Addressing Challenges to Homeland Security Information Sharing in American Policing: Using Kotter’s Leading Change Model

• Published date: 01 October 2019
• DOI: 10.1177/0887403418786555
• Date: 01 October 2019
• Author: David E. Lambert
• Subject Matter: Essay

https://doi.org/10.1177/0887403418786555

Criminal Justice Policy Review

2019, Vol. 30(8) 1250 –1278

© The Author(s) 2018

Article reuse guidelines:

sagepub.com/journals-permissions

DOI: 10.1177/0887403418786555

journals.sagepub.com/home/cjp

Essay

Addressing Challenges

to Homeland Security

Information Sharing in

American Policing: Using

Kotter’s Leading Change

Model

David E. Lambert1,2,3

Abstract

The sharing of homeland security information is a crucial aspect of modern policing

in the United States. This article outlines some of the obstacles to information

sharing at the state and local levels, including interagency and intra-agency issues

that arise for police agencies. It explores the complexities of information sharing

across a highly decentralized policing system. Many police departments lack a formal

intelligence function that limits their ability to share information. This article offers

an organizational change model using John Kotter’s Leading Change principles that

police agencies of any size can follow. It outlines Kotter’s eight-stage process from

establishing a sense of urgency through anchoring new approaches in the culture

to create a framework for police departments to integrate homeland security

information sharing. Its intent is to provide a framework for police agencies to

incrementally implement some of the recommendations of the various strategic

documents that guide information sharing.

Keywords

information sharing, homeland security intelligence, intelligence-led policing, law

enforcement intelligence, terrorism

1University of New Haven, West Haven, CT, USA

2Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI, USA

3Institute for Intergovernmental Research, Tallahassee, FL, USA

Corresponding Author:

David E. Lambert, Roger Williams University, 1 Old Ferry Rd. Bristol, RI, 02809, USA.

Email: dlambert@rwu.edu

786555CJPXXX10.1177/0887403418786555Criminal Justice Policy ReviewLambert

research-article2018

Lambert 1251

Introduction

After the 9/11 attacks, it became a rallying cry that police and intelligence agencies

would work together to connect the dots to prevent and interdict future terrorist acts

(Business Executives for National Security [BENS], 2016; Gilmore, 2003; Kruger &

Haggerty, 2006; U.S. Department of Justice, 2003, 2005). There is an expectation

among many that the field of American policing is fully engaged in homeland security

and counterterrorism including information sharing and intelligence gathering (BENS,

2016; D. Carter, 2004; Cilluffo, Clark, & Downing, 2011; Henry, 2002; Holden, 2003;

Office of Justice Programs, 2004; Randol, 2013; White, 2004). Although there is a

serious need to utilize all our law enforcement resources to detect and prevent future

terrorist attacks, it is far less certain whether state and local agencies are invested in

this counterterrorism activity in a significant way (Jenkins, Liepman, & Willis, 2014;

Ortiz, Hendricks, & Sugie, 2007; Randol, 2013). To effectively connect the dots, field-

based information sharing entities at all levels need to collect, process, analyze, and

disseminate intelligence to federal, state, and local police departments, a mission that

is not a component of traditional policing. The challenge to information sharing in

American policing is considerable.

Statement of the Problem

There has been substantial criticism of the current state of homeland security informa-

tion sharing (D. Carter, 2004; Chermak, Carter, Carter, McGarrell, & Drew, 2013;

Government Acountability Office (GAO), 2013; Offices of the Inspectors General,

2017; Taylor & Russell, 2012); yet, most of these examinations have analyzed issues

from a national perspective. Few have analyzed the challenges of information sharing

and intelligence collection from the ground level, state and local policing (Carter,

2016; J. G. Carter, Phillips, & Gayadeen, 2014; J. G. Carter & Phillips, 2015). Much

has been written regarding fusion centers as information and intelligence sharing hubs

(J. G. Carter, Carter, Chermak, & McGarrell, 2017; J. G. Carter, Lewandowski, &

May, 2016; Lewandowski, Carter, & Campbell, 2017a; Lewandowski, Carter, &

Campbell, 2017b; Taylor & Russell, 2012). This article specifically examines barriers

at the state and local police agency unit of analysis.

This article focuses on law enforcement and homeland security information, which

are demarcated somewhat differently. Law enforcement information is defined in the

Information Sharing Environment Guidelines (Office of the Director of National

Intelligence [ODNI], 2006) as any information obtained by or of interest to a law

enforcement agency or official that is both

 related to terrorism or the security of our homeland and

 relevant to a law enforcement mission, including but not limited to

○information pertaining to an actual or potential criminal, civil, or adminis-

trative investigation or a foreign intelligence, counterintelligence, or coun-

terterrorism investigation;