Why are we in Iraq?

• Author: Bresler, Robert J.
• Position: State Of The Nation - Column

OVER 35 years ago, few could give a persuasive answer to the question: Why are we in Vietnam? That simple question contained a series of more vexing ones: How do we define winning? What would be gained by it? What would be the costs of such a victory? What American interests and what enduring values were we fighting for? The Johnson Administration could not answer them to the satisfaction of a growing number of citizens. Consequently, the public lost its taste for the enterprise, forced Lyndon Johnson out of office, supported Richard Nixon's gradual withdrawal, and hardly raised a voice in the face of an eventual humiliating retreat in 1975.

No international involvement that requires the sacrifice of blood and treasure, regardless of the scope, can be sustained in a democratic society unless such questions can be answered intelligently and persuasively. Pres. George W. Bush must not repeat the mistakes of LBJ, or he will suffer roughly the same fate. Bush does not have the rhetorical gifts of Franklin Roosevelt, John Kennedy, Ronald Reagan, or even Bill Clinton. His language is unadorned, and, in televised interviews, he often is repetitious and halting in his responses. Nonetheless, be has a case to make. and it is essential that he find a way to make it.

When weapons inspector David Kay--who resigned Jan. 24, 2004--concluded that there were no stock-piles of chemical and biological weapons when the U.S. invaded Iraq, the Bush Administration failed to give an immediate and effective response. Yet, the case was there to be made. The rationale for the war and the persistence in the policing effort were not dependent upon finding large stockpiles of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) in Saddam Hussein's hands. In his October, 2003, report to Congress and later, Kay reported his inspectors had found plenty of disturbing evidence that had been concealed from Hans Blix's UN inspectors: a clandestine network within the Iraq Intelligence Service that had equipment suitable for research in the production of chemical mad biological weapons, as well as evidence that the renovation of a nuclear program was in its early stages. Kay testified to Congress that Saddam, by maintaining WMD programs and activities, was in clear violation of UN Resolution 1441 and that he undoubtedly had the intention to resume the initiative. Blix's investigators never would have uncovered this information as long as Saddam was in power. It was disclosed to Kay's team by...