§ 24.06 IS MIRANDA A CONSTITUTIONALLY BASED DECISION?

• Jurisdiction: United States

§ 24.06. Is Miranda a Constitutionally Based Decision?

[A] Act 1: Congress and Miranda

In 1968, Congress passed the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act. It provided in pertinent part:

§ 3501

Admissibility of confessions

(a)

In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the District of Columbia, a confession . . . shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury, determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence. . . .

(b)

The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense for which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of counsel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.

The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the confession.

As the Supreme Court later observed in Dickerson v. United States,⁹⁹ "[g]iven § 3501's express designation of voluntariness as the touchstone of admissibility, its omission of any warning requirement, and the instruction for trial courts to consider a nonexclusive list of factors relevant to the circumstances of a confession, . . . [it is evident] Congress intended by its enactment to overrule Miranda."

But, Congress cannot overrule a constitutional right. Therefore, Section 3501's legitimacy—or, put another way, Miranda's continued vitality — was placed in issue with enactment of this legislation. For approximately three decades, however, Section 3501 remained dormant: Federal law enforcement officers continued to give Miranda warnings as a matter of course, and federal prosecutors did not claim that Section 3501 undid Miranda.

[B] Act 2: Miranda as a "Prophylactic Rule"

The constitutional underpinnings of Miranda were seemingly cut out from under it by the Supreme Court in Michigan v. Tucker.¹⁰⁰ In Tucker, T was not fully informed of his constitutional rights as mandated by Miranda. Consequently, T's statement obtained by the police was excluded at his trial. At issue, however, was whether the fruit of the confession—the testimony of a witness whose name came to light in T's Miranda-less statement—was also inadmissible, as a "fruit of the poisonous tree."

In order to resolve the fruit issue, the Court, per then-Associate Justice William Rehnquist, asked a foundational question: "[W]hether the police conduct complained of directly infringed upon [T's] right against compulsory self-incrimination or whether it instead violated only the prophylactic rules developed to protect that right." The Court's answer was that "[c]ertainly no one could contend that the interrogation faced by [T] bore any resemblance to the historical practices at which the right against compulsory self-incrimination was aimed," namely, the "ecclesiastical inquisitions and Star Chamber proceedings occurring several centuries ago." Therefore, "the police conduct here did not deprive [T] of his privilege against compulsory self-incrimination as such, but rather failed to make available to him the full measure of procedural safeguards associated with that right since Miranda."

What did the Court mean by speaking of Miranda as "only" a "prophylactic" rule? Essentially, what lawyers and scholars...