A Constitutional Right to an Appeal: Guarding Against Unacceptable Risks of Erroneous Conviction
Publication year | 1984 |
I. Introduction
In 1894 in
Nearly ninety years later, a majority of the Court appeared to reaffirm the holding of
Since today virtually every state recognizes a right to appeal in "significant criminal cases," premised upon either a statute or a court rule, a case presenting the issue of whether the right to appeal is guaranteed by the federal Constitution is, as Justice Brennan observed, "unlikely to arise."(fn9) Thus, one may ask, "What difference does it make whether the right to appeal a criminal conviction is of constitutional magnitude?" In this Article, I will demonstrate that it makes a significant difference.
The framers of the Washington State Constitution believed that it made a difference, for they expressly included the right to appeal from a criminal conviction in article I, section 22 of the Declaration of Rights.(fn10) In 1889 Washington thus became the first state in the nation to constitutionalize explicitly the right to appeal in criminal cases. Since that time six more states have amended their constitutions to include a specific guarantee of the right to appeal in criminal cases. Utah(fn11) and Arizona(fn12) adopted provisions nearly identical to article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution. The constitutional provisions of Michigan,(fn13) Louisiana,(fn14) Nebraska,(fn15) and New Mexico(fn16) are worded somewhat differently. Three other states, Wisconsin,(fn17) West Virginia,(fn18) and Florida,(fn19) have recognized a constitutional right to appeal in criminal cases through the process of judicial interpretation of less explicit clauses of their state constitutions.
The many consequences of "constitutionalizing" the right to appeal become evident only when one answers certain underlying questions about the nature of an appeal. What are the essential elements of an appeal? Why should we view the criminal defendant's right to appeal as an element of due process of law? Part II of this Article seeks to develop a theoretical due process framework for use in deciding when the right to appeal under article I, section 22 of the Washington Constitution has been unconstitutionally abridged or denied. Part III contains an analysis of oral argument as an essential element of the right to appeal. Finally, parts IV through VII discuss some of the possible consequences flowing from the constitutionalization of the right to appeal in criminal cases.
II. A Due Process Framework for the Constitutional Right to Appeal in Criminal Cases
In
No right of appeal existed at common law.(fn23) The right, when recognized, was strictly of civil-law origin.(fn24) At common law, review of a trial court judgment of conviction could be obtained only if a defendant successfully petitioned for a "writ of error."(fn25) The critical difference between the civil-law right to an appeal and a common-law writ of error was that review was discretionary under the common-law procedure, but mandatory under the civil law. At the Washington State Constitutional Convention of 1889, the seven members of the Committee on the Constitutional Preamble and Bill of Rights, who drafted the Declaration of Rights, presumably were aware that there was no existing common-law right to appeal.(fn26) Perhaps they knew that earlier that year Congress had, for the first time, created a statutory right to appeal in federal criminal cases when a sentence of death was imposed.(fn27)
The committee submitted a draft Declaration of Rights to the convention on July 25, 1889, which contained the provision in article I, section 22 guaranteeing all criminal defendants an absolute right to appeal.(fn28) Although the committee studied three proposed constitutional models when drafting article I, section 22, the right to appeal in criminal cases did not devolve from any of them.(fn29) Thus, it can be inferred that the idea of constitu-tionalizing the right to appeal in criminal cases originated in the United States with this committee of seven, charged with the task of defining the inalienable natural rights of citizens of their state.
The Washington Supreme Court has suggested that an examination of "[t]he central principles of the common law" is an appropriate aid to state constitutional interpretation.(fn30) By interpreting our state constitutional provisions in a manner "consistent with their common law beginnings," the courts can best achieve the intentions of the framers.(fn31) But with respect to the right to appeal, there are no "common law beginnings" and no applicable "central principles of common law." The provision in article I, section 22 granting a constitutional right to appeal in all criminal cases marks a sharp break with the common-law past. Consequently, proper judicial interpretation of the scope of the constitutional right to appeal must reflect the framers' intention to transform a discretionary privilege into an absolute right.(fn32) Recognition of the historical background of the right to appeal, therefore, leads to the conclusion that the framers would have been vigorously opposed to any attempt, either legislative or judicial, to restrict a convicted defendant's right to appeal or to diminish the scope of appellate review.
The modern judicial test for assessing the requirements of procedural due process, imposed upon the states by the fourteenth amendment, calls for a balancing of three distinct factors: (1) the private interest affected by the government's action; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest if the procedural safeguard were absent; and (3) the fiscal and administrative burdens that the procedural safeguard would impose upon the government.(fn33) This formulation of the test of procedural due process necessarily implies that procedural due process "is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances."(fn34) "[D]ue process is flexible," the Supreme Court tells us, "and calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands."(fn35)
Applying the three-factor test of procedural due process to the "particular situation" of a convicted criminal defendant, one must first ask: What is the nature of the "private interests" at stake? In
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