Accounting for Competition, ‘Circuits of Power’ and Negotiated Order Between Not‐For‐Profit and Public Sector Organisations

AuthorLars G. Hassel,Jean C. Mutiganda,Arne Fagerström
Date01 November 2013
DOIhttp://doi.org/10.1111/faam.12023
Published date01 November 2013
Financial Accountability & Management, 29(4), November 2013, 0267-4424
Accounting for Competition,
‘Circuits of Power’ and Negotiated
Order Between Not-For-Profit and
Public Sector Organisations
JEAN C. MUTIGANDA,LARS G. HASSEL AND ARNE FAGERSTR¨
OM
Abstract: This study analyses the role of accounting information in negotiating
contractual relationships in the framework of circuits of power during a competitive
tendering process. The study asks how institutionalised accounting information
affects taken-for-granted ways of thinking and acting by institutional actors in
negotiating inter-organisational order when analysed using the framework of circuits
of power. Field research took place in a Finnish not-for-profit aged care organisation
and municipality from 2008 to 2012. The study shows that institutionalised
accounting information cannot be taken-for-granted to prevail in obligatory passage
points of the circuits of power in negotiating order.
Keywords: accounting information, circuits of power, institutional change, negoti-
ated order, public sector competition
INTRODUCTION
Accounting for competition, within the public sector, has attracted increased
attention among academics and practitioners since the European Union (EU)
The first author is M.Sc. in Economics, Finance Director and Research Fellow in Accounting
at the School of Business and Economics at ˚
Abo Akademi University, Henriksgatan, Finland.
The second author is Dr. Sc. and Professor of Accounting at Ume˚
a School of Business and
Economics, Sweden. The third author is Dr. Sc. and Associate Professor of Accounting at the
University of G¨
avle, Sweden. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 13th Biennial
CIGAR, Ghent, Belgium, 8–10 June, 2011. The authors wish to thank participants at that
conference, Professor Gary Cunningham, Professor Giuseppe Grossi, and two anonymous
referees for their constructive comments. The authors are thankful for financial support
provided by the research institute and the School of Business and Economics, ˚
Abo Akademi
University.
Address for correspondence: Jean Mutiganda, School of Business and Economics at ˚
Abo
Akademi University, Henriksgatan 7, 20500 ˚
Abo-Turku, Finland.
e-mail: jmutigan@abo.fi.
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Oxford OX4 2DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 02148, USA. 378
ACCOUNTING, CIRCUITS OF POWER AND NEGOTIATED ORDER 379
passed a directive on competitive tendering for the public procurement of
goods and services in its member countries (Arlbjørn and Freytag, 2012).
Mandatory competition has led to institutional change in public sector
organisations by opening the door for foreign competition (Gunnar, 2009). In
some areas, such as health care, however, public authorities still have discretion
to negotiate contractual relationships with local organisations directly when
deemed necessary (Mossialos et al., 2010). How local organisations use their
accounting information in this context, as a source of power1to negotiate con-
tractual relationships with public authorities, remains an unexplored research
area.
Burns and Scapens (2000) provided a conceptual framework to analyse
the intra-organisational process through which institutionalised management
accounting rules and routines shape the ways of thinking and acting of
institutional actors that are taken-for-granted in their fields (Scapens, 2006).
Their framework has been applied in accounting studies focusing on insti-
tutionalisation of management accounting change (Lukka, 2007; and Ribeiro
and Scapens, 2006), budgetary practices (Hyv¨
onen and J¨
arvinen, 2006; and
Macinati, 2010), cost allocation (Lucas and Rafferty, 2008), and management
control systems (Nyland et al., 2009). However, the Burns and Scapens (2000)
framework has a theoretical gap (Scapens and Varoutsa, 2010), especially when
analysing how institutionalised accounting information can be taken-for-granted
as a stream of power in negotiating inter-organisational relationships.
This study uses a multiple theory approach, based on the framework of
circuits of power (Clegg, 1989) and theory of negotiated order (Strauss, 1982),
to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework. The theory of negotiated
order states that the ways of doing of organisations and their actors are
outcomes of negotiations. Negotiation is any process through which two or
more negotiating parties use their thinking, talking and doing to influence
each other (Strauss, 1978). Therefore, any negotiated order depends on the
organisational setting and the context of negotiation (Strauss, 1982). The theory
of negotiated order provides a platform to analyse how institutionalised policies
become tools of negotiating further institutional change (Basu et al., 1999) and
macro institutional factors that affect institutionalisation of accounting change
(Modell, 2006). Lapsley et al. (2011) have shown, however, that the theory of
negotiated order is not useful in conceptualising the role of power in negotiating
order.
In order to extend the Burns and Scapens (2000) framework to the theory
of negotiated order, this study uses the framework of circuits of power (Clegg,
1989). Clegg (1989) argues that power and resistance go hand in hand and
form various circuits that shape the actions of organisational actors. A circuit
of power is an inter-related structure of power that is held by a given number
of actors or organisations (Clegg, 1989). Circuits of power are, according to
Clegg (1989), threefold. The power to influence the action or conduct of another
person or organisation is episodic; the power to use discretion about how to apply
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2013 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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