The Singapore Workaround: Providing a 'Greenprint' for a UNFCCC Party Reclassification
| Author | P. Cal Trepagnier |
| Position | Master's student at The Johns Hopkins University in the energy policy and climate program |
| Pages | 66-68 |
WINTER 2011 66
INTRODUCTION
The international climate debate currently focuses on the
world’s two largest greenhouse gas emitters: China and the
United States.1 However, to successfully address the impasse in
climate change negotiations, the focus should actually be on one
of the smaller emitters, the Republic of Singapore (“Singapore”).
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(“UNFCCC”)2 classifies nations into two categories originally
based on 1990 economic levels: Annex I Parties (developed
countries) and Non-Annex I Parties (developing countries).3
Although there is no automatic graduation based on predefined
criteria, a process and a precedent exists for status graduation
that could provide a model for countries to shift from Non-
Annex I to Annex I Parties. In 2009, Malta, originally a Non-
Annex I country, successfully petitioned the UNFCCC after
joining the European Union (“EU”) to “put itself on the same
legal footing as the other Member States of the European Union
that are included in Annex I to the Convention.”4 Singapore’s
economy is also strong enough to shift it from a Non-Annex I
to an Annex I country and other countries can then follow suit,
providing a solution to the current impasse in negotiations.
This article offers a “Singapore workaround” as a way for-
ward: diplomatic negotiations with Singapore aimed at changing
the classification of nations that have developed economically
since the formation of the UNFCCC. It has been argued by
“[p]roponents of reclassification . . . that responsibility for mitiga-
tion and eligibility for support should reflect contemporary differ-
ences in levels of development among developing countries, rather
than those current[ly] built into the Convention.”5 The reclassifica-
tion of Singapore from a Non-Annex I to an Annex I Party would
provide the ideal model for shifting parties’ obligations in the cli-
mate realm in the future. Singapore is a financial leader in both
globalization6 and the global recovery7 and is well positioned for
international and domestic “carbon finance.”8 The nation is eco-
nomically poised to retool its energy sector,9 faces imminent and
significant risks from climate change impacts,10 and is also ready
to create and enforce modern climate laws.11 This article examines
climate law in Germany and Spain to show how Annex I classifi-
cation benefited their economies over the past six years. Finally, it
discusses how establishing climate laws in Singapore could affect
emerging economies, namely Brazil, India, and China.
OPPORTUNITY FOR BREAKTHROUGH IN
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE LAW
Current international climate law is regulated primarily
by the UNFCCC, which was created in 1992 from the United
THE SINGAPORE WORKAROUND:
PROVIDING A “GREENPRINT” FOR A UNFCCC PARTY RECLASSIFICATION
by P. Cal Trepagnier*
Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de
Janeiro, Brazil, also commonly known as the “Earth Summit.”12
Article 3 of the Kyoto Protocol of 1997 binds Annex I Parties to
reduce “their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per-
cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period between 2008
and 2012.”13 Under the Kyoto Protocol, however, the majority
of countries—Non-Annex I nations—do not have greenhouse
gas reduction targets.14 Moreover, there is no automatic system
that requires them to reduce emissions, regardless of the level
of gross domestic product (“GDP”) per capita.15 The lack of a
mechanism to graduate Non-Annex I Parties once they achieve a
certain level of economic development has emerged as perhaps
the greatest challenge of the UNFCCC.
The richer developing nations with high emissions that do not
take on Annex I rights and responsibilities have long caused frus-
tration and concern for the United States,16 which refuses to ratify
the Kyoto Protocol and commit to emissions reductions.17 The
first commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol is on course to end
in 2012 and recent UNFCCC negotiations in Cancun, Mexico fell
short of creating a second commitment period.18 A lack of emis-
sions reductions targets from emerging economies such as Brazil,
India, and China have caused stalemates in international negotia-
tions.19 Despite Singapore’s small size and its relatively minor
greenhouse gas emissions, Singapore’s graduation to an Annex I
Party could have broader implications for emerging economies in
the international effort to curb global climate change.
