Williams v. Illinois: Confronting Experts, Science, and the Constitution

• Jurisdiction: United States,Federal
• Citation: Vol. 64 No. 3
• Publication year: 2013
• topic: Constitutional Law,Criminal Law

Williams v. Illinois: Confronting Experts, Science, and the Constitution

Natasha Crawford

[Page 805]

Casenote

Williams v. Illinois: Confronting Experts, Science, and the Constitution

I. Introduction

DNA evidence has revolutionized forensic science, making it the "single greatest advance in the search for truth . . . since the advent of cross-examination."¹ In Williams v. Illinois,² the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Illinois Supreme Court's holding that there was no Confrontation Clause violation where experts based their testimony on another analyst's DNA report that was not admitted into evidence.³ The Court held an expert may assume the truth of certain facts—such as a DNA profile contained in a forensic report—to offer testimony based on those facts without testifying to the truth of the matter asserted.⁴ Until Williams, the expert that performed the forensic tests had to testify at trial to avoid violating the Confrontation

[Page 806]

Clause.⁵ With Williams, the Court attempted to reshape the constitutional lens of scientific confrontation.

II. Factual Background

The State of Illinois tried the petitioner, Sandy Williams, at a bench trial for the alleged rape of L.J.⁶ A Chicago police detective performed a rape kit on L.J., labeled the kit with an inventory number, and transported it to the Illinois State Police (ISP) lab for chemical testing. The ISP lab confirmed the presence of semen, prompting the lab to send a biological sample to Cellmark Diagnostics Laboratory (Cellmark) in Germantown, Maryland.⁷ Cellmark performed forensic testing and produced a report containing a male DNA profile.⁸

A forensic specialist, Sandra Lambatos, conducted a computerized search that compared the Cellmark report's DNA profile with the Illinois DNA database. The Cellmark report matched a DNA profile from a blood sample taken from Williams after the police arrested him on an unrelated charge in August 2000. This DNA match from Lambatos's search implicated Williams, who was not previously under suspicion for L.J.'s rape. As a result of this match, the police conducted a physical lineup where L.J. picked Williams as her assailant.⁹

The indictment charged Williams with aggravated criminal sexual assault, aggravated kidnapping, and aggravated robbery. Williams waived his right to a jury trial. In April 2006, L.J. identified Williams as her attacker during the bench trial, and the prosecutor produced three expert witnesses. First, Brian Hapack testified as the ISP forensic scientist who performed the rape kit and confirmed the presence of semen on L.J.'s vaginal swabs through an acid phosphatase test. Second, Karen Abbinanti testified as the state forensic analyst who

[Page 807]

developed the DNA profile from Williams's blood sample through Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR) and Short Tandem Repeat (STR) techniques, which she entered into the Illinois DNA database. Third, Sandra Lambatos testified as the analyst who compared the Cellmark report with the DNA profiles from the Illinois DNA database.¹⁰

Defense counsel objected during Lambatos's testimony referencing the report generated by Cellmark, which was not admitted into evidence or evaluated by the judge as factfinder.¹¹ Lambatos never quoted, read, or identified the report as the source of her expert opinion. Specifically, Lambatos testified that it is "commonly accepted" within the scientific community for "one DNA expert to rely on the records of another DNA expert."¹² After being shown the shipping manifest entered into evidence as business records, Lambatos testified those records indicated that the ISP lab sent L.J.'s sample to Cellmark, and Cellmark sent the sample back with a DNA profile.¹³ The prosecutor then asked Lambatos whether "a computer match" existed between "the male DNA profile found in the semen from the vaginal swabs of [L.J.]" and "[the] male DNA profile that had been identified."¹⁴ Defense counsel objected for lack of foundation because no evidence of the Cellmark report had been admitted into evidence; however, the judge agreed with the prosecutor that Lambatos was not "getting at what another lab did," but merely testifying about "her own testing based on [DNA] information."¹⁵

Defense counsel moved to exclude Lambatos's testimony about Cellmark as a violation of the Confrontation Clause because no evidence existed to justify Lambatos's testimony with respect to any work or analysis performed by Cellmark.¹⁶ Conversely, the prosecutor claimed

