Serving the "apparently Under the Influence" Patron: the Ramifications of Barrett v. Lucky Seven Saloon, Inc
Publication year | 2007 |
Citation | Vol. 31 No. 02 |
Given a choice between a rule that fosters individual responsibility and one that forsakes personal accountability, we opt for personal agency over dependency and embrace individual autonomy over paternalism.(fn1)
I. Introduction
Imagine a woman named Sue meets a friend for dinner at a restaurant in downtown Seattle. The restaurant is packed with customers, and Sue decides to have a few beers. She is not loud, and she maintains her outward composure. Given these facts, the bartender would probably not be able to determine that Sue is intoxicated. He or she might subjectively determine, however, that Sue is "apparently under the influence" of alcohol because close observation would reflect that her eyes are slightly red and her breath smells faintly of beer. After a few hours, Sue leaves the restaurant, drives off in her car, and hits a pedestrian. Under the recently established standard set forth in
A different individual-and well-known brawler-named Joe regularly drinks to excess at his neighborhood pub in a small town in Washington. One night Joe excitedly shows the bartender a switch-blade knife he recently purchased. The bartender serves Joe several pitchers of beer. Joe, like Sue, handles his liquor well and shows no outward signs of intoxication. Subsequently, Joe leaves the pub, gets into a scuffle across the street, and stabs another man to death. Despite the foreseeability of harm based on Joe's violent reputation, his new weapon, and his consumption of several pitchers of beer, the commercial vendor would probably not be liable to the third party victim for over-serving Joe, because Joe was not "obviously intoxicated"(fn3) and did not injure his victim with an automobile.(fn4)
If foreseeability of harm is the foundation of negligence,(fn5) is it really more foreseeable that Sue, and not Joe, would injure a third party, when Joe brandished a weapon and neither party was "obviously intoxicated"? Moreover, should we really presume that injuries caused by impaired drivers are any more foreseeable than those caused by other impaired tortfeasors?
In
This Note is divided into five parts that collectively explore the history of vendor liability in Washington, the mistakes made by the Washington Supreme Court in deciding
II. Vendor Liability History in Washington
The history of vendor liability in Washington reveals that, although the sale of alcohol has consistently been regulated in one form or another,(fn15) the courts and legislature have been reluctant to attach liability to a vendor unless the patron was "obviously intoxicated" at the time of service.(fn16) This Part discusses the basic principles of negligence liability, the important distinction between the "obviously intoxicated" standard and the "apparently under the influence" standard, and the development of vendor liability until
Under the law of torts, a person is liable for the injuries caused by his or her negligence.(fn17) A claim for negligence requires proof of duty owed to the plaintiff, breach of that duty, and harm or damages that are proximately caused by the breach.(fn18) Litigants in vendor liability actions dispute whether a commercial vendor is negligent for serving alcohol, focusing on the elements of duty and proximate causation.(fn19) A vendor's duty arises at the moment the act of serving alcohol to a patron creates a foreseeable risk of harm to third parties who may be injured by the patron.(fn20) The issue of proximate cause arises under the common law theory that the impaired driver's conduct, not the act of serving alcohol, causes the injury to the third party.(fn21)
The common law rule provided that a vendor who over-served a patron could not be liable for the patron's tortious acts(fn22)-no matter how much alcohol was served, or how foreseeable the patron's harmful action was to the vendor-because it was the
Nevertheless, the thinking on commercial vendor liability for serving alcohol changed over time. Such liability was established during the beginning of the Prohibition era as dramshop(fn25) acts were enacted.(fn26) In the 1830s, people abandoned hope that "drinkers would reform themselves," and prohibitionists attempted to eliminate the public's alcohol supply through legislative means.(fn27) While still a territory,(fn28) Washington enacted a dramshop act that allowed a civil cause of action against any person or vendor that provided alcohol to an intoxicated person who then caused injury to another.(fn29) Dramshop liability survived from 1879 until 1955, when the Legislature expressly repealed the statute.(fn30) Although legislative history fails to explain the rationale behind the repeal, courts have consistently inferred that the repeal indicated the legislature's disapproval of third party recovery against a commercial vendor for serving alcohol.(fn31) Consequently, injured parties searched elsewhere for compensation.
Even after dramshop liability was eliminated in Washington, the Washington Liquor Control Board retained power to regulate liquor sales "for the protection of the welfare, health, peace, morals, and safety of the people of the state."(fn32) Since 1933, a Washington statute has prohibited commercial vendors from serving a patron who is "apparently under the influence" of alcohol.(fn33) Vendors violating the statute face sanctions that include fines, liquor license suspension or revocation, or imprisonment.(fn34) Significantly, the statute remains silent as to the issue of civil liability, even after amendments.(fn35) After the dramshop act was repealed,(fn36) the legislative silence on civil liability forced courts to revert to the common law rule that a commercial vendor does not owe a duty to a third party because "it is not a tort to either sell or give intoxicating liquor to ordinary able-bodied men."(fn37) The common law rule prohibited vendor liability based on the...
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