Year in Review 1999: Cases from Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court of Appeals, U.s. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and U.s. District Court for the District of Alaska

• Jurisdiction: Alaska,United States
• Publication year: 2000
• Citation: Vol. 17

§ 17 Alaska L. Rev. 161. YEAR IN REVIEW 1999: CASES FROM ALASKA SUPREME COURT, ALASKA COURT OF APPEALS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, AND U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Alaska Law Review
Volume 17
Cited: 17 Alaska L. Rev. 161

YEAR IN REVIEW 1999: CASES FROM ALASKA SUPREME COURT, ALASKA COURT OF APPEALS, U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT, AND U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

Michael R. Asam, Antony L. Sanacory, William R. Terpening, and Jonathan M. Werner

I. INTRODUCTION

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

III. BUSINESS LAW

IV. CIVIL PROCEDURE

A. Costs and Attorney's Fees

B. Damages

C. Miscellaneous

V. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

A. Due Process

B. Equal Protection

C. The Legislature

D. Miscellaneous

VI. CRIMINAL LAW

A. Constitutional Protections

B. General Criminal Law

VII. EMPLOYMENT LAW

A. Discrimination

B. Labor Law

C. Workers' Compensation

D. Miscellaneous

VIII. FAMILY LAW

A. Child Support

B. Child Custody

C. Dissolution of Marriage and Distribution of Marital Property

D. Miscellaneous

IX. INSURANCE LAW

X. PROPERTY

XI. TORT LAW

APPENDIX

FOOTNOTES

[*pg 162]

I. INTRODUCTION

Year in Review contains brief summaries of selected decisions handed down in 1999 by the Alaska Supreme Court, Alaska Court of Appeals, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and U.S. District Court for the District of Alaska. The summaries focus on the substantive areas of the law addressed, the statutes or common law principles interpreted, and the essence of each of the holdings. Attorneys are advised not to rely upon the information contained in this review without further reference to the cases cited.

The opinions have been grouped according to general subject matter rather than the nature of the underlying claims. The summaries are presented alphabetically in the following ten areas of the law: administrative, business, civil procedure, constitutional, criminal, employment, family, insurance, property, and torts.

II. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

In White v. State Department of Natural Resources, ^[1] the Alaska Supreme Court held that the Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") violated a lease assignee's due process rights. ^[2] DNR ruled that a lease had expired without first granting a hearing when a factual dispute existed over whether the conditions for automatic [*pg 163] extension of the lease had been met. ^[3] White, the assignee, leased land from the state for oil and gas exploration. ^[4] The lease provided for automatic term extension if the lessee drilled such that the "bottom hole location is in the leased area . . . as of the date on which the lease otherwise would expire . . . ." ^[5] Because there was a factual dispute between DNR and White over whether this condition had been met, DNR's commissioner violated White's due process by not granting a hearing. ^[6] The court emphasized that a hearing would not have been required in the "absence of substantial and material issues crucial to the determination." ^[7]

In Native Village of Elim v. State, ^[8] the Native Village of Elim ("Elim") sued the Board of Fisheries, alleging that the Board was not sufficiently protecting their interests under the subsistence law. ^[9] Elim believed that a commercial fishery was depleting the supply of fish on which Elim residents lived, and requested that the Board intervene. ^[10] The Board had already limited the number of fish that the commercial interest could take, but refused to further lower this cap. ^[11] Elim brought suit contesting many of the Board's practices. ^[12] The supreme court held that the Board possessed the requisite experience necessary to set policy for enforcing the sustained yield clause of the Alaska Constitution ^[13] and the subsistence law. ^[14] Thus, the Board did not abuse its discretion by rejecting a numerical limit for fisheries in favor of a flexible standard. ^[15] The court reasoned that the Board was in the best position to devise a formula that saved time, money, and energy. ^[16] Applying a reasonable basis standard, ^[17] the court held that the Board also had authority to set geographical scope and type of fish restrictions in this situation. ^[18]

[*pg 164]

