Year of Upheaval: A symposium on the future of U.S. foreign policy.

• Position: Pp. 4-82

Part 1 of 2

Emma Ashford

In December 2021, Secretary of State Antony Blinken addressed negotiations over Russia's formidable military buildup around Ukraine. He reiterated that the United States would not discuss Russian concerns over Ukrainian membership in NATO, arguing that "one country does not have the right to exert a sphere of influence. That notion should be relegated to the dustbin of history." At the Munich Security Conference, mere days before the invasion, this assertion was echoed by a variety of policymakers, including the German foreign minister, Annalena Baerbock, who argued that Europe faced a stark choice: "Helsinki or Yalta... The choice, in other words, between a system of shared responsibility for security and peace... or a system of power rivalry and spheres of influence."

It is therefore easy to see why many have hailed the war in Ukraine--and the unexpected successes of the Ukrainian military in pushing back the initial Russian onslaught--as a repudiation of spheres of influence in world affairs, and a reassertion of the notion of an American-led liberal international order in which power and might matters less than norms and values.

But nothing could be more mistaken. A sphere of influence is not a normative concept, nor something a state cedes to another out of courtesy or pity. It is instead a simple fact: the place where one great power is unwilling or unable to commit the necessary resources to force another state to submit. In that regard, Ukraine is itself not a repudiation of the idea of spheres of influence, but rather a clear example of how they work in practice. Ukraine is both a clear indicator of the limits of America's global sphere of influence in the post-Cold War period, and a demonstration of the extent to which Russia is able to defend what it sees as its own regional sphere. The war in Ukraine thus does not mark a continuation of the unipolar moment, but instead, a dividing line between the period when the United States saw the whole world as its sphere of influence, and a new, more multipolar world in which U.S. power is constrained and limited.

To put it another way: the war in Ukraine has demonstrated three things about the shifting balance of global power.

First, while America may still claim a global sphere of influence, it is not willing in practice to risk a nuclear war with Russia to protect Ukraine. American arms, intelligence, and finance have undoubtedly served to tip the balance in the conflict, but it will not be fought by American troops. Second, spheres of influence are rarely uncontested, and Russia has thus far proven incapable of imposing its will on Ukraine, failing to achieve both its primary and secondary military goals in this war. As such, the boundaries of a potential Russian sphere of influence may in practice be far smaller than assumed prior to February 24. They may be limited to little more than Russia's own borders.

Third, while much of the coverage of the war in Ukraine has been framed in this bipolar way--presenting the conflict as a struggle between Russia and the West--the response to the war has been far less clear-cut. Outside of Europe, most states have taken a more nuanced approach to the crisis.

Poorer African and Asian states have joined UN votes condemning Russia, but have not joined sanctions. India has refused to take sides, a decision rooted in its partial dependence on Russian military exports, and has benefitted from cut-rate Russian oil exports. The Gulf States have for the most part carefully cultivated their neutrality, refusing to increase oil production or even to call the conflict a war. Meanwhile, Beijing has pursued cautious support of Moscow, but has resisted any deeper political or economic involvement.

None of this suggests either that we are headed back into the post-Cold War unipolar moment, or that we are headed for a new Cold War-style showdown with Russia, or even with both Russia and China. Instead, it suggests that the world is increasingly fracturing into a more complex and multipolar environment, one in which America's long-running foreign policy adventurism and overreach are liable to leave it overextended. For all the triumphalism of the Washington foreign policy narrative on Ukraine, it would be foolish for U.S. policymakers to assume that this war presents either a vindication of the liberal order, or a repudiation of power politics and spheres of influence. Instead, it suggests that they must learn to navigate a world that is not divided into black and white, but rather, into many shades of grey.

Emma Ashford is a Resident Senior Fellow with the New American Engagement Initiative in the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security.

Dan Caldwell

Russia's vile war of aggression against the people of Ukraine has accelerated discussion about the future of U.S. foreign policy. However, the terms of debate have done more to confound than clarify. While foreign policy elites declare that the Russian invasion "changes everything," their resounding chorus offers a familiar refrain, namely, the vindication and perpetuation of U.S. global primacy.

In truth, Russia's invasion of Ukraine does not change the fact that America's global power position is constrained. The heady days of unipolarity are over. Policymakers who fail to acknowledge those realities when dealing with the fallout from the war in Ukraine will only make America less safe and threaten the conditions of our prosperity.

To be sure, the United States retains a powerful economy and military. But unlike in the early 1990s, the United States faces real global competitors--in particular China--along with domestic challenges that will require better prioritization and trade-offs.

While far from guaranteed, there is a reasonable chance that China's total economic power will overtake the United States within the next few years. China's economy now comprises 18 percent of the world's gross domestic product (in terms of purchasing power parity) compared to 16 percent for the United States. Additionally, future American economic growth is threatened by record levels of inflation and a $30 trillion national debt.

Meanwhile, the U.S. military has spent the last two decades bogged down in a handful of endless wars across the Middle East and Africa. The price of these conflicts has been steep. Thousands of American lives were lost and more than $8 trillion squandered. These conflicts also wore down important strategic assets like our B-1 bomber fleet, incentivized investments in platforms like the Littoral Combat Ship that are not suited for combat against near-peer adversaries, and forced cuts to the U.S. Air Force and Navy to build an Army designed to fight counterinsurgency conflicts in strategic backwaters.

Moreover, these wars were unpopular--both at home and abroad--and their pernicious effects have eroded the power of American leadership. The challenges facing America have not gone unnoticed. Many countries have refused to join the American and European-led sanctions regime imposed on Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine. These nations are clearly hedging their bets in a world where American dominance is less certain. This even includes countries that have benefitted from the American security umbrella. Take the United Arab Emirates for example, which has enabled Russian oligarchs to escape targeted sanctions on their assets. The Emirati crown prince doubled down on this bad behavior when he refused a call from President Joe Biden to discuss energy market distress.

The United States should not tolerate a delusional foreign policymaking elite that ignores real constraints on American power. Instead, our leaders should adopt a sober and realistic approach to the current state of the world that recognizes our limits so that America can remain safe and prosperous.

In Eastern Europe, the United States must make it clear to our wealthy European partners that they are primarily responsible for the security of their own continent. Russia's failures in Ukraine have revealed that its conventional armed forces are not a threat to well-funded and well-trained European armies--even without significant American support. A Russian Army that cannot take Kharkiv certainly cannot take Warsaw, Berlin, or Paris.

Accordingly, the United States should encourage the strengthening and development of non-NATO security architectures in Europe, like the European Union's Common Defence and Security Policy. To effectively facilitate this, the United States must avoid taking actions that encourage free-riding under the American security umbrella. This would include short-sighted policies like more permanent deployments of U.S. troops to Europe, or NATO expansion to countries such as Finland and Sweden.

In the Middle East, the United States should resist efforts by authoritarian petro-states such as Saudi Arabia to exploit the current energy crisis caused by the war in Ukraine to extract more security commitments from the United States. Instead, the United States should draw down from this increasingly less important region--especially from the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Syria--in order to free up resources for other priorities.

Real U.S. interests are at stake in East Asia, and this region will require careful navigation of perilous waters. China is a rising competitor that poses challenges that U.S. policymakers must take seriously. To deal with this, the United States should continue to develop defensive systems and technologies that enable partners in the region to deter Chinese aggression. Future defense budgets should prioritize funding for the Air Force and Navy over other branches since these two services would be at the forefront of any potential conflict in the Pacific. Additionally, the U.S. intelligence community should confront China's malign economic and military espionage activities more aggressively.

But U.S. leaders should avoid...