§64.02 Construction of A Decree

• Jurisdiction: Washington

§ 64.02 CONSTRUCTION OF A DECREE

Issues pertaining to the construction of a decree can arise in a variety of post-decree circumstances.

[1] General Standards of Interpretation

The interpretation of a decree presents a question of law for the court. Gimlett v. Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699, 705 , 629 P.2d 450 (1981). When an order is ambiguous, a reviewing court seeks to ascertain the intention of the court that entered the original decree by using general rules of construction applicable to statutes, contracts, and other writings. Id.; Callan v. Callan, 2 Wn. App. 446, 468 P.2d 456 (1970). For example, the court may consider the purpose of the clause in question. Kruger v. Kruger, 37 Wn. App. 329, 679 P.2d 961 (1984). In Kruger, a support order required the husband to continue paying child support past the age of 18 until the child was age 21, so long as each child was engaged in a full-time program of higher education. Wife brought an action to enforce the child support provisions. Husband contended that the phrase "so long as" must be read as words of limitation, meaning "until such time," not "during such time," and assigned error to the trial court's calculation of unpaid child support, which included the time the children were enrolled in school after age 18. The Court of Appeals concluded that the purpose of providing support beyond age 18 was clearly to encourage and aid the children in pursuing higher education and to decrease any financial disadvantage they might suffer as a result of their parents' divorce. The more restrictive reading of the clause urged by the husband would not further this purpose, and the court held that the trial court had properly construed the decree in this regard.

Undefined, unambiguous terms within a legal document or statute are given their ordinary meaning, which may be determined by referring to a dictionary. In re Marriage of Tower, 55 Wn. App. 697, 703, 780 P.2d 863 (1989), review denied, 114 Wn.2d 1002 (1990). Contracts are construed to give a reasonable, fair, just, and effective meaning to all manifestations of intent. In re Marriage of Nielsen, 52 Wn. App. 56, 58, 757 P.2d 537, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1023 (1988). Further, a court will not construe a divorce decree as requiring a person to perform a "vain and useless act." In re Marriage of Sager, 71 Wn. App. 855, 859-60, 863 P.2d 106 (1993). In Sager, the court rejected the argument that when a divorce decree required the obligor to make the minor children beneficiaries of life insurance, the obligor's only duty was to "make" the minor children beneficiaries for a moment in time; and once he did that, he had no further duty to "maintain" them as beneficiaries, and he could remove them at will. The court observed that a requirement to make the children beneficiaries for only a moment in time would be reading the decree as requiring a vain and useless act, and instead read it in accordance with its obvious intent, which was to require the obligor to make the minor children beneficiaries for as long as they were dependent minors.

Washington courts have historically been limited to examining the provisions of the decree itself to resolve issues concerning its intended effect, Gimlett, 95 Wn.2d 699; Puckett v. Puckett, 41 Wn. App. 78, 702 P.2d 477, review denied, 104 Wn.2d 1018 (1985), although ambiguity was sometimes resolved by reviewing the property settlement agreement, Kirk v. Jacobson, 85 Wn.2d 85, 88, 530 P.2d 643 (1975). Technically, the court's inquiry is not into the intent of the parties. Berry v. Berry, 50 Wn.2d 158, 161, 310 P.2d 223 (1957). Therefore, the focus of the proceeding is on the intent of the trial court as it is expressed in the findings and decree. Thus, affidavits from the parties as to what they intended would be irrelevant.

Although the court's inquiry historically has been into what the court meant, not what the parties intended, id. at 161, this approach has evolved over time. Washington courts have also held that interpretation by the reviewing court must be based upon the parties' intent as reflected in the language of the incorporated agreement. Byrne v. Ackerlund, 108 Wn.2d 445, 455, 739 P.2d 1138 (1987); Sullivan v. Aetna Life and Cas., 52 Wn. App. 876, 879, 764 P.2d 1390 (1988), review denied, 112 Wn.2d 1009 (1989). In In re Marriage of Coyle, 61 Wn. App. 653, 811 P.2d 244, review denied, 117 Wn.2d 1017 (1991), an ambiguity existed as to whether the award of term insurance was an award of property, or an award creating a continuing obligation, akin to maintenance. The court stated that the decree should be given a construction that makes it a rational and probable agreement, and that the circumstances and intent of the parties should be considered. Id. at 662. The intent of the parties is determined by examining their objective manifestations, including both the written agreement and the context within which it was executed. If the agreement has only one reasonable meaning when viewed in context, that meaning necessarily reflects the parties' intent. If the agreement has two or more reasonable meanings when viewed in context, the court must identify and adopt that which reflects the parties' intent. In the latter situation, a...