Youngblood is Old News in Adoption Law All South Carolina Residents have Statutory Standing to Seek Adoption, 0319 SCBJ, SC Lawyer, March 2019, #46
| Author | By Robert S. Trey Ingram III |
| Position | Vol. 30 Issue 5 Pg. 46 |
By Robert S. "Trey" Ingram III
Every family court lawyer even remotely familiar with foster care and adoption in the last five years is likely well-versed in references to Youngblood v. S.C. Dep't of Soc. Serus., 402 S.C. 311, 741 S.E.2d 515 (2013). Many of those practitioners are probably also quite familiar with its decade-old predecessor Michael P. v. Greenville County Dep't of Soc. Serus., 385 S.C. 407, 684 S.E.2d 211 (Ct.App. 2009). However, 2018 was quite a year for South Carolina adoption law. The South Carolina Supreme Court issued two significant opinions - S.C. Dep't of Soc. Serus. v. Boulujare, 422 S.C. 1, 809 S.E.2d 223 (2018) and S.C. Dep't of Soc. Serus. v. Smith, 423 S.C. 60, 814 S.E.2d 148 (2018). In addition, statutory standing was revamped courtesy of the General Assembly. Because of these changes, citing Youngblood has become a thing of the past.
This article provides a brief, yet instructive, refresher on Michael P. and Youngblood, followed by an overview of the latest progeny of foster care/adoption opinions from the South Carolina Supreme Court (Boulujare and Smith) as well as the infamous (and now newly revised) title 63, chapter 9, section 60 of the South Carolina Code. For those anxious for a conclusion up front, the main take away of the 2018 changes is that now any South Carolina resident has statutory standing to petition the family court for an adoption of any child in this state regardless of who has legal or physical custody of the child.
The Old: Michael P. and Youngblood
Youngblood (and to a lesser extent Michael P.) have been cited against foster parents in South Carolina Department of Social Services (DSS) cases for years in arguments that went something like this: "These are merely the foster parents; they do not have standing to intervene or to petition the family court to adopt a child in foster care. See Youngblood; Michael P."
An admittedly oversimplified explanation of the holding in Michael P. is that former foster parents lacked statutory standing to petition the family court to adopt a child in foster care who had been removed from their home and " placed" for adoption in another home by DSS. The Court of Appeals explained: We find the plain meaning of the statute and intent of the Legislature when enacting subsection (B) of 63-9-60 was to clarify that not just "any South Carolina resident" can petition to adopt a child when the child has been placed by DSS in another home for the purposes of adoption. Accordingly [the foster parents] do not have standing based on this statute because Child was placed by DSS in [a different pre-adoptive home] for purposes of adoption.
Michael P., 385 S.C. at 415, 684 S.E.2d at 216.
Here the Court of Appeals first announced its interpretation that section 60(B) of the South Carolina Adoption Act conditioned or limited subsection (A) on who may petition to adopt a child; and the condition or limitation imposed was this: "when the child has been placed by DSS in another home for the purposes of adoption." Id. "[A]s former foster parents, who declined to challenge DSS's removal of Child, [foster parents] do not have standing to initiate a private adoption action once Child was placed by DSS into a different pre-adoptive home." Id. at 418, 684 S.E.2d at 217.
By comparison, again in overly simplified terms, the nuance of the Youngblood holding was that foster parents lacked statutory standing to petition to adopt children still in their homes if DSS had "placed" them elsewhere by merely selecting a different adoptive resource. Like the Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court interpreted section 60 so as to deprive foster parents of statutory standing when the family court order granted a termination of parental rights and vested DSS with authority to consent to adoption and when DSS had "placed" the child for adoption. The Court explained: Thus, while section 63-9-60(A) broadly grants standing to "any South Carolina resident," section 63-9-60(B) makes that grant of standing inapplicable to a child placed for adoption by DSS."
Youngblood, 402 S.C. at 318, 741 S.E.2d at 518.
Importantly, the Supreme Court clarified and expressly defined what is meant by the verb "placed": Rather than its ordinary meaning connoting a change in physical location, the verb "place" is used by the statutory language and DSS to mean the selection of an adoptive family. While Child had been placed with another family as of March 17, 2009, she physically remained in the care of the [foster parents] at that time.
Id., at 314, 741 S.E.2d at 516, n.2. Accordingly, once authorized by the family court, DSS could "place" a child through "the selection of an adoptive family" and thereby divest a ll others of statutory standing...
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