§ 24.07 MEANING OF MIRANDA: "CUSTODY"

• Jurisdiction: United States

§ 24.07. Meaning of Miranda: "Custody"¹¹⁰

[A] General Principles

Miranda warnings prior to questioning are required "only where there has been such a restriction on a person's freedom as to render him 'in custody.' "¹¹¹ According to Miranda, "custody" arises when a person is "taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way." As the Court has subsequently explained that statement, a person is "in custody" for purposes of receiving Miranda warnings if "there is a 'formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement' of the degree associated with a formal arrest."¹¹²

In determining whether a person is in custody, "a court must examine all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation."¹¹³ Ironically, therefore, although Miranda was intended to serve as a bright-l ine alternative to the totality-of-the-circumstances voluntariness standard, there is no bright line (formal arrests aside) for determining whether "custody" exists and, therefore, whether Miranda potentially applies.

One matter that is not a factor in determining whether a subject is in custody is an "officer's subjective and undisclosed view concerning whether the person being interrogated is a suspect."¹¹⁴ Indeed, according to the Court, "the initial determination of custody depends on the objective circumstances of the interrogation, not on the subjective views harbored by either the interrogating officers or the person being questioned."¹¹⁵ Put simply, "the only relevant inquiry is how a reasonable man in the suspect's position would have understood his situation."¹¹⁶

For example, in Berkemer v. McCarty,¹¹⁷ O, a police officer, observed M driving erratically on a highway. O forced M to pull over and get out of his car. When M complied, O observed that M had difficulty standing. At that moment, O subjectively determined that M would be charged with a driving offense and taken to jail—M was not free to leave and would soon be formally arrested. Without informing M of his Miranda rights, O asked M whether he had been using intoxicants.

The Supreme Court held that M's answer to O's question was admissible, because M was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. O's unarticulated plan to arrest M had no bearing on the issue. The correct issue was what a reasonable person in M's shoes would have understood to be his situation. The Court concluded that at the time of the brief questioning, a reasonable driver in M's shoes would not have believed that he was under arrest or in "the functional equivalent of formal arrest." The relevant inquiry in all cases is, simply, "how a reasonable person in the position of the individual being questioned would gauge the breadth of his or her 'freedom of action.' "¹¹⁸

As the preceding discussion suggests, there are "two discrete inquiries" in custody analysis: (1) "what were the circumstances surrounding the interrogation"; and (2) "given those circumstances, would a reasonable person have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave."¹¹⁹ In the Miranda context, this latter inquiry requires more than that the interrogated party would reasonably believe he has been temporarily detained, but, as noted above, that the restraint constitutes a formal arrest or a restriction on his movement comparable to a formal arrest.

More recently, in Howes v. Fields,¹²⁰ the Court summarized "custody" analysis this way:

[T]he initial step is to ascertain whether, in light of "the objective circumstances of the interrogation," a "reasonable person [would] have felt he or she was not at liberty to terminate the interrogation and leave." And, in order to determine how a suspect would have "gauge[d] his 'freedom of movement,' " courts must examine "all of the circumstances surrounding the interrogation." Relevant factors include the location of the questioning, its duration, statements made during the interview, the presence or absence of physical restraints during the questioning, and the release of the interviewee at the end of the questioning.
Determining whether an individual's freedom of movement was curtailed, however, is simply the first step in the analysis, not the last. Not all restraints on freedom of movement amount to custody for purposes of Miranda. We have "decline[d] to accord talismanic power" to the freedom-of-movement inquiry, and have instead asked the additional question whether the relevant environment presents the same inherently coercive pressures as the type of station house questioning at issue in Miranda.

[B] Commonly Asked "Custody" Questions

[1] Does "Focus" Equal "Custody"?

The Miranda opinion suggested that "custody" and "focus" (as the latter term was used in Escobedo v. Illinois¹²¹) were synonyms.¹²² In fact, however, as the Court has since conceded, "focus" can exist in the absence of "custody," in which case Miranda warnings are not...