The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996: a new one-year limitation for filing a federal habeas corpus petition.

• Author: Glaid, Douglas J.

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), enacted and effective on April 24, 1996, dramatically changed the legal landscape of federal habeas corpus law. One of the many features of this statute was the addition of a one-year limitation period for the filing of habeas corpus petitions by state and federal prisoners.(1) Section 28 U.S.C. [sections] 2244(d)(1) of the AEDPA provides in pertinent part that

(d)(1) A one-year time period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a state court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of--

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date upon which the impediment to filing an application created by unconstitutional state action was removed, assuming the applicant was prevented from filing by state action;

(C) the date upon which the alleged constitutional right was recognized by the Supreme Court if the right was newly recognized and held applicable on habeas corpus;

(D) the date upon which the factual predicate of the claim or claims could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for state post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132,110 Stat. 1214, codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. [sections] 2244. This act is presumed to have become effective on April 24, 1996, the date it was enacted.(2)

By this statutory provision, Congress obviously intended to impose a one-year statute of limitations for the filing of federal habeas claims by state prisoners. The purpose of the statutory reform was to curb the lengthy delays in filing that were occurring in federal habeas corpus litigation, while preserving the availability of habeas review when a prisoner diligently pursues state remedies and applies for federal habeas relief in a timely manner.(3)

A plain reading of the language of [sections] 2244(d) logically leads to the conclusion that Congress intended that the limitations period be interpreted as a statute of limitations, and not a jurisdictional bar(4); for the AEDPA's limitations period does not "speak in jurisdictional terms" and does not expressly refer to any limitations on jurisdiction.(5) To the contrary, [sections] 2244(d)(1) merely states that "a one-year time period of limitation shall apply" and does not contain any restrictive language that would imply a limit on federal court jurisdiction.(6)

When Does the One-year Period Commence?

In determining the commencement date of the running of the one-year federal statute of limitations, it is first necessary to consider whether the habeas petitioner's conviction(s) predated or postdated the enactment of the AEDPA. In the event a habeas petitioner's conviction predated the enactment of the AEDPA, he or she is entitled to a "grace period" of one year from the date of enactment, i.e., until April 23, 1997, to file his or her federal habeas petition excluding any time during which a "properly filed" application for collateral relief was "pending."(7) Aside from the grace period, events that could extend the time for filing the habeas petition by such petitioner include the state's creation of an unconstitutional impediment, the emergence of a newly recognized constitutional right, or the discovery of a claim previously undiscoverable with due diligence. See 28 U.S.C. [sections] 2244(d)(1)(B) through (D), supra.

Assuming that the petitioner's conviction postdated the effective date of the AEDPA, 28 U.S.C. [sections] 2244(d)(1) of the AEDPA lists four dates, as stated above, the latest of which starts the running of the one-year period of limitations. The most common of the four events which can start the limitations period is the date on which a habeas petitioner's conviction becomes final upon "the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review."

In Florida, assuming a criminal defendant directly appeals a conviction, the defendant's judgment of conviction becomes final on the date on which the appellate court's mandate issues following the court's affirmance of the defendant's conviction.(8) If a defendant does not appeal a conviction, which is most common where a guilty or no contest plea is entered, the conviction is deemed final upon the expiration of the "time for seeking such (direct) review," i.e., 30 days from the rendition of the order imposing defendant's sentence.(9) If, following a direct appeal, a defendant timely seeks discretionary review of the case in the Florida Supreme Court, the commencement date for filing a habeas petition is extended until the Supreme Court denies discretionary review or issues an opinion and its mandate.(10) Moreover, although the issue has not yet been directly decided by the 11th Circuit Court of Appeals, it has been held by other circuits that the commencement date is extended for the 90-day period of time for filing a petition for certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court.(11) This is so regardless of whether a certiorari petition is ever, in fact, filed.(12)

However, it is noteworthy that in Coates v. Byrd, 211 F.3d 1225, 1226 (11th Cir. 2000), the 11th Circuit held that the time during which a petition for writ of certiorari is pending, or could have been filed, following the denial of collateral relief in the state courts (as opposed to the denial of relief after direct review), is not to be subtracted from the running of time for the AEDPA's limitations purposes, i.e., does not toll the running of the statute of limitations. The court's holding was based on a distinction between the language of two provisions of the AEDPA regarding the tolling of the statute during direct review and...