Who Wants Electoral Competition and Who Wants to Win?

• Author: Thomas L. Brunell,Harold D. Clarke
• Date: 01 March 2012
• Published date: 01 March 2012
• DOI: 10.1177/1065912910388186
• Subject Matter: Articles

388186PRQ65110.1177/1065912910388186B
runell and ClarkePolitical Research Quarterly
Political Research Quarterly
65(1) 124 –137
Who Wants Electoral Competition
© 2012 University of Utah
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and Who Wants to Win?
DOI: 10.1177/1065912910388186
http://prq.sagepub.com
Thomas L. Brunell1 and Harold D. Clarke1
Abstract
This article employs data gathered in a 2006 national survey to study how the American electorate evaluates a trade-
off between competitive elections and winning to implement preferred policies. The results show that voters do
not share in the prevailing elite consensus about the overriding virtues of competition. A multilevel model indicates
that ideological extremism, partisanship, social trust, and several other individual-level variables have predictable
relationships with preferences for winning or competition. In addition, electoral margin in the 2006 congressional
district election interacts with support for winning or losing candidates. Voters supporting candidates who are soundly
defeated take refuge in competition, whereas those supporting candidates who win decisively view victory as a means
of implementing policy preferences. Additional analyses show that preferences for winning and competition influence
various forms of political participation. By emphasizing public involvement in policy making, voters expressing a
preference to win echo “responsible party government” critiques of the democratic shortcomings of the American
political system.
Keywords
elections, voting behavior, representation, electoral systems
It is a basic tenet of democratic theory that citizens par-
into public policy and electoral competitiveness—are in
ticipate in politics—whether by donating money to a can-
rough opposition to one another. As elections become more
didate, protesting against a war, or voting in an election—to
competitive, it is necessarily the case that a higher propor-
increase the chances that their political preferences will
tion of voters will end up as losers. An election decided by
be translated into public policy. Elections in particular are
a single ballot effectively means half of the voters will be
considered to be one of the most important ways for citi-
disappointed with the outcome because they are less likely
zens to have their voices heard. But in competitive elec-
to see policy proposals that accord with their views than
tions, the votes of those who prefer the winning candidate
would have been the case had their preferred candidate
are going to matter more than those who supported the
won. At the same time, close competition maximizes the
loser. This is the very nature of electoral choice as a col-
benefits of elections as a device for ensuring the probity and
lective decision. At a very fundamental level, democratic
responsiveness of public officials.
theory makes winning elections a key political outcome.
The tenets of democratic theory thus emphasize both the
When voters’ preferred candidates lose, this means gov-
desirability of policy congruence with public preferences
ernment is less likely to enact the kinds of policies that
and electoral competition as keys to responsive governance.
those voters prefer. However, democratic theory also
But what do voters themselves prefer? How is the tension
extols the virtues of electoral competition. Without com-
between policy congruence and the instrumental value of
petition, representatives have no incentive, other than a
electoral competition resolved in the mind of the American
normatively grounded desire to adhere to the precepts of
electorate? Are these beliefs consequential? We address
democracy, to respond to the wishes of the electorate.
these questions by conducting an empirical analysis of why
Also, absent competition, representatives are prone to
some voters prefer to win elections so that their policy
succumb to the temptations of corrupt practices because
misdeeds in office are unlikely to be sanctioned by defeat
1
at the polls. Tammany Hall–style distinctions between
University of Texas at Dallas, Richardson, TX, USA
“honest” and “dishonest” graft (Riordin 1963) are mean-
Corresponding Author:
ingless when tenure in office is all but ensured.
Thomas L. Brunell, University of Texas at Dallas, Box 830688,
These considerations suggest that two very important
Richardson, TX 75080
democratic “goods”—having voters’ preferences translated
Email: tbrunell@utdallas.edu

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Brunell and Clarke
125
preferences are more likely to be translated into policy,
or qualify the case are few and far between. One contem-
whereas others prefer to have competitive elections to help
porary dissenting voice is Brunell (2008) who argues that
keep representatives responsive to the wishes of the elector-
the champions of competition have confused contestabil-
ate, even if that means their preferred candidate might lose.
ity with competition. He believes that no politician is ever
We first discuss how elite discourse has emphasized the vir-
truly “safe” because regardless of how Democratic or
tues of electoral competition. Next, we present data gath-
Republican a district is, the incumbent can be defeated in
ered in a national panel survey conducted before and after
a primary election.1 This fact introduces an irreducible
the 2006 congressional elections on public preferences for
measure of uncertainty in the minds of elected officials
close competition versus electoral victory. We consider
about their ability to retain their seat, which, in turn, encour-
various factors that might lead some people to prefer
ages them to heed the will of their constituents. Much
victory to have favored policies enacted, whereas others
earlier, Schlesinger (1966) argued that competition works
emphasize competition. A multilevel model is employed to
to restrain legislators with “static ambitions.” However,
assess the influence of these factors. Then, we investigate
legislators who will not run again have no incentive to heed
the impact of preferences for winning and competition on
the views of their constituents, and those with “progres-
various types of political participation. The conclusion
sive ambitions,” that is, those who view their present posi-
summarizes key findings and briefly considers implications
tion as a stepping stone to higher office, may or may not
for the theory and practice of American democracy.
be responsive. It all depends on strategic calculations about
maximizing support for the office sought the next time
Competition and Its
around. Such dissenting voices have had little resonance—
an overwhelming majority of pundits, scholars, and reform-
Consequences
minded citizens think there is not enough competition in
Electoral competition is a central concept for many
American elections, with the U.S. House of Represen-
democratic theorists. For example, in his landmark study,
tatives being perhaps the most widely cited example.
Joseph Schumpeter (1950) declared that the sine qua non
Every two years, a new cycle of House elections prompts
of democracy is the competitive struggle among candi-
renewed calls for more competition to restore the health
dates for the votes of the electorate. Similarly, one of the
of American democracy.
most frequently quoted students of American democracy,
Although the beneficial consequences of competition
V. O. Key, Jr. (1956, 11), concluded that electoral com-
are frequently extolled, relatively little attention has been
petitiveness “rates a high value as protector of liberty and
paid to other, less desirable effects. However, there is a
as a means of assuring responsiveness of government.”
developing literature demonstrating that close competi-
Schumpeter and Key are not outliers conveniently cited
tion is not an unalloyed political good. Analyses of survey
because they voice contrarian opinions. Rather, aca-
data indicate that people supporting losers feel signifi-
demics, journalists, and other commentators constantly
cantly less politically efficacious, are significantly less
extol the virtues of competitive elections while bemoan-
trusting in government, and are less satisfied with their
ing the fact that there are not enough closely fought con-
representation in government (Acock and Clarke 1989;
tests for important offices. “Competitive elections lead to
Anderson et al. 2005; Anderson and LoTempio 2002; Bowler
more responsive government.” This phrase, or something
and Donovan 2002; Miller and Listhaug 1999). In addi-
like it, has been uttered innumerous times, so much so
tion, there typically is a gap between those supporting
that it has become an eminently familiar conventional
winners and losers on certain key issues such as whether
wisdom with currency far beyond the confines of Political
they believe the government is responsive and whether
Science 101 lecture halls. The underlying assumption is
they think elections are conducted fairly. Perhaps most
easily grasped—as observed above, the less certain elected
serious, losing, especially serial losing, tends to erode sup-
officials are of their ability to secure reelection, the more
port for the legitimacy of democratic institutions and pro-
likely they are to heed the wishes of their constituents.
cesses (Anderson et al. 2005).
Moreover, responsiveness and probity are twinned. As
elected officials’ uncertainty...