A graduation mechanism in the UNFCCC would adjust
country mitigation obligations over time. A similar option was
successfully established by the 1987 Montreal Protocol on Sub-
stances that Deplete the Ozone Layer; that Protocol created a
panel that reviews country requests for exemptions from ozone
depleting substance commitments.20 Currently however, the
UNFCCC’s approach to evaluating country classification is
ambiguous.21 Singapore taking on the rights and responsibili-
ties of an Annex I Party would help to kick-start the process
and encourage other rising nations to follow suit. Therefore, the
United Nations should facilitate talks with Singapore regarding
the transition of Singapore’s status from a Non-Annex I country
to an Annex I country.
* P. Cal Trepagnier is a master’s student at The Johns Hopkins University in the
energy policy and climate program. While pursuing an undergraduate degree in
environmental chemistry at the University of Virginia, he studied abroad at the
National University of Singapore.
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT LAW & POLICY67
ECONOMIC READINESS
The International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) describes Singa-
pore as a “newly industrialized Asian economy.”22 Singapore,
by land area, is a small, densely populated urban city-state that
has limited energy resources.23 In contrast to its Southeast Asian
neighbors, Singapore is not a major agricultural center and there-
fore much of its food is obtained through importation.24 The
IMF last reported on Singapore’s GDP in 2009 and, at reces-
sion levels, Singapore had a GDP of $182.2 billion U.S. dollars
or $37,200 U.S. dollars per capita.25 Singapore’s economy has
proven to be one of the most stable—not just in Asia, but also
globally.26
As a result of a strong economic outlook, Singapore can con-
tinue to retool its energy sector and meet the challenges of carbon
reduction.27 Singapore has already taken significant action toward
clean energy development. In 2001, for example, Singapore’s
National Environment Agency set up the Innovation for Envi-
ronmental Sustainability Fund to provide grants for clean energy
investment.28 In 2007, the Economic Development Board created
the inter-agency Clean Energy Programme Office (“CEPO”).29
Additionally, the Ministry of National Development allocated
approximately thirty-nine million U.S. dollars over a five-year
period for a Research Fund for the Built Environment.30
Currently, Singapore also receives carbon finance through
the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”), under which
Annex I Parties sponsor projects in Singapore to offset the spon-
soring country’s emissions.31 The Kyoto Protocol defines the
CDM as an instrument “to assist Parties not included in Annex
I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to
the ultimate objective of the UNFCCC, and to assist Parties
included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quan-
tified emission limitation and reduction commitments under
Article 3.”32 If Singapore were to accept Annex I responsi-
bilities, it could no longer receive CDM financing and would
instead finance these projects in the developing world to help
offset its own emissions.33 With its regional placement and cul-
tural expertise, Singapore would be well positioned to sponsor
the projects for other Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(“ASEAN”)—nine other developing countries that do not tra-
ditionally participate in climate finance projects.34 Furthermore,
Singapore’s stable and strong financial sector would bring addi-
tional liquidity to the global carbon market.
SINGAPORE’S CLIMATE NEGOTIATING POSITION
The Singaporean government has taken a proactive stance
on mitigating global climate change and enforces its laws effec-
tively. Singaporean climate negotiators made statements dur-
ing the last two Conferences of Parties (“COP”) meetings that
indicate its willingness to address global climate change.35 On
January 28, 2010, Singaporean Ambassador-at-Large and Chief
Negotiator for Climate Change, Chew Tai Soo, wrote, “Singa-
pore therefore wishes to associate with the [Copenhagen] Accord
as a good basis for advancing further international negotiations
towards reaching a legally binding global agreement on climate
change” in a letter to the Executive Secretary, Yvo de Boer, of
the UNFCCC Secretariat.36 On December 9, 2010, Shunmugam
Jayakumar, Singapore’s Senior Minister and Chairman of the
Inter-Ministerial Committee on Climate Change addressed a
high level conference in Cancun, Mexico at the 16th COP meet-
ing.37 He emphasized his commitment to a legal framework stat-
ing that
it is important that as we pursue a “Balanced Package”
in Cancun, we must have clarity that our end goal is to
reach a legally binding outcome. Whatever we achieve
in Cancun, and whatever be our next steps, it is impera-
tive that these elements or decisions will eventually be
stitched together in a legally binding nature, without
which, there can be no guarantee of mitigation actions,
