Why Do Leaders Build Walls? Domestic Politics, Leader Survival, and The Fortification of Borders

• Published date: 01 May 2022
• Date: 01 May 2022
• Author: Alex Braithwaite,Christopher Linebarger
• DOI: 10.1177/00220027211066615
• Subject Matter: Articles

Article

Journal of Conf‌lict Resolution

2022, Vol. 66(4-5) 704–728

© The Author(s) 2022

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DOI: 10.1177/00220027211066615

journals.sagepub.com/home/jcr

Why Do Leaders Build Walls?

Domestic Politics, Leader

Survival, and The

Fortif‌ication of Borders

Christopher Linebarger

1

and Alex Braithwaite

2

Abstract

States around the world are fortifying their international borders at unprecedented

rates. While only seven states had fortif‌ied their borders with walls or fences as of the

end of World War Two, this number has now grown to more than 75. Why do states

build walls on their international borders? While states may build walls to ameliorate

the consequences of cross-border economic inequalities and to defend against

transnational security threats, we suggest that another compelling logic stems from

domestic politics and leaders’desire to remain in off‌ice. Building on assumptions

furnished by diversionary theory, we argue that national political leaders at risk of losing

off‌ice are incentivized to implement popular policies, such as border wall construction,

hoping that doing so will prompt a domestic rally effect. To test this argument, we

assemble a global dataset of leader-years and f‌ind that politically insecure leaders are

more likely to be seen to start and continue border wall construction.

Keywords

domestic politics, international security, national security, political survival,

counterterrorism, border walls

1

School of Criminology and Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell, Lowell, MA, USA

2

School of Government & Public Policy, University of Arizona, Tucson, AZ, USA

Corresponding Author:

Christopher Linebarger, School of Criminology and Justice Studies, University of Massachusetts Lowell,

113 Wilder Street, HSSB 435, Lowell, MA 01854, USA.

Email: Christopher_Linebarger@uml.edu

Introduction

In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, many observers argued that international

politics had entered a “borderless”era (e.g., Ohmae 1990). Ease of travel, diminishing

international tensions, and a new revolution in communications technology seemed to

augur an age in which states could, if not ignore their borders, then at least deemphasize

them. What has emerged across the subsequent three decades is, however, almost the

exact opposite. States supposedly threatened by the economic, cultural, and security

implications of globalization have increasingly reimposed border controls in an attempt

to limit the movement of people and goods (Brown 2010;Sterling 2009;Vallet 2016).

One manifestation of this trend is the fortif‌ication of borders. States have been

building walls and fences on their borders at unprecedented rates (Brown 2010;Sterling

2009;Vallet2016). By some estimates, as few as seven states had fortif‌ied their borders

with walls or fences as of the end of the Second WorldWar. When the Berlin Wallfell in

1989, that number had gradually risen to f‌ifteen. By 2018, the number had grown to

more than 75. Most of these fortif‌ication projects began in the wake of 9/11, with a

substantial fraction occurring after the so-called global refugee crises of 2015. Given

the seeming contradiction between the benef‌its that can be gained from border lib-

eralization and the costs resulting from the securitization of borders, we pose a simple

question: why do states build walls on their international borders?

Answering this question has signif‌icant policy and theoretical implications. There

are now notable border walls and fences on almost every continent. Walls now separate

the West Bank from Israel, Syria from Turkey, Iraq from Saudi Arabia, Botswana from

Zimbabwe, India from Bangladesh, and the former Yugoslav Republics of Serbia,

Croatia, and Slovenia from Hungary. This growth in reliance upon border fortif‌ication

is likely fueled by governments wishing to demonstrate their activity in response to

perceived threats associated with globalization, including transnational violence,

migration, illicit trades and, especially, to ameliorate the consequences of cross-border

economic inequalities and refugee f‌lows (Avdan and Gelpi 2016;Carter and Poast

2017;Hassner and Wittenberg 2015). Yet,there is good reason to doubt the eff‌icacy of

border walls. They are easily circumvented, and their unintended consequences include

a displacement of illicit activities and a reduction of cross-border trade (Carter and

Poast 2017,2020;Getmanski et al. 2019;Jellissen and Gottheil 2013;Laughlin n.d.;

Nanes and Bachus 2021;Schon and Leblang 2021). Thus, many argue that leaders

favor border walls as purely symbolic efforts to reassure their citizens about the

uncertainties of globalization, even knowing their relative ineff‌iciency (Brown 2010;

Linebarger and Braithwaite 2020).

It is the latter argument that we draw upon. Building from the framework of

“diversionary theory,”we posit that national political leaders at risk of removal from

off‌ice recognize incentives to implement symbolic and populist policies, such as border

wall construction, hoping that doing so will create a domestic rally effect that helps to

extend their tenure in off‌ice (Johnson and Barnes 2011;Levy 1989;Mitchell et al. 2004;

Mueller 1973;Ostrom and Job 1986). Diversionary theory makes the case that national

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