Will Latin America miss U.S. hegemony?

• Author: Sabatini, Christopher
• Position: Hemispheric Relations - Report

For decades, the standard framework for describing and understanding U.S.-Latin American relations has been the overwhelming hegemonic power of the "colossus of the north." Now, though, with the rise of regional powers like Brazil the importance of new emerging economies like China, and the diversity of political and economic models in the region, policymakers and observers are beginning to discuss the decline of U.S. power in the region. Whether real or perceived, the effects of waning U.S. influence are already shaping countries' calculations in their domestic and foreign policies and the formation of multilateral alliances. What are the implications of the perceived decline of U.S. hegemony for Latin America? This article explores the possible facets of the decline of U.S. influence in the region. It will start by examining whether, indeed, the United States' ability to shape outcomes or impose its preferences in the region has diminished or shifted in how it must conduct diplomacy. Second, it will examine the possible outcomes of diminished influence. Finally, this article will consider the times when there have been a convergence of values and interest between the United States and governments in the region, and the likely effect that diminished U.S. power will have on areas of common interest: democracy, human rights, and the peaceful resolution of intra-regional conflicts.

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From the cover of the September 2010 issue of The Economist to the pages of Foreign Affairs journalists and observers are proclaiming the decline of U.S. power in Latin America. (1) While some populist leaders, such as former President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela, may celebrate what they call the end of U.S. dominance (and a number of U.S. academics as well), other more sober governments such as Brazil and Chile are already calling for a rebalancing of power in the western hemisphere.

The standard framework for describing and understanding U.S.-Latin American relations these past decades has been one where the United States stands as the primary hegemonic power--the "colossus of the north." (2) Since the Monroe Doctrine, that power has shaped a U.S. policy that has allowed it to intervene either overtly or covertly at will to impose its national interests; support policy preferences and allies; and in some cases, even overturn governments, often with bloody consequences. But while Latin America has long chafed over U.S. military, economic, and political overwhelming predominance, is it possible that, if U.S. power south of its border has indeed waned, Latin America will actually miss the reduced U.S. presence and even U.S. hegemony?

The United States' reduced ability to unilaterally get what it wants in the hemisphere is already shaping Latin American countries' calculations of domestic and foreign policies and the formation of multilateral alliances. The last ten years have witnessed the emergence of regional and multilateral powers seeking to assert regional diplomatic power, if not to specifically reduce the role of the United States in intra-regional diplomacy. The most obvious and pointed example is the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of our Americas (ALBA) formed by former President of Venezuela Hugo Chavez, which includes Bolivia, Cuba, Ecuador, Nicaragua, and Venezuela among others in a bloc vowed to oppose a now-defunct plan to establish a hemisphere-wide free-trade agreement. At the same time, as its economy rebounded quickly and strongly from the 2007 global financial crisis until 2012, Brazil has sought a greater regional and even global role, exerting its new-found diplomatic and economic muscle, often as an alternative to U.S. influence in matters as diverse as the threat of political upheaval in Venezuela to the UN drive to sanction Iran for its nuclear ambitions. (3)

Yet, there may likely be a down side to the retrenchment of U.S. leadership and prerogative in the region. While there are multiple tragic examples of U.S. intervention and a long history of abuse by U.S. power that have thwarted the political and economic development of countries such as Guatemala or Haiti, U.S. leadership and power have also brought benefits. For example, governments have long relied on U.S. leadership to champion specific causes, at times "passing the buck" to have U.S. support serve as a foil for a general principle or policy that they support but do not want to lead publicly. Similarly, recent cases of U.S. technical assistance and cooperation helped focus national attention and energy on addressing violence and crime in countries like Colombia and Mexico. Moreover, countries in the region have long benefited from the security provided by being in the U.S. diplomatic and military sphere of influence. This security has helped states struggling with violence and instability and contributed to intra-regional peace. Will a shift in U.S. power weaken these hemispheric public goods?

PATTERNS OF U.S. POWER IN THE HEMISPHERE: USE, ABUSE, AND BACKLASH

Much of U.S. policy toward the region has been guided by a long historical view of its hemispheric neighbors as a partner against potential threat by outside powers. The Monroe Doctrine of 1823, while cloaked in rhetoric of shared democratic values of former colonies against their European empires, was largely a bluff on the part of the still-young U.S. republic to discourage feared intentions by Russia and France to recolonize the recently liberated Spanish colonies. At the time, the United States lacked the military force to back up its threat, but the threat worked, not just in dissuading any potential interlopers in the hemisphere but also in setting the course for U.S. attitudes toward its strategic understanding and approach to the region.

Subsequent efforts at intervention conveyed the same sense of "manifest destiny" over the region, though by the nineteenth century the United States had the military force, economic power, and diplomatic presence to back it up. When the United States jumped in to support Cuban and Puerto Rican independence against Spain, the result of the former was the adoption of a constitutional amendment that allowed the United States to intervene practically at will in the new Cuban republic (the Platt Amendment). In the latter, the result was the suspended situation of being neither a state nor a sovereign nation, but rather a U.S. commonwealth.

Later, in support of U.S. efforts to establish the Panama Canal which involved a U.S.-supported insurrection to break away the Panamanian isthmus from Colombia--U.S. diplomats, such as Senator Elihu Root in 1914, referred to the enduring practicality of the Monroe Doctrine. (4) When debt crises struck the region in the 1920s (neither the first nor the last), the United States used its diplomatic and economic muscle--in what became termed Theodore Roosevelt's Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine--to intervene in Nicaragua (1909 to 1934), Haiti (1915 to 1934), and the Dominican Republic (1916 to 1924) to ensure that its creditors were paid, and more importantly, to ensure that European governments did not intervene on their creditors' behalf. The United States also intervened in varying degrees (and in some cases multiple times) in Costa Rica, Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, and Panama. (5) In most of those cases, the U.S. forces deposed governments, rearranged local institutions--often the customs houses and the military or the police forces,--and left an elected government.

The Cold War brought with it another amendment to the Monroe Doctrine, this time from diplomat George Kennan. In what became known as the Kennan Corollary, the real politic cold warrior...