nor can there be guarantee of the support provided.38
Moreover, as a requirement for being a member of the
UNFCCC, Singapore submitted two “national communications
on climate change.”39 Each communication shows a willingness
to offer solutions to mitigate and adapt to climate change.40 In its
first national communication to the UNFCCC in August 2000,
the government of Singapore wrote, “[c]omprehensive preven-
tive measures to safeguard the environment will not work unless
there is stringent enforcement to ensure that the laws and regula-
tions are complied with.”41 In its second national communica-
tion from November 2010, the Singaporean government stated,
As a non-Annex I Party to the UNFCCC, we are not
subject to binding greenhouse gas emissions reduction
commitments under the Kyoto Protocol. Our contribu-
tion to global greenhouse gas emissions is, and will
remain, small. Nonetheless, as a small-island state vul-
nerable to the impacts of global climate change, Singa-
pore takes climate change seriously. We will therefore
continue to do our part in global efforts to address cli-
mate change.42
However, some opposition exists within the Singaporean
government. Its chief climate negotiator, Chew Tai Soo, made
a statement in February 2009 that Singapore should not become
an Annex I Party given its size and relatively small carbon
footprint: 0.3% of global emissions.43 Mr. Chew also made an
unofficial statement at a sustainability conference in Singapore
regarding his opinion on the UNFCCC country classifications:
“This approach is flawed as it does not take into account the
unique considerations and capabilities of different countries . . .
it penalizes small countries with small populations without tak-
ing into account their limitations.”44
These comments do not reflect Singapore’s overall commit-
ment in addressing climate change and the important example
it would set for the global community by becoming an Annex I
party. For example, in 2009 a program called Sustainable Singa-
pore Blueprint pledged that the nation would reduce greenhouse
gases by sixteen percent below 2020 business as usual levels
if a binding international agreement on climate change were
reached.45 With this program, Singapore is already implement-
ing a voluntary mitigation plan, as a contingency should there be
a binding international climate agreement. The United Nations
WINTER 2011 68
should facilitate discussions to encourage Singapore to “gradu-
ate” and accept these responsibilities since Singapore is willing
and able to create and enforce laws necessary to achieve carbon
reductions.
ANNEX I SUCCESS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR EMERGING ECONOMIES
Singapore can benefit from looking to two Annex I Parties,
Germany and Spain, as models for maintaining economic growth
through Kyoto Protocol-based energy efficiency and renewable
energy projects. In 2005, both Germany and Spain entered into a
binding agreement to reduce carbon emissions under the Kyoto
Protocol.46 Since then, laws designed to reduce carbon and mod-
ernize electricity generation, distribution, and consumption have
steadily increased.47 Germany has a national commitment to
reduce its carbon footprint forty percent from its 1990 levels by
2020.48 Germany met its 2012 goal early, in 2007, by generat-
ing 12.5% of its electricity from renewables, and Germany will
likely exceed its twenty percent by 2020 goal as early as 2011.49
By 2020, conservative estimates show that Germany will source
forty-seven percent of its electricity from renewable energy.50
Thus, while honoring its Kyoto Protocol commitments, German
energy projects have in turn bolstered the fifth largest economy
in the world.51 Spain made a commitment to reduce its carbon
emissions by twenty percent from its 1990 levels by 2020, in line
with the EU target.52 Spain also committed to achieving twenty
percent of its own final consumption and ten percent of its trans-
port energy needs from renewable energy by 2020.53 According
to its 2005-2010 Renewable Energy Plan, Spain plans to deploy
clean energy to meet 12.1% of its primary energy needs, 30.3%
of electricity needs, and 5.83% of transportation fuel.54 One of
Spain’s goals in its 2004-2012 Energy Efficiency Strategy is to
reduce domestic energy intensity by 7.2% by 2012.55
If Singapore adopts Annex I status and follows in Ger-
many and Spain’s carbon reduction footsteps, it could advance
compliance in other developing countries such as Brazil, India,
and China. These countries will face greater and different chal-
lenges in greenhouse gas reduction from Singapore due to their
larger size and strong economies.56 However, Singapore could
establish the model and blueprint, which would help to change
the playing field for non-Annex I Parties and encourage greater
participation among those nations. Binding carbon emission
reductions and carbon finance are only possible if countries take
responsibility for their contributions to climate change, however
small they are.