In Halter v. Department of Commerce and Economic Development, Medical Board, ^[19] the supreme court held that Alaska Statutes section 08.64.326(a)(8)(A) was not vague as applied to Dr. Halter to sanction him for professional incompetence. ^[20] Defendant filed a complaint against Halter, alleging professional incompetence based on the statute, because he had not properly recorded prescriptions for controlled substances on his patients' charts. ^[21] Halter argued that the statute was vague and violated his due process rights because it contained no standard of conduct regarding record keeping. ^[22] The supreme court held that the statute was not vague as applied to Halter because Alaska case law does not require the State to promulgate standards to further define "professional incompetence." ^[23] The statute sufficiently warns doctors that if their professional performance does not meet acceptable levels in the current state of the art, their license may be revoked. ^[24]

In Willis v. State, Department of Revenue, Child Support Enforcement Division, ^[25] the supreme court held that a Child Support Enforcement Division ("CSED") hearing officer failed to explain adequately her reasons for denying a financial hardship exemption to lower child support payments and provide relief from child support arrears. ^[26] The supreme court noted that the CSED usually is not required to explain a denial of the hardship exemption if the denial is based on a finding that no hardship exists. ^[27] The court noted that the denial could have been reached on any of three different reasons: (1) there was no finding of hardship with respect to the arrears; (2) the CSED hearing officer did not believe she had the authority to reduce arrears under the hardship exemption; or (3) the hearing officer simply did not consider the issue of reducing arrears. ^[28] However, due to the unique procedural facts of the case and the ambiguity of the decision, the supreme court could not determine the basis for the CSED hearing officer's decision. ^[29] Moreover, the supreme court [*pg 165] stated that the hearing officer had the authority to reduce arrears retroactively and that there was adequate evidence of past financial hardship to require consideration of this request. Therefore, the supreme court remanded the case to the hearing officer for determination on the question of a retrospective exemption covering Willis's child support debt. ^[30] The supreme court rejected Willis's claim that the hearing officer failed to explain adequately her reasons for refusing to reduce Willis's ongoing obligations. ^[31] The court reasoned that the exemption is an exception within a broader rule, Alaska Civil Rule 90.3, and applies only to unusual cases. ^[32] Therefore, the rule must be sufficiently flexible to be applied to unique circumstances. ^[33]

In Romann v. State, Department of Transportation and Public Facilities, ^[34] the supreme court held that the Department of Transportation and Public Facilities ("DOT") correctly auctioned a lease to state-owned airport property because there were two competing applications for the lease. ^[35] A month before Romann's twenty-year lease of state-owned airport property expired, he applied for renewal. ^[36] Before the thirty-day period for public comment ran, another person applied to lease the property. ^[37] After determining that both applications met its approval, the DOT Review Committee decided to sell the lease at public auction. ^[38] Romann argued that Alaska Administrative Code section 40.320(c)(1)'s "first come-first served" rule governed and, therefore, he should have received the lease when the DOT Review Committee first approved his application. ^[39] However, the supreme court noted that a harmonious reading of sections 40.320(c)(1) and 40.320(c)(8)(A) requires that the latter section's public auction provision governs when there are conflicting applications. ^[40] Additionally, failing to require an auction would defeat the purpose of the notice requirement. ^[41]

[*pg 166]

In McConell v. Department of Health and Social Services, Division of Medical Assistance, ^[42] the supreme court held that the State was not contractually required to provide Dr. McConell with education pertaining to proper Medicaid billing protocols before it sanctioned him for improper billing practices. ^[43] Dr. McConell argued that in a previous incident, the State had agreed in a settlement to provide education that would have prevented the instant violations. ^[44] Thus, the State's failure to do so caused these most recent violations. ^[45] The supreme court held that the State did not in fact have a contractual duty to provide the education, because the settlement on its face did not create such a duty. ^[46] In fact, the agreement required Dr. McConell to pay for the education. ^[47] The court further held that the State did not violate the covenant of good faith and fair dealing implied in the settlement because the State's conduct did not breach the objective or subjective components of the covenant. ^[48]

In Boyd v. State, ^[49] the supreme court held that...