XVII. Commentary-Maritime and Coalition Operations: Neil Brown

• Author: Neil Brown
• Pages: 303

T he United Kingdom's participation in operations against al Qaeda and the Taliban (in support of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM) is, with the exception of the contribution to the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan, pursuant to the right to self-defense codified in Article 51 of the UN Charter. In those operations, the United Kingdom is participating in an extensive, US-led, multi-national coalition. No single set of coalition rules of engagement (ROE) exists for all states participating in Operation ENDURING FREEDOM. Each nation operates under its own national ROE, for what are perfectly understandable reasons. After all, the ROE are produced specifically for each mission, taking into account the threat, and it is each nation's policy and its view of the relevant international law which will define its national mission. Whereas for other coalition and combined operations, ROE are routinely shared, it seems more than likely, for reasons I will explain, that nations will, for the foreseeable future, keep a fairly close hold on the 1. Commander Neil Brown is an judge advocate serving in the UK Royal Navy. During the initial phase of Operation ENDURING FREEDOM he was assigned as a liaison officer to US Central Command.

ROE applying to their forces undertaking missions in what is often referred to as the 'global war on terrorism.' The history of the United Kingdom is one that speaks to our marked involvement in the Gulf of Arabia over a long period. After all, oil production in the Gulf region began in earnest to meet the need for oil to fuel the Royal Navy's ships. In recent years, the United Kingdom has routinely deployed warships to the Gulf, first to keep oil flowing through the Straits of Hormuz during the Iran-Iraq War, and (apart from initial operations against Iraq following the invasion of Kuwait) ever since then in support of UN Security Council Resolution 665.2

The Royal Navy's familiarity with the region has been a tremendous operational strength, as has working with many of the same coalition members while adjoined to the US Central Command. In the days following September 11th, this familiarity was also, I sense, something of a complication. It is perhaps inevitable that differences between missions not sharing the same legal bases would not be immediately obvious, particularly when set against the political and media background presenting a united front in the war on terrorism. The fact that operations...