Why Hybrid Bicameralism Is Not Right for Sortition*

• DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789893
• Published date: 01 September 2018
• Date: 01 September 2018
• Author: Terrill Bouricius
• Subject Matter: Special Issue Articles

https://doi.org/10.1177/0032329218789893

Politics & Society

2018, Vol. 46(3) 435 –451

© The Author(s) 2018

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DOI: 10.1177/0032329218789893

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Special Issue Article

Why Hybrid Bicameralism Is

Not Right for Sortition*

Terrill Bouricius

Former member, Vermont House of Representatives

Abstract

Structural problems are examined with pairing two chambers, one selected by

election and the other by sortition, into a traditional bicameral system. It is argued

that an all-purpose legislative chamber modeled on existing elected chambers is a

mismatch for sortition and that purported benefits of maintaining partisan elections

alongside sortition are illusory. Alleged benefits of a hybrid bicameral system are

shown to be outweighed by a variety of harmful effects. Furthermore, even if those

harms are not substantiated, the continued existence of an elected chamber will likely

result in the delimitation of the sortition chamber. Combining many different sorts

of minipublics with different characteristics and functions is preferable, and a possible

multibody sortition legislative system is presented. Finally, an alternative way forward

for sortition is proposed by peeling away individual topic areas from elected bodies

and transferring them to sortition bodies.

Keywords

bicameral legislature, corruption, deliberation, democracy, elections, minipublics,

random selection, representation, sortition

Corresponding Author:

Terrill Bouricius, 56 Booth Street, Burlington, VT 05401, USA.

Email: terrybour@gmail.com

*This special issue of Politics & Society titled “Legislature by Lot: Transformative Designs for Deliberative

Governance” features a preface, an introductory anchor essay and postscript, and six articles that

were presented as part of a workshop held at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, September 2017,

organized by John Gastil and Erik Olin Wright.

789893PASXXX10.1177/0032329218789893Politics & SocietyBouricius

research-article2018

436 Politics & Society 46(3)

Proposals for incorporating sortition into the lawmaking process frequently envision a

hybrid bicameral legislature with the members of one of the chambers selected by lot.1

This could be a transitional model on the path to a fully sortition-based legislature—

sort of a trial run to see whether such a body can behave in a competent manner. But

for many theorists it is the final goal. Gastil and Wright argue that despite a host of

problems with election-based representation, important beneficial aspects of an elected

chamber would be lost in an all-sortition system. I will argue that the purported bene-

fits of maintaining elections are illusory. Also, the all-purpose legislative chamber

design is a mismatch for sortition; it would sabotage sortition’s hoped for benefits and

delegitimize a sortition chamber. I will conclude by arguing that there are better ways

to evolve into a virtually all-sortition lawmaking system.

Purported Benefits of Maintaining an Elected Chamber

In this section, I will examine several commonly asserted benefits of maintaining an

elected chamber alongside a sortition chamber. Citizens would be loath to forfeit an

elected chamber for fear of losing at least four presumed benefits: the societal benefits

of parties; the utility of having elected officials as authorized negotiators; the political

leadership cultivated by electoral politics; and the political expertise provided by

elected officials. In turn, I will cast doubt on the existence, or importance, of each.

Benefits of Parties

Without elections it is suggested that parties would atrophy, yet parties ideally play an

important role in formulating political programs, educating the public about policy

alternatives, and mobilizing citizens. Others argue that US parties “have become little

more than political labels behind which well-financed candidates organize their elec-

toral bids.”2

Parties would inevitably change in an all-sortition system, but they would not nec-

essarily atrophy. Active political parties have organized across the globe under non-

electoral regimes, even when outlawed. Rather than contending in elections, parties

would aim to influence the general public, who would form the minipublics. And, of

course, political parties are not the only avenue for important social mobilization, with

Black Lives Matter, Occupy Wall Street, or the pro-life movements in the United

States being examples. With parties stripped of their unique electoral significance,

such popular mobilizations might be more common and effective under a sortition

system.

But let us focus on the effects of eliminating the competitive electoral function of

political parties in an all-sortition democracy. Anthoula Malkopoulou argues that vot-

ing in elections “offers a real and continuous relationship between government and

citizens that, aided by the excitement of competition, produces a higher incentive to

stay informed and form an opinion about general political issues.”3 She speculates that

“sortition does away with the momentum of discursive interaction and contestation,

which the experience of election provides.”4