The Wrong Place at the Wrong Time? Territorial Autonomy and Conflict During Regime Transitions

• Published date: 01 November 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/00104140231168365
• Author: Andreas Juon,Daniel Bochsler
• Date: 01 November 2023
• Subject Matter: Articles

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Comparative Political Studies

2023, Vol. 56(13) 1996–2029

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DOI: 10.1177/00104140231168365

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The Wrong Place at the

Wrong Time? Territorial

Autonomy and Conf‌lict

During Regime

Transitions

Andreas Juon

1

and Daniel Bochsler

2,3

Abstract

This article evaluates how territorial autonomy affects ethnic mobilization and

conf‌lict during regime transitions. Previous research has highlighted its

conf‌lict-inducing role during prominent transition contexts. Alternatively, it

has shown its pacifying role in the “average”case, without distinguishing

transition periods from stable contexts. Addressing these gaps, we argue that

the de-escalatory consequences of autonomy depend on critical stabilizing

factors which are themselves “muted”during transitions. We test our ex-

pectations in a cross-national analysis, covering all regime transitions between

1946 and 2017. We also revisit the 1989 transition from Communism, fo-

cusing on the role of “inherited”autonomy in the post-communist successor

states. This enables us to address concerns whereby autonomy is offered to

ward off transitions or whereby transitions are themselves induced by

mobilization. Our f‌indings indicate that during transitions, territorial au-

tonomy increases the likelihood of ethnic mobilization, government con-

cessions in response, and violent escalation where these are not forthcoming.

1

ETH Zurich, Switzerland

2

Central European University (CEU), Wien, Austria

3

University of Belgrade, Serbia

Corresponding Author:

Andreas Juon, ETH Zurich, Haldeneggsteig 4, Zurich 8092, Switzerland.

Email: andreas.juon@icr.gess.ethz.ch

Keywords

federalism, race, ethnicity and politics, civil war, ethnic conf‌lict,

democratization and regime change

Introduction

Regime transitions are profoundly unstable times and often entail intense,

sometimes violent, political conf‌lict (Cederman et al., 2010;Hegre et al.,

2001;Snyder, 2000). Does territorial autonomy reduce these risks, by re-

assuring diverse ethnic groups of their security in unstable times? Or is

territorial autonomy a basis for ethno-nationalist mobilization, which group

leaders might opportunistically exploit while the new regime is still un-

consolidated (Cornell, 2002;Hale, 2004;Saideman et al., 2002)? A recent

surge of conf‌licts in autonomous regions in democratizing or newly inde-

pendent states underlines the importance of these questions.

In spite of these questions’profound implications, previous research faces

diff‌iculties addressing them. A f‌irst strand of research highlights the poten-

tially destabilizing role of autonomy and reaches pessimistic conclusions.

However, it focuses on a small set of regime transitions during which ter-

ritorial autonomy did coincide with ethnic mobilization and conf‌lict (Bunce,

1999;Hechter, 2000, p. 149–152; Sambanis & Shayo, 2013, p. 316). In

contrast, a second strand attains more optimistic conclusions. Using evidence

from large global samples, these studies indicate that autonomy reduces ethnic

mobilization and conf‌lict in most cases, by alleviating the grievances of

diverse groups (Anderson, 2014;Cederman et al., 2015;Saideman et al.,

2002). This strand provides compelling evidence for the “average”case.

Moreover, it pays increasing attention to the conditions under which au-

tonomy operates. However, it has so far not distinguished stable contexts from

periods of regime transitions, which constitute far more diff‌icult environments

for territorial autonomy to “work,”similar to post-conf‌lict contexts

(Cederman et al., 2015).

In this article, we address this gap. We argue that the uncertainty associated

with regime transitions moderates how territorial autonomy affects ethnic

mobilization and conf‌lict. First, the lack of reliable information on the new

regime’s capabilities and intentions increases the risk of strategic miscalcu-

lations between autonomous groups and the government. Second, the un-

predictable consequences of transitions for future ethnic relations reduce the

grievance-alleviating effect of territorial autonomy. And, third, the prospect

that territorial autonomy might itself be withdrawn during transitions in-

centivizes group leaders to mobilize while the new regime is still uncon-

solidated. In consequence, during regime transitions, we expect autonomy to

be more likely to fuel destabilizing bargaining and thereby raise the risks of

Juon and Bochsler 1997

ethnic mobilization and conf‌lict. In contrast, during periods of regime stability,

these escalatory dynamics are “muted”by the grievance-alleviating conse-

quences of territorial autonomy.

We test our expectations in two quantitative, cross-national analyses. First,

we investigate how autonomy affects ethnic mobilization and conf‌lict in a

comprehensive, global sample of regime transitions since the Second World

War. Thereby, we avoid an exclusive focus on prominent transitions asso-

ciated with conf‌lict. Second, we revisit the already prominently discussed case

of ethnic mobilization during the transition from Communism. In contrast to

previous work, we shift focus from the socialist federations’initial breakup to

the consequences of “transmitted”autonomy in their successor states.

Complementing our global analysis, this enables us to alleviate concerns

whereby autonomy might be offered to ward off regime transitions or whereby

transitions might themselves be induced by ethnic mobilization in the f‌irst

place. In this second set of analyses, we use new f‌ine-grained data on territorial

autonomy. This enables us to study its impact in a stepwise manner.

Together, our analyses indicate that the relationship between territorial

autonomy and ethnic mobilization and conf‌lict differs between periods of

regime transition and periods of regime stability. During transitions, ethnic

groups with substantial territorial autonomy are not only more likely to

mobilize for self-determination, but also more likely to obtain concessions,

and to violently escalate their contestations. We f‌ind that this relationship is

mitigated where autonomous groups are included in the central government.

Thereby, they underline advice that autonomy should be combined with

central government inclusion (Bakke, 2015;Cederman et al., 2015)to

generate trust and enable institutionalized bargaining during regime

transitions.

Literature Review

We start by def‌ining two key terms used in this article. First, we employ the

term (territorial) “autonomy”to refer to the degree of territorial self-

government available to an ethnic group. While some scholars conceive of

autonomy as a dichotomous concept (Vogt et al., 2015), others conceptualize

it as a matter of degree, whereby autonomy arrangements are composed of

political autonomy (ethnic groups having their own executive and legislative

institutions), broad policy-making competences, and independent f‌iscal re-

sources (Bakke, 2015;Hooghe et al., 2016). Second, under “regime transi-

tions”we subsume periods where a previously authoritarian regime introduces

competitive elections, or vice-versa where democracy is suspended, and

periods where a polity recently attained statehood (Hegre et al., 2001, p. 37).

We now discuss prior evidence on how territorial autonomy affects ethnic

mobilization and conf‌lict. A f‌irst inf‌luential body of research highlights that

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