Why Did the Taliban Win?

• Published date: 01 October 2023
• DOI: http://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221096702
• Author: Anthony King
• Date: 01 October 2023
• Subject Matter: Commentaries

https://doi.org/10.1177/0095327X221096702

Armed Forces & Society

2023, Vol. 49(4) 923 –938

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DOI: 10.1177/0095327X221096702

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Commentary

Why Did the Taliban

Win?

Anthony King1

Abstract

On October 7, 2001, 3 weeks after 9/11, U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan; bombers

struck Taliban headquarters and Al Qaeda training sites. By early December, the

Taliban and Al Qaeda have been defeated and had fled. However, a war that began

so successfully in 2001, eventually ended ignominiously on August 30, 2021, almost

exactly 20 years later, with a U.S. withdrawal and a total Taliban victory. The speed

of the Taliban’s triumph shocked everyone. The entire campaign, costing US$2.3

trillion and 2,488 U.S. lives, had failed—utterly. The United States had lost its

longest-ever war. How is it possible to explain a defeat of that magnitude? This

article seeks to address this question. Although numerous factors played a role,

this article identifies three principal factors: the environment, the local politics,

and the Taliban. Afghanistan is a very difficult place to conduct large-scale military

operations. The West never came to terms with the local politics and consequently

undermined their own efforts. Finally, although they were not militarily sophisticated,

the Taliban were politically astute and very resilient.

Keywords

Afghanistan, counter-insurgency, civil wars, conflict resolution

On October 7, 2001, 3 weeks after 9/11, U.S. forces attacked Afghanistan; bombers

struck Taliban headquarters and Al Qaeda training sites, including Osama Bin

Laden’s favorite Afghan residence, Tarnak Farms, just south of Kandahar airfield.

U.S. Special Operations Force arrived in the north soon after, sweeping the Taliban

1University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

Corresponding Author:

Anthony King, University of Warwick, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry CV4 7AL, UK.

Email: a.king.9@warwick.ac.uk

1096702AFSXXX10.1177/0095327X221096702Armed Forces & SocietyKing

research-article2022

924 Armed Forces & Society 49(4)

regime away with the Northern Alliance. By November 23, 2001, they had reached

Kabul; the Taliban fled. In the south, U.S. Special Forces finally defeated the Taliban

in the terminal building of Kandahar Airfield, the “Last Stand,” on December 7. The

initial U.S. intervention was a startling success; 110 Central Intelligence Agency

(CIA) agents, 350 Special Operations Forces personnel, and 5000 soldiers and

marines had destroyed a regime and defeated Al Qaeda in a few weeks. Only 12 U.S.

service personnel died in the operation; by contrast, 15,000 Taliban had been killed

or captured (Malkasian, 2021, p. 66).

The U.S. intervention was understandable and, indeed, inevitable. Having suf-

fered mass civilian casualties in an unprovoked terrorist outrage, no state, still less

the world’s only superpower, would have abjured retaliation. Yet, from a beguiling

beginning, the United States was unwittingly following an established historical pat-

tern in Afghanistan. They were compelled to intervene ever deeper into a theater,

which had always proved very difficult for foreign powers to stabilize. A war that

began so successfully in 2001, eventually ended ignominiously on August 30, 2021,

almost exactly 20 years later, with a U.S. withdrawal and a total Taliban victory. The

speed of the Taliban’s triumph shocked everyone. The entire campaign, costing

US$2.3 trillion and 2488 U.S. lives, had failed—utterly. The United States had lost

its longest-ever war. How is it possible to explain a defeat of that magnitude?

The Afghan campaign was complicated. Eventually, more than 40 nations con-

tributed to the security effort alone. In addition, many more contributed to the devel-

opment effort, while a panoply of international organizations, like the United Nations

(UN), and nongovernmental aid organizations also became involved. Each influ-

enced the campaign and, therefore, ultimately contributed to the defeat of 2021.

Many other factors were also at play. The cost of the campaign especially after the

Crash of 2008, the distraction of Iraq, the excessive use of Special Operations Forces

raids, air strikes, corruption, the destruction of poppy harvests, the interference of

Pakistan, the inability to build Afghan security forces, dwindling public support all

played their part.

While campaigning for the Presidency, Trump declared his opposition to the

Afghanistan campaign in some notorious tweets: “Afghanistan is a complete waste.

Time to come home.” In office, he decided to pull out unilaterally with few condi-

tions imposed upon the Taliban. This decision was manifestly also critical to the

outcome. President Biden only compounded that decision. The causes of the failure

in Afghanistan were plainly complex and multiple; political, strategic, operational,

and tactical mistakes all played a role (Greentree, 2021).

Scholars will be debating the defeat for decades, as they have Vietnam. It is

impossible to capture the interplay of all these factors comprehensively in a short

article. However, a few months after the humiliation in Kabul, it might be worth

recording some obvious elements which seem to have been central to the defeat and

which are likely to be the focus of future analysis. I do not propose a refined assess-

ment of specific policies or Western strategy in general; on the contrary, I bluntly

identify three major obstructions to Western success in the theater. This commentary