Lindsey v. Tacoma-pierce County Health Department: Cipollone Revisited, Billboards, State Law Tort Damages Actions, Federal Preemption and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

Publication year2000

SEATTLE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEWVolume 24, No. 3WINTER 2001

Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Department: Cipollone Revisited, Billboards, State Law Tort Damages Actions, Federal Preemption and the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act

Harold C. Reeder(fn*)

Table of Contents

Introduction .............................................................. 767

I. Background ................................................................. 771

A. The Enactment of the FCLAA and the Amendments Thereto ................................................ 771

B. The Prior Case Law Involving the FCLAA, Including Cipollone .................................................... 773

1. Banzhaf ................................................................ 773

2. Cipollone (Third Circuit) ...................................... 774

3. Stephen, Palmer, Roysden, and Pennington .............. 777

4. Cipollone (U.S. Supreme Court) ............................ 777

5. Lacey, Sonnenreich, Griesenbeck, and Cantley ................................................................. 782

6. VangoMedia ........................................................ 783

7. PennAdvertising .................................................... 784

8. Harshbarger .......................................................... 784

9. Chiglo ................................................................... 787

10. Forster .................................................................. 787

11.Dewey ................................................................... 788

12.Mangini ................................................................ 790

II. FAIR, Giuliani, Lindsey, and Reilly......................... 790

A. FAIR ........................................................................: 790

B. Giuliani ...................................................................... 794

C. Lindsey ...................................................................... 798

D. Reilly ......................................................................... 802

III. Discussion ..................................................................... 806

A. Some General Observations Relating to Lindsey, Billboards, and the FCLAA ....................................... 806

1. In Lindsey, the Ninth Circuit, Like Other Courts, Misconstrued the Supreme Court's Discussion of the Preemptive Scope of the FCLAA in Cipollone by Not Reading It in Context ................................................................ 806

2. Both the Original FCLAA and the 1969 Act Targeted the Television, Radio, and Print Media but Did Not Refer to Billboard Advertising Either in the Acts Themselves or in the Legislative Histories Accompanying Them ................................................................... 808

3. The FCLAA Did Not Specifically Reference Billboards Until 1984, Well After Even the Amended Preemption Provision Was in Place, and It Distinguishes Them from Other Types of Advertising ............................................ 810

B. The Problem with the Ninth Circuit's Extensive Reliance on Cipollone ................................................. 812

1. Cipollone Addressed the Preemption or Nonpreemption of State Based-Activities in a Very Different Context from That in Lindsey and the Other Cases and, Further, Was Only a Plurality Decision .............................. 812

2. The Supreme Court's Plurality Opinion in Cipollone Was a Compromise Decision About the Extent to Which Federal Law Preempts State Law Tort Damages Claims Against Cigarette Manufacturers ....................................... 813

3. Despite the Edict in Cipollone to Rely "Entirely" Upon the Express Language of § 5(b), the Plurality Still Proceeded to Examine the Act's History, Structure, and Purpose to Delineate Its Preemptive Impact ........................... 814

C. There Are Legitimate Criticisms Regarding the Plurality's Opinion in Cipollone .................................. 816

1. The Plurality's Determination That the Amended Preemption Provision Expressly Preempts Certain State Law Claims but Not Others Is Questionable and Operates Much Like Implied Preemption ...................................... 816

a. Is There a "Reliable Indicium of Congressional Intent?"...................................... 816

b. The Other Courts Found No Express Preemption ..................................................... 818

c. The Methodology Created Operates Much Like Implied Preemption ....................... 818

2. Although Justices Blackmun and Scalia Reached Opposite Conclusions in Cipollone, Each Makes a Good Argument Criticizing the Plurality Opinion and Both Agree It Created a Confusing Methodology ........................ 818

a. Scalia: Plurality Created New Rule on Implied Preemption ......................................... 819

b. Blackmun: Plurality's Reasoning Flawed and Disregarded Legislative History ........................................................... 821

i. The Plain Language of the 1969 Act ......................................................... 821

ii. The Legislative History Accompanying the 1969 Act ................... 823

c. Blackmun and Scalia: The Plurality Created a Confusing Methodology ................... 825

3. The Amended Preemption Provision Was Not a Substantial Reworking, as Claimed by the Plurality in Cipollone, and the Changes Thereto Were Primarily Clarifications to Prevent the Provision's Circumvention ................. 826

a. The Change from "Statement" to "Requirement or Prohibition" ......................... 827

b. The Phrase "With Respect to the Advertising or Promotion" .............................. 828

c. The 1969 Act's "Based on Smoking and Health" ........................................................... 829

d. The Reason the Term "State Law" Was Used ............................................................... 831

D. The Ninth Circuit's Opinion in Lindsey Also Has Certain Flaws ............................................................ 833

1. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit's Contention in Lindsey, Cipollone Does Provide Support for the Location/Content Distinction That Was First Articulated by the Fourth Circuit in Penn Advertising ................................................ 833

2. The Ninth Circuit in Lindsey Ignores the Fact That the FCLAA Relates to the Prevention of Health-Care Warnings in Advertising, Which Location Restrictions Clearly Do Not Implicate .............................................................. 836

3. Lindsey Confuses the Concept of "Public Health" as a State Police Power with the Phrase "Based on Smoking and Health" as Used in the FCLAA ............................................. 839

E. Other Thoughts on Lindsey, Cipollone, Federal Preemption, and the FCLAA....................................... 841

1. The Tombstone Provisions in Lindsey and the Other Cases Do Not Appear to Violate the FCLAA Despite the Fact That Each Court Unanimously Found That They Did Violate the Act ..................................................... 841

2. It Is Noteworthy That the Smokeless Tobacco Act Allows State Damages Actions and Regulation of Outdoor Billboard Advertisements of Smokeless Tobacco Products by State and Local Entities ..................... 842

3. There Is Probably a More Difficult First Amendment Issue in These Billboard Cases and the FCLAA Should Not Be Used with Federal Preemption Principles Solely to Avoid Addressing the Constitutional Issue ...................... 843

CONCLUSION: THE FCLAA SHOULD NOT BE permitted to "immunize" cigarette Manufacturers from State Law Tort Damages Actions or Act as a "Shield" Against These Local Regulations Restricting Cigarette Advertising........................ 845

A. State Common Law Damages Actions ........................ 845

1. The Plurality Decision in Cipollone Was Clearly a Compromise Decision ............................ 845

2. The Best Positions Are the Third Circuit and New Jersey Supreme Court's .......................... 846

3. Of the Two Positions, New Jersey Supreme Court's Is Probably Best ......................... 847

B. Local Regulations Restricting Cigarette Advertising ................................................................ 850

Introduction

Despite the fact that there are approximately half as many cigarette smokers today as there were 35 years ago(fn1) before the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA)(fn2) was enacted, tobacco use is still the greatest health hazard in the United States.(fn3 )Consequently, state and local government entities still feel compelled to find effective ways to curb tobacco use. This has led to the enactment of state and local restrictions aimed at limiting the impact of tobacco advertising. In response, cigarette manufacturers, retailers, and advertisers argue that these provisions violate the FCLAA. This is not surprising, because cigarette manufacturers have effectively used the FCLAA to their benefit in another context-state law tort damages claims.(fn4) However, manufacturers' attempts to utilize the FCLAA as a "shield" against local regulations...

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