CONCLUSION
In the UNFCCC, richer nations, mostly those in the EU,
have assumed the role of Annex I Parties.57 Singapore can and
should become an Annex I nation so that it can fulfill a broader
role on the global stage as a leader in greenhouse gas reduction.
Singapore is the ideal candidate for graduating from Non-Annex
I to Annex I. Its mature economy is ready to retool its electric-
ity sector and to finance clean development mechanism projects.
Singapore has national interests in safeguarding its borders from
flooding and protecting the health of its citizens.58 It has a stable
government with a history of developing innovative laws and
enforcing them.59 As the international climate law community
awaits 17th COP in Durban, South Africa, it should consider
graduating a nation to Annex I status as a way to shift bind-
ing obligations from the Kyoto Protocol to a new international
agreement between nations.
1 Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The Complex
Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA
L. REV. 1675 (1964).
2 Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, Dec. 10, 1997, 137 I.L.M. 22, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/
kpeng.pdf.
3 Parties & Observers, UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/items/2704.php (last visited
Feb. 15, 2011) [hereinafter Parties & Observers].
4 United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Copenhagen,
Den., Dec. 7-18, 2009, Proposal from Malta to Amend Annex I to the Con-
vention, 2, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/2009/2 (May 13, 2009), http://unfccc.int/
resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/02.pdf (noting that Malta has not set a binding
greenhouse gas reduction commitment). In 1997, the UNFCCC Parties granted
their approval for six nations to be included as Annex I Parties. Most were new
countries that gained independence within that decade and others had not previ-
ously been associated with the Annex I process. These countries are Croatia,
Liechtenstein, Monaco, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia, with the
last two replacing Czechoslovakia. See United Nations Framework Convention
on Climate Change, Conference of the Parties, Third Session, Kyoto, Japan,
Dec. 1-11, 1997, Amendments to the List in Annex I to the Convention Under
Article 4.2(f) of the Convention, dec. 4/CP.3, in Part Two: Action Taken by the
Conference of the Parties at its Third Session, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/7/
Add.1 (Mar. 25, 1998), http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/cop3/07a01.pdf.
5 Sikina Jinnah et al., Tripping Points: Barriers and Bargaining Chips on the
Road to Copenhagen, 4 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 034003 (2009), http://iopscience.
iop.org/1748-9326/4/3/034003/pdf/1748-9326_4_3_034003.pdf.
6 Statement by the Hon. Lee Hsien Loong, Prime Minister of Singapore at the
Annual Meetings of the Boards of Governors of the International Monetary
Fund and the World Bank Group, INT’L MONETARY FUND (Sept. 19, 2006),
http://www.imf.org/external/am/2006/speeches/pr04e.pdf.
7 IMF Chief Highlights Need for Strong Partnership with Asia, IMF SUR-
VEY MAGAZINE (Feb. 09, 2011), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/
so/2011/new020911a.htm.
8 Rachel Ward Saltzman, Distributing Emissions Rights in the Global Order:
The Case for Equal Per Capita Allocation, 13 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEV. L.J. 281
(2010).
9 NAT’L ENV. AGENCY, SINGAPORE’S SECOND NATIONAL COMMUNICATION: UNDER
THE UNITED FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE 4 (Nov. 12, 2010),
http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/sinnc2.pdf [hereinafter SSNC].
10 Id. at 3.
11 Trust, SINGAPORE ECON. DEV. BOARD, http://www.sedb.com/edb/sg/en_uk/
index/why_singapore/trust.html (last updated Apr. 29, 2009).
12 See GRACIELA CHICHILNISKY & KRISTEN A. SHEERAN, SAVING KYOTO 56-57
(Kate Parker ed., 2009); DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 667-74 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 2007).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 CHICHILNISKY, supra note 12; U.N. Framework Convention on Climate
Change art. 4(1)-(2), May 9, 1992, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCCC].
Endnotes: The Singapore Workaround
Endnotes: The Singapore Workaround continued on page 97