[Page 808]

that the Confrontation Clause had been satisfied because Williams had the opportunity to cross-examine Lambatos who, pursuant to Illinois Rule of Evidence 703,¹⁷ merely testified to the match between DNA profiles.¹⁸ Again, the trial judge agreed with the prosecution.¹⁹

The trial court found Williams guilty of all charges. The Illinois Court of Appeals affirmed because the Cellmark report was not entered into evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted. The Illinois Supreme Court also affirmed, noting the Cellmark report was used for the basis of Lambatos's testimony.²⁰ The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari.²¹

III. Legal Background

A. The Confrontation Clause: Rights, History, and Relationship with Evidence

The Confrontation Clause serves as a procedural guarantee for both federal and state criminal defendants.²² The foundation for the clause became rooted in the Constitution after notorious trials in England, namely that of Sir Walter Raleigh for treason,²³ and after controversial

[Page 809]

examination practices in the colonies left the Founders afraid of the government's ability to use ex parte communications against the defendant without face-to-face confrontation.²⁴ In fact, the right to confront was deemed to be such a fundamental right at ratifying conventions for the Constitution that the First Congress responded by including the Confrontation Clause in the Sixth Amendment.²⁵

The Sixth Amendment of the Constitution states that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him."²⁶ In Crawford v. Washington,²⁷ the Court articulated the modern Confrontation Clause standard when it held that out-of-court testimonial statements made by witnesses violate the Confrontation Clause unless the witness is unavailable and the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the witness.²⁸ Crawford was convicted of assault after attacking and stabbing a man who allegedly tried to rape his wife. At trial, the wife did not testify due to the spousal privilege, but the prosecution played a tape recording of her prior statement. The wife's tape-recorded statement corroborated Crawford's story except for his self-defense theory. Each level of the state courts in Crawford used different tests to indicate the reliability of evidence to find that the tape recording did not violate Crawford's Sixth Amendment rights.²⁹ The Supreme Court reversed, dispensing with the reliability standard, and found that the wife's statements were testimonial and thus in violation of the Confrontation Clause.³⁰

[Page 810]

Crawford overruled the leading precedent of Ohio v. Roberts,³¹ which allowed out-of-court testimony if it fell within a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" and bore adequate "indicia of reliability."³² The Roberts standard allowed more evidence to be admitted into trial against defendants through hearsay exceptions and rules of evidence while also granting the judge discretion to determine reliability.³³ However, the Court in Crawford explained that "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to amorphous notions of 'reliability.'"³⁴ Instead, the Court explained that reliability is not determined by a judge's discretion, but instead by the Constitution's guarantee of "confrontation" and the "crucible of cross-examination."³⁵

Although the Court in Crawford failed to conclusively define testimony,³⁶ it attempted to provide examples of what, at a minimum, qualified as testimony—such as police interrogations and testimony at preliminary hearings, grand jury proceedings, or former trials.³⁷ The Court determined that testimony could not be admitted because the questioner, like the police in Crawford, served as a neutral party to not untruthfully change a witness's testimony.³⁸

Since Crawford, the Court has continued to determine the limits of testimony and when it is used to establish the truth of the matter asserted. In Davis V.Washington,³⁹ the Court held a victim's statement in response to a 911 operator's interrogation was not testimonial and not subject to the Confrontation Clause when taken during a domestic violence disturbance.⁴⁰ However, in Hammon v. Indiana,⁴¹ the Court

[Page 811]

held a domestic violence victim's statement, given in an affidavit to a police officer when the victim was separated from the abuser, was testimonial under the Confrontation Clause.⁴² The Court wrote Davis and Hammon together in an attempt to explain the distinction between statements given during an emergency and statements given to implicate the accused of a crime.⁴³ In Michigan v. Bryant,⁴⁴ the Court further explained the meaning of testimonial, holding that a shooting victim's statements to police were not testimony that implicated the Confrontation Clause when removed from the shooter and the emergency of the crime.⁴⁵ Instead, the victim's statements implicated the rules of evidence because the objective "primary purpose" was not to give testimony, but to end an ongoing emergency.⁴⁶

B. Expert Testimony About Forensic Reports and the Confrontation Clause

In Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,⁴⁷ the Court confronted the issue of whether affidavits reporting forensic evidence are "testimonial" and whether the affiants are "witnesses" under the Confrontation Clause.⁴⁸ After police arrested Melendez-Diaz with...