To assist with that reading, the court considered the common and customary usage of the word, the context of the word, and dictionary definitions.⁴⁶ Given an analysis of these sources, the court of appeals held that the EPD could reasonably conclude that the standard "does not require that 'all people get to use all sections of every waterbody at all times.'"⁴⁷ Accordingly, the court of

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appeals held that the superior court correctly decided that the standard prohibits "unreasonable" interference congruent with the EPD standard contrary to the A.L.J. finding.⁴⁸ However, the court of appeals held that the proper remedy was for the trial court to remand the case back to the A.L.J. for a determination based upon the correct legal standard.⁴⁹

In Grogan v. City of Dawsonville,⁵⁰ the Georgia Supreme Court held that the plaintiff, Grogan, was entitled to a direct appeal from the City of Dawsonville's decision to remove Grogan as mayor.⁵¹ The Dawsonville City Council (City) voted to remove the mayor of the city, W. James Grogan, from his position, citing "provisions of former Section 5.16 (1) of the Dawsonville Charter."⁵² Grogan sought review of the decision by filing an appeal with the Dawson County Superior Court; the City filed a counterclaim against Grogan for attorney's fees and money had and received.⁵³ Grogan then moved to dismiss the City's counterclaim pursuant to...