The Yamashita War Crimes Trial: Command Responsibility Then and Now

• Author: Bruce D. Landrum
• Pages: 03

1. Introduction

General Tomoyuki Yamashita was a man at the wong place at the wong time. Toward the end of World War 11. a8 United States forces were slicing through the Pacific, the Japanese high command knew that an attack an the Philippines was likely.' But Field Marshal Terauchi, the Japanese Southern Army Commander, had lost confidence in his man on the scene in the Philippines, Lieutenant General Kuroda.2 On 26 September 1944, Kuroda was relieved as 14th Area Army Commander and General Yamashita was appointed to replace him.3 Arriving from his pnor command in Manchuria and assuming command of the 14th Area Army on 9 October 1944, Yamashita had a mere eleven days before the American invasion of Leyte began on 20 October.' He received little or no turnover from Kuroda or his staff, inherited an army with a number of new and untrained soldiers, and was immediately tasked with supporting the defense of Leyte.5 General Yamashita barely had time to put together a staff,6 learn the situation, and make basic defensive plans He undoubtedly was not thinking about "law of war" trammng.

Pendleton, CdiCmm~, 1989.91, Marine Corps Funded Legal Education Program', 1956.89, Series Commander. Marme Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island. Saufh Carahns, 1885.86, Platoon CammanderBeitelm Staff'Company Exswtwe Oficer 2d Battalion, 6th Mennes. Cemp Lqeune. North Carolma, 1983-85.

.RICHARD L LAEL. THE YAXAIHITA

WAR Celvrs A ~ D

COMMAND

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4ld at 8rid a 3, 8-10'Yamaahna's chosen chief of ~tsadid not even arnve on the ecene from hv prior command until 20 October, the day of the Amencan invebi~nof L+e Id st 8

General Yamashita had no way of knowing that he would be judged against the 8mctest standard e ~ e r devised to hold B commander responsible for the actions of his subordinates Sat only was he at the wong place and time when he rook command of the 14th Area .Army. he also was at the wrong place and time when he was captured and tried as B war criminal the fallowing \ear

11. The War Crime:

By December of 1944, General Yamashita had gwen up on try ~ n g to support the defense of Leyte and decided to concentrate on defending Luzan 7 To do this, he divided his army into three noups each of which would be responsible for a different sector of the island Yamashita's "Shobu" Group would occupy the northern sec-tor, while Lieurenant General Yokoyama's "Shimbu" Group would have the ector that included Manila 8 As It turned out. the vast majority of Japanese atrocities were committed in Yokoyama's sec-tor, dunng the time after Yamaahita had departed Manlla to go north

The greatest numbers of civil~ans were killed m the Batangas Province, an area under the con~rol of Colonel Fuj~shige,

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Yokoyama subordinate The total was estimated at 26,000 killed Because Fujishige's forces (known as the Fuji Force) were far removed from Yokoysma's main farce, the general gave m1smn-oriented guidance to hi6 colonel, but left the details of execution to his discretion Filipino guerrilla resmtance was the main problem for the Fuji Force. so Colonel Fujishige decided. an his own authonty, to declare war on the civilian population 10 Fujmhige reportedly told hie subordinates that "all the civilians have now turned into guerril. las; therefore, kill all of them."" With orders like this, it E easy to see why such astounding numbers of civilians were murdered in Batangas

The next highest number of atrocities occurred in Manila. dur~ n g the defense of that uty by the remaining Japanese naval forces. technically attached to Yamashita's army but acting cantraiy to hia orders. General Yamashita had no intention of defending Manila.

Id at 12*Id 81 13 The third group *as the Kenbu' group commanded b? Ma:ar General Tsuksda in the Bataan Pmnsuia Feu li an? *ai crime8 *ere alleged to haie occurred in this sector Id at 13, 140sin re Yaamaihita 327 US 1. 14,1946 ULmprc note 1 at 34 35

but uanted to keep it as long as possible to remove as many of his supplies as he could from the city 12 Apparently. Rear Admiral lwabuchi, Commander of the Manila Naval Defense Force was either unable to withdraw in time. or had decided to defend the city with his 20,000 men 13 By the time that...