Why Military Organizations Are Cautious About Learning?

• Author: Hans Hasselbladh,Karl Ydén
• DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19832058
• Published date: 01 July 2020
• Date: 01 July 2020
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Why Military

Organizations

Are Cautious About

Learning?

Hans Hasselbladh

1

and Karl Yde

´n

2

Abstract

This article argues that military organizations display a more rigorous form of

collective sensemaking than ordinary bureaucratic organizations. Military organizing

is predicated on the rigorous modes of thinking and acting that follow from the

particular military propensity to impose order on chaos. This trait is antithetical to

modern notions of “the learning organization,” in which exploring variety and

experimenting and testing out unproven methods are central. We identify two sets

of structural conditions that constitute the sociocognitive landscape of military

organizations and discuss how the military logic of action might be enacted in dif-

ferent sociocultural contexts. Our framework is brought to bear on recent research

on international military missions, and in the concluding section, we summarize our

arguments and discuss their wider implications in terms of trade-offs between

adaptability and other capabilities in the design of military forces.

Keywords

military organization, learning organizations , international missions, military logic

of action

1

School of Business, O

¨rebro University, O

¨rebro, Sweden

2

Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, Sweden

Corresponding Author:

Hans Hasselbladh, School of Business, O

¨rebro University, O

¨rebro 701 82, Sweden.

Email: hans.hasselbladh@gmail.com

Armed Forces & Society

2020, Vol. 46(3) 475-494

ªThe Author(s) 2019

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X19832058

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The broad debate on learning in organizations is characterized by a tendency to

dismiss traditional bureaucratic organizations (Senge, 1990/2006). In the most opti-

mistic descriptions, the learning organizatio n is regarded as an extension of the

human propensity to continuously learn, develop, and adapt. Among academic

scholars, however, it is generally recognized that formal learning in formal organi-

zations is conditioned by a set of circumstances that extend far beyond the individual

level (Blackler, 1995). What individuals learn, or do not learn, is only partially and

imperfectly linked to what becomes sanctioned knowledge, laid down in organiza-

tional routines, manuals, procedures, and voc abularies. Even if the processes of

learning are seen as nested in social exchange and interaction (O’Toole & Talbot,

2011), their outcomes remain tied to their context of inception, unless they pass the

scrutiny and evaluations of the formal organization.

In this article, we intend to address organizational learning in relation to military

organizations. This topic is partly similar to the general debate on formal organiza-

tions and learning: Are the generic traits of bureaucratic organizations a dysfunc-

tional obstacle to necessary changes within military organizations? Although the

notion of “learning organizations” has not had an equally substantial impact on the

discourse on modern military organizations as it has on business ente rprise dis-

course, problems in the contemporary armed forces have been posed as problems

of learning and adaptation (Di Schiena, Letens, Van Aken, & Farris, 2013; Schmitt,

2017; Visser, 2016). Military organizations are assumed to be able to acquire the

traits of a “learning organization” and, it is held, should do so in order to improve

their effectiveness in dealing with new challenges. Learning—based on true knowl-

edge and relevant experiences, freed from the yoke of cognitive limitations, low

aspirations, and political in fighting—is seen as a remedy to over come both the

frictions of war and the inherent limitations of large-scale, centralized, and forma-

lized bureaucracies.

From such a learning-centric perspective, learning can be regarded as a signifi-

cant source of renewal and rationalized action in military matters, potentially affect-

ing everything from military strategic-level decision-making to tactical responses to

new emerging problems in the daily toil of international missions (Cohen, 2004).

Research on recent international missions often draws on the general discourse of

organizational learning when explaining why experiences from the field are seldom

allowed to influence organizational practices, a critique often voiced by ambitious

midlevel officers with extensive operational experience. Despite the fact that their

formal approaches are quite different, the armed forces of both the United States and

Great Britain have adopted learning-centric doctrines, strongly emphasizing the

need for “bottom-up learning” (Foley, Griffin, & McCartney, 2011). Some research-

ers have even suggested that military organizations are inherently conservative and

the only hope to change them is to form coalitions between civilian experts and

“maverick officers” (Farrell, 2008). The supposed cognitive rigidity of the military

is frequently referred to in derogatory terms as in the quote by Basil Liddell Hart:

476 Armed Forces & Society 46(3)