Yao, Anton, and Greene explore a range of work on the economic and policy implications of "weak" patents--patents that have a significant probability of being overturned or are relatively easy to circumvent--for innovation and disclosure incentives, antitrust policy, and organizational incentives and entrepreneurial activity.

• Position: Conferences

Yao, Anton, and Greene explore a range of work on the economic and policy implications of "weak" patents--patents that have a significant probability of being overturned or are relatively easy to circumvent--for innovation and disclosure incentives, antitrust policy, and organizational incentives and entrepreneurial activity. Weak patents cause firms to rely more heavily on secrecy. Thus, the competitive environment is characterized by private information about the extent of the innovator's know-how. In such an environment, weak patents increase the likelihood of imitation and infringement, reduce the amount of knowledge that becomes publicly disclosed, and potentially reduce the incentives to innovate. Further, weak patent rights increase the likelihood of patent litigation over commercially...