An Analytical View of Recent "lending of Credit" Decisions in Washington State
Publication year | 1984 |
I. Introduction
Sections 5(fn1) and 7(fn2) of article VIII of the Washington State Constitution, concerning gifts or loans by the state and its subdivisions, have been a source of confusion to the courts and frustration to the sponsors of governmental programs. One recent Washington Supreme Court opinion referred to "[t]he presence of inconsistent analyses or exceptions" regarding article VIII, sections 5 and 7,(fn3) and another noted the "erratic decisions" and the "unjustified interpretation of the intent of the drafters" with respect to those constitutional provisions.(fn4)
The Washington Supreme Court and commentators recently have attempted to simplify or integrate the law concerning article VIII, sections 5 and 7, seeking to develop a single rule or formula for applying the two provisions-a flexible rule or formula that would enable the court to permit a wider range of government programs that might otherwise be barred.(fn5) Nevertheless, attempts to create a single rule or set of coherent rules for interpreting these problematical provisions are apt to fail. The constitutional language is complex, involving numerous elements, each of which must be present for the prohibition to apply.
Rather than a single formula governing the application of these provisions to every fact pattern, a uniform method of approach or analysis is required. That approach should permit the continued existence of a variety of rules that would apply to the different elements of the constitutional clauses in various factual situations. The method proposed in this Article would reduce sections 5 and 7 to their component parts, applying appropriate rules to each part while insisting that every part be present before either of the provisions would apply.
In addition to the problems created by attempts to find a single formula to resolve all government "lending of credit" cases,(fn6) a source of confusion in recent cases interpreting sections 5 and 7 has been the tendency of the court to attempt too much and to analyze more components of the constitutional provision in question than are necessary to resolve the case at bar.(fn7) This tendency leads either to troublesome dicta that return to haunt the court in later decisions, or to a confusion of theories resulting in opinions that cannot be reconciled to serve as useful guides for future interpretations.
This Article first presents an analytic framework for assessing government actions that present possible violations of article VIII, sections 5 and 7, and then analyzes five recent cases interpreting those provisions:
II. Reducing the Provisions to Their Component Parts
The core of the method proposed here is, first, to divide the language of the applicable constitutional provision into discrete components and, then, to insist that each component be present for the provision to apply. Article VIII, section 7 provides the best example for this approach. Section 7 is the more detailed version of the prohibition, and the court has long held that article VIII, section 5 should be interpreted in a fashion similar to article VIII, section 7, although the language of the two provisions clearly differs.(fn16)
Article VIII, section 7 may be divided for analysis as follows:
Each of the above eleven components plays a different role whenever a court must decide whether the prohibition applies to a government activity. This subdivision of the provision into its component parts is consistent with the court's frequent determination that the prohibition did not apply because a single component was missing.(fn17)
The court's traditional approach is exemplified by its analyses of whether or not a "gift" has been present. Many decisions have held that money or property was not "given" when adequate consideration supported the exchange. Component (b), above, therefore was absent, and the constitutional prohibition did not apply.(fn18) A recent, typical example is
In other cases, the court has found no gift or loan when a public entity was carrying out a "recognized public governmental function" and the benefit to private individuals or corporations therefore was incidental to the implementation of that basic governmental function. For example, in companion cases,(fn23) a car dealer challenged the restitution remedy provided by the state's consumer protection act(fn24) on the theory that such restitution is a gift to those who receive recompense. In each action the dealer also challenged the Attorney General's representation of wronged individuals on the ground that such representation is a gift to the persons who receive representation in remedying violations of that law. In
The Washington Supreme Court has determined that a "loan of money or credit" did not exist when debt in its ordinary sense had not been created. In
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