Why Low Levels of Democracy Promote Corruption and High Levels Diminish It

Published date01 December 2020
AuthorBrigitte Seim,Staffan Lindberg,Kelly M. McMann,Jan Teorell
DOI10.1177/1065912919862054
Date01 December 2020
Subject MatterArticles
https://doi.org/10.1177/1065912919862054
Political Research Quarterly
2020, Vol. 73(4) 893 –907
© 2019 University of Utah
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DOI: 10.1177/1065912919862054
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Article
In theory, democracy should be associated with less cor-
rupt governments. Government officials should use pub-
lic office more for the public good than for private gain in
democracies, compared to autocracies. Yet, recent
research has shown an inverted curvilinear relationship
between democracy and corruption, rather than a linear
one. While low corruption levels coincide with both very
high levels of democracy and an absence of democracy,
high corruption levels are associated with modest levels
of democracy.1 What explains this inverted curvilinear
relationship? Answering this question is important not
only for theoretical, but also for practical, reasons because
corruption undermines regime legitimacy, fosters politi-
cal and economic inequality, and increases economic
inefficiencies (Miller, Grødeland, and Koshechkina 2001;
Roniger 2004; Rose-Ackerman 1999; Uslaner 2008).
This paper departs from earlier studies by disaggregat-
ing both democracy and corruption theoretically as well as
empirically to reveal the connections underpinning the cur-
vilinear relationship. Theoretically, other studies conceptu-
alize democracy and corruption broadly, such as “political
democracy in a liberal sense” and “quality of government”
(Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and Lapuente 2010).
Empirically, there is also a lack of disaggregation: most
scholars rely on composite indices of democracy and cor-
ruption rather than indicators of individual democratic
institutions or practices and measures of specific types of
corruption (e.g., Bäck and Hadenius 2008; Charron and
Lapuente 2010).
A different set of studies, while disaggregating democ-
racy, examines only one or two components of democ-
racy and does not seek to explain the overall curvilinear
relationship (e.g., Adserá, Boix, and Payne 2003; Brunetti
and Weder 2003). This strand of research emphasizes
how certain democracy components strengthen the
accountability of officials to the public, as well as between
each other, and thus increase the costs of engaging in cor-
ruption. This offers only an account for why high levels
862054PRQXXX10.1177/1065912919862054Political Research QuarterlyMcMann et al.
research-article2019
1Case Western Reserve University, Cleveland, OH, USA
2The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
3Lund University, Sweden
4University of Gothenburg, Sweden
Corresponding Author:
Kelly M. McMann, Department of Political Science, Case Western
Reserve University, 11201 Euclid Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44106-7019,
USA.
Email: kelly.mcmann@case.edu
Why Low Levels of Democracy
Promote Corruption and
High Levels Diminish It
Kelly M. McMann1, Brigitte Seim2, Jan Teorell3, and Staffan Lindberg4
Abstract
Theory predicts democracy should reduce corruption. Yet, scholars have found that while corruption is low at high
levels of democracy, it is high at modest levels, as well as low when democracy is absent. A weakness of studies that aim
to explain this inverted curvilinear relationship is that they do not disaggregate the complex concepts of democracy
and corruption. By contrast, this paper disaggregates both. We demonstrate that the curvilinear relationship results
from the collective impact of different components of democracy on different types of corruption. Using Varieties
of Democracy data, we examine 173 countries from 1900 to 2015, and we find freedom of expression and freedom
of association each exhibit an inverted curvilinear relationship with corruption—both overall corruption and four
different types. The introduction of elections and the quality of elections each act in a linear fashion—positively and
negatively with corruption, respectively—but jointly form a curvilinear relationship with both overall corruption and
many of its types. Judicial and legislative constraints exhibit a negative linear relationship with executive corruption.
We offer a framework that suggests how these components affect costs and benefits of engaging in different types of
corruption and, therefore, the level of corruption overall.
Keywords
corruption, democracy, freedom of expression, freedom of association, elections, constraints on the executive

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