X. [§ 1.47] Standing

• Jurisdiction: Maryland

X. [§ 1.47] STANDING

A plaintiff must have standing in order to successfully pursue a proper cause of action. Opinions from the Court of Appeals that discuss and explain standing include George v. Baltimore Cty., 463 Md. 263, 275, 205 A.3d 950, 956 (2019) (taxpayer standing); Floyd v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 463 Md. 226, 241, 205 A.3d 928, 937 (2019) (taxpayer standing); State Center, LLC v. Lexington Charles Limited Partnership, 438 Md. 451, 92 A.3d 400 (2014) (taxpayer and property owner standing); Anne Arundel County v. Bell, 442 Md. 539, 113 A.3d 639 (2015) (taxpayer and property owner standing); Chesapeake Bay Foundation, Inc. v. DCW Dutchship Island, LLC, 439 Md. 588, 97 A.3d 135 (2014); Kendall v. Howard Cty. 431 Md. 590, 66 A.3d 684 (2013); and Ray v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 430 Md. 74, 59 A.3d 545 (2013).

The Court of Special Appeals summarized standing principles in Norman v. Borison, 192 Md. App. 405, 420, 994 A.2d 1019, 1027 (2010), aff'd on other grounds, 418 Md. 630, 17 A.3d 697 (2011), commenting:

Standing is a threshold issue; a party may proceed only if he demonstrates that he has a real and justiciable interest that is capable of being resolved through litigation. Mayor & City Council of Ocean City v. Purnell-Jarvis Ltd., 86 Md. App. 390, 403, 586 A.2d 816 (1991). In order to have standing, a party must demonstrate an "injury-in-fact," or "an actual legal stake in the matter being adjudicated." Hand v. Mfrs. & Traders Trust Co., 405 Md. 375, 399, 952 A.2d 240 (2008) (citation omitted).

Norman v. Borison, 192 Md. App. at 420, 994 A.2d at 1027.

The Court then applied those principles to conclude that the plaintiff in the case before it lacked standing. Id. at 421-23, 994 A.2d at 1028-30.

The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in the case and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals on other grounds. Norman, 419 Md. 630, 17 A.3d 697. In doing so, it specifically noted that it was "bypassing" the standing question and that it "should not be understood to subscribe necessarily to the Court of Special Appeals' reasoning with regard to its disposition of the standing issue." Id. at 649 n.13, 17 A.3d at 708 n.13.

The Court of Special Appeals described the two-part test courts apply when assessing whether a plaintiff has standing:

To maintain standing, a plaintiff must demonstrate both that (1) he or she "has an interest such that he [or she] is personally and specifically affected in a . . . way different from the public generally," and that (2) "the interest sought to be protected by the complainant is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in question." Id. at 603-04, 66 A.3d 684 (alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted).

With respect to the first prong, a plaintiff must allege "special damage," or that the injury they suffered was "concrete and particularized," as opposed to an injury based on an "abstract, generalized interest" shared by all members of the general public. Kendall, 431 Md. at 609, 614-15, 66 A.3d 684. Such "special damage" must be "differing in character and kind from that suffered by the general public." Id. at 603-04, 66 A.3d 684 (quoting Evans v. State, 396 Md. 256, 328, 914 A.2d 25 (2006)).

Paula v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 253 Md. App. 566, 581, 268 A.3d 972, 981 (2022). The Court also rejected the appellants' purported taxpayer standing. Id. at 588, 263 A.3d 986.

Also note Maddox v. Cohen, 199 Md. App. 63, 71, 20 A.3d 153, 158 (2011), rev'd on other grounds, 424 Md. 379, 36 A.3d 426 (2012). There the court stated, "[a]s a threshold inquiry in any litigation, a party must be able to demonstrate 'a real and justiciable interest that is capable of being resolved through litigation.'" Id. at 71, 20 A.3d at 158 (quoting Norman v. Borison, 192...