Work‐on‐demand in patchwork capitalism: The peculiar case of Uber's fleet partners in Poland

• Published date: 01 November 2023
• Author: Bartosz Mika,Dominika Polkowska
• Date: 01 November 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1111/ntwe.12262

Received: 17 January 2022

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Accepted: 23 November 2022

DOI: 10.1111/ntwe.12262

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Work‐on‐demand in patchwork capitalism:

The peculiar case of Uber's fleet partners

in Poland

Bartosz Mika

1

|Dominika Polkowska

2

1

Department of Sociology, University of

Gdansk, Gdańsk, Poland

2

Department of Sociology, Maria

Curie‐Sklodowska University in Lublin,

Lublin, Poland

Correspondence

Dominika Polkowska, Department of

Sociology, Maria Curie‐Sklodowska

University in Lublin, pl. Marii

Curie‐Sklodowskiej 4, 20‐031 Lublin,

Poland.

Email: dominika.polkowska@umcs.pl

Funding information

European Commission; Narodowe

Centrum Nauki

Abstract

In recent years, global corporations entering Central and

Eastern European (CEE) markets have begun to adapt to

existing legal regulations through innovative means.

Uber's entry into Polish market, for example, involved

the use of a supplementary entity—a fleet partner. Based

on 42 interviews with Uber drivers in Poland (conducted

between 2018 and 2020) and two in‐depth interviews with

fleet partners (2021), this article investigates the prerequi-

sites necessary for the emergence of fleet partners within a

work‐on‐demand platform and their role in the relation-

ships between different stakeholders. Using the concept of

patchwork capitalism adapted for CEE countries, this study

shows that additional entities took advantage of institu-

tional hybridity, situating themselves as the intermediary

between a global giant and a local regulator, and thereby

creating a patchwork gig economy.

KEYWORDS

CEE, gig economy, patchwork capitalism, platform economy,

Uber, work‐on‐demand

INTRODUCTION

In the social sciences, the debate surrounding work‐on‐demand (WOD) platforms tends to

focus on whether a particular platform should be understood as technological infrastructure or

as an employer who falls under the jurisdiction of regulatory institutions. In terms of working

New Technol Work Employ. 2023;38:513–528. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/ntwe

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© 2022 Brian Towers (BRITOW) and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.

conditions, the controversy rages over whether service providers should be classified—legally

and typologically—as independent contractors or employees (Aloisi, 2015; Baron, 2018; Cherry

& Aloisi, 2017; De Stefano, 2015; Todoli‐Signes, 2017). In the case of Uber's ride‐hailing

platform, the above issues have been debated especially vociferously (see Schor et al., 2020).

Uber defines itself as an innovative, disruptive technology platform (Aloisi, 2015; De Stefano,

2015; Todoli‐Signes, 2017) and acts according, typically entering new markets without

obtaining regulatory approval (Baron, 2018). In the United Kingdom (Dudley et al., 2017) and

Australia (Stein & Head, 2020), the company has operated outside the law for some time,

exposing its drivers to sanctions—a strategy that was repeated in Poland. Uber's disruptive

market entry is the departure point for the company's efforts to gain ‘platform power’(Mazur &

Serafin, 2022). According to Culpepper and Thelen (2020), this new kind of political power is a

distinctive element of platform capitalism. Rahman and Thelen (2019, p. 4) add that the global

firms at the vanguard of platform capitalism represent a new kind of organisation based on ‘gig’

labour practices, the inflow of patient (long‐term) capital, market dominance, and an alliance

with consumers. In addition, Mazur and Serafin (2022) also point out that achieving a certain

level of platform power has caused the institution of state regulations to stall. In short, the

platform's desire to act fast in colonising new markets consequently hampers the entry of other

actors into the market by delaying new regulations. As a result, ‘institutional drift’occurs,

revealing ‘the failure of relevant decision‐makers to update formal rules’(Hacker et al., 2015,

p. 184), as well as create regulations complementary to the rest of the institutional framework.

Both features are accelerated when platforms like Uber confront local environments

characterised by the patchwork nature of their institutional order. As Rapacki, (2019) have

demonstrated, CEE countries including Poland share a weaker institutional coherence,

compared to well‐established liberal market economies or coordinated market economies. The

well‐regulated markets of continental Western Europe stand in contrast to CEE countries,

whose economic systems are characterised by ‘systemic entropy’, deep intra‐institutional

friction and low institutional complementarity, resulting in a form of patchwork capitalism.

This article examines the distinctive processes involved in taking advantage of existing

loopholes in labour law that are the response to the appearance of a global WOD company.

Poland was selected as the case study as a paradigmatic example of a CEE country with

patchwork‐like industrial relations.

1

The WOD system implemented by Uber in Poland is

different from the model adopted in Western countries, insofar as certain factors encouraged

the emergence of a new actor—fleet partners—in the platform economy (similar entities can be

found in Slovakia—see Sedlakova, 2018) making Poland a distinctive case for the study of the

patchwork gig economy. Thus, the main research questions of this article are: How and why do

certain entities—here, fleet partners—arise within work‐on‐demand platforms in the ride‐hailing

industry? What is their role in the relationships between different stakeholders? The aim of the

article is thus to describe and explain the role of Uber's fleet partners from the perspective of

patchwork capitalism. These partners, usually experienced drivers or former drivers, emerge as

intermediaries (or brokers, as Mazur & Serafin, 2022 prefer) between a global company and the

local institutional context by taking on the cost of setting up a business. They lend their permits

to other drivers and offer accounting and legal support. Soon after their initial appearance, they

also began leasing cars to drivers. Fleet partners situate themselves between Uber and the

drivers to re‐establish (in response to legal changes described below) open employment

relations based on a low barrier for entry. From a formal point of view, their existence is made

possible through specific loopholes in the legislation. The term fleet partner results from the

fact that the vast majority of intermediaries, in addition to the formal support they provide